




GLOBALIZED AFRICA:

Political, Social and Economic Impact

Kwame A. Ninsin [Editor]

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Globalized Africa:

Political, Social and Economic Impact

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Is globalization beneficial to Africa? Does it open infinite opportunities for economic growth, development and social transformation of the continent? So far, the controversy regarding globalization's implications for the continent has raged from platforms where African voices are drowned by an orchestrated chorus of voices of academics, politicians and technocrats from the developed world who parade policy corridors of African states as experts, combining the role of advocates as well as public policy doctors prescribing solutions to African governments. A common prescription for the development crisis facing the continent is that African governments must pursue policies that would effectively adjust their economies into the global economy. The alternative to adjustment to the logic of the global economy is the calamitous collapse of the continent's economy, political and social institutions.

Clearly, the triumph of the Western idea of human progress is forcefully articulated by Western scholars who dominate existing spaces for research and scholarship, and marginalize African voices. African researchers and scholars are unable to compete effectively on this global stage with alternative diagnoses of Africa's development crisis, enunciate alternate thinking about the continent's condition, and propose alternative paradigms for solving the crisis. Hence, the relevant academic and policy discourse persistently represent globalization as panacea to Africa's development crisis. Its principal proponents conveniently ignore the fact that globalization benefits the most powerful; and leaves the weak ones in a quagmire of crisis. The contributions in this volume are intended to complement the emerging African voices in the discourse, academic and policy discourse, on globalization and Africa.

The collection has had a long and chequered history. It was originally commissioned by the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) months before it went into coma. Since then several of the authors have had opportunity to revise and update their contributions. Others have not; because in the interregnum we lost contact.

GLOBALIZED AFRICA

I am grateful to AAPS for its initial support of this idea of an anthology interrogating globalization with respect to Africa. I must also commend the contributors for responding to the invitation to prepare a chapter for the collection, and to the good number of them who kept faith and in diverse ways encouraged this publication. I share their faith in the timeless value of the contributions.

Kwame A. Ninsin

May 9, 2012.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Globalization and Africa – A Subjective View

Kwame A. Ninsin

Since the dawn of modern history the position of Africa in the world system has been contentious; it has been disputed between Africans on the one hand and *The Makers of Civilization*,¹ on the other. The issue at stake may be summarized as whether Africans are free *subjects* of their own history or are mere *objects* – spokes in the wheel of world history. The apologists of the latter position always point to incontrovertible evidence from modern history. At crucial moments in Africa's encounter with modernity, the continent has lost out: it has been captured into history – first into slavery, then into colonialism, and later into what Kwame Nkrumah (1965) described as neo-colonialism. They would not only point to the gains of the so-called 'civilizing mission' which, in their view, so graciously salvaged the continent from its 'dark days' and brought it into world history; they would also vehemently deny any culpability in this mission as well as denounce any claims of reparations. In contrast, Pan-Africanists, patriots and nationalists, dispute such claims of altruism and nobility that allegedly drove colonialism: they point to the trail of plunder, violence, destruction and suffering that the continent has inherited from the centuries of encounter with modernity – from the slave trade to this age of globalization.

The controversy still rages on regarding whether globalization bears opportunities or constraints for the continent; whether its impact on the continent is or will be positive or negative; whether or not Africa is sufficiently integrated into the world economy; whether the continent will be worse off outside the global order or not; and so on. The controversy is inevitable because vital material interests are at stake in globalization, both as a concept and as

a historical process. Admittedly, modern (capitalist) civilization has expanded from its humble origins in the industrial revolution to attain its present global spread. But the pursuit of accumulation on a world scale epitomized in this global expansion has not been for universal benefit. The revolutionary discoveries and inventions – like the present revolution in information and communication technologies (ICT) – historic explorations, as well as wars of expansion, conquest and plunder have been driven by the insatiable appetite for opulence of the few (nations and people) that continue to rule the world, and not for the benefit of the whole of humanity. For the majority, who are the losers in this encounter with modernity, very fundamental matters of life and death still remain unresolved – matters concerning access to food, health, and shelter; matters about education for their children as well as the type of education available to them; a continuing preoccupation with matters of human. It is that gruesome, because, in a world dominated by Darwinian ethics, real life choices are determined by enlightened self-interest, by zero-sum rules in which the wealthy and powerful are always right, get the best of everything, and determine where history begins and when it ends. The rest become mere survivors – invisible things, dragged along through the humiliating quagmire of disease, poverty, violence and insecurity. Their pain is sometimes assuaged through gestures of self-serving benevolence in which they lose their self-respect, their dignity, and their identities. They become another set of statistics in the cycle of human tragedies, such as wars, famine, refugees, and HIV/AIDS, and their lives are written in invisible narratives of horrendous struggles. When accumulation on a world scale is in reality accumulation for the few who dominate the world, and when the dynamics of this accumulation result in the impoverishment of the majority of the world's peoples, globalization becomes contested. It is perceived and interpreted differently depending on who are the beneficiaries and who are the losers. The debate concerning whether Africa is a beneficiary or victim of globalization is taking place in this context of profane contradictions.

In whatever way it is defined, globalization impinges on various aspects of Africa – its economy, society, politics and culture; it impacts on present as well as the future of the continent. It is bound therefore to provoke endless

controversies. The essays in this volume engage in this controversy as they address globalization, its essence and its effects on various facets of life on the continent. The authors approach their respective subjects from different perspectives, meeting at a common point, the point at which Africa meets the industrialized world. In what follows, I interrogate globalization as a phase in the unfinished history of modernity, and therefore as another moment in which Africa has to contend with the forces of this modernity. I weave into this exposition various arguments from these essays and from other sources to paint the picture of a continent that is in serious jeopardy unless revolutionary measures are taken to counter the challenges posed by globalization.

One of the primary instruments by which Africa is being globalized is the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) currently referred to as economic reforms, which are based on a presumption that Africa's economies are not fully integrated in the world economy, or at least that they are not integrated sufficiently. The solution for the continent is therefore to become a complete part of the global even though this 'partial integration', according to Mkandawire (see Chapter 3 of this volume), has generated multiple crises: it has been disruptive of the nationalist project of building cohesion out of an amalgam of ethnic groups, worsened emerging social inequalities, created fatal political faults along both class and, especially, ethnic lines, and created the material basis for ethnic chauvinism and the bloody conflicts that have swept the social and political landscape of Africa during the last several decades. The manifestations of these multiple crises are (i) the continent's external debt, which continues to defy solution and has become the greatest constraint on the continent's capacity to embark on meaningful development; (ii) the spiraling poverty which has also continued to defy solution, and has spread beyond its traditional confines, and diminished the material conditions of the lower middle classes in both urban and rural sectors of African societies; and (iii) the authoritarian nature of the new 'liberal' regimes that the political reforms have brought into being under the control of a new generation of free marketeers who are liberal democrats in theory and kleptocrats in practice. The success of the economic reforms seizing control of Africa's economies

has hinged on two revolutions – the revolution in transforming the African state from a Leviathan to a referee; and the revolution in re-subordinating the resurgent masses to the hegemony of capital and Africa's ruling classes. This was a revolution in the balance of social forces. Having turned the African state into a referee, stripped it of its social responsibilities, and left its citizens defenseless and impoverished, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) [otherwise referred to as the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)] then turned around to hold the state responsible for the harm that has been inflicted on the economy and society. The IFIs would not accept responsibility for such policy failures, and certainly not for the fact that throughout the adjustment period African governments were under their tutelage, implementing their doctrinaire, 'one fits all', economic and social policies. Regimes were accused of being undemocratic, corrupt, unaccountable, and lacking transparency. Thandika Mkandawire has caricatured "the lavish promises made to the continent by the international financial institutions (IFIs), which they failed to deliver".

However, unencumbered by any contrition about this failure, these institutions have simply made new promises. The Berg Report (World Bank 1981) promised to "accelerate development in Africa". Two years later, the World Bank said that Africa was being moved "toward sustained development" (World Bank 1983); a further three years on, the Bank said it was "financing adjustment with growth in Sub-Saharan Africa" (World Bank 1986), making one wonder what it had been financing all along. And then again, after another three years it said that Africa was to be moved "from crisis to sustainable growth" (World Bank 1989). In this last report the World Bank announced that it had discovered the missing piece in the puzzle: "governance". Then in 1994, totally oblivious of this momentous discovery, the Bank optimistically mapped out the "road ahead" for Africa (World Bank 1994) - essentially a regurgitation of the Berg report - which argued that adjustment was working. A year later we were told

(that) Africa was “a continent in transition” (World Bank 1995). By the beginning of the millennium, uncertainty seemed to have settled in at the World Bank, when it posed the question “Can Africa reclaim the 21st Century?” (World Bank 2000) By 2007, the World Bank was mapping out “strategic directions” to address “challenges of African growth (Ndulu 2007)” (Mkandawire 2008: 1)

Meanwhile the new solutions have not worked; and the state was still heavily weighed down by external debt while poverty among its people reached crisis proportions. Most African countries were compelled to join the club of poor and indebted nations - the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). The Fund and the Bank had initiated the HIPC programme in 1999 to relieve the world's poor countries – mainly African – of their external debt of US \$214 billion by \$70 billion by 2015. Under this programme, HIPC countries would be able to free budgetary funds for public expenditure and investment, in accordance with commitments undertaken in their poverty reduction strategy programmes (PRSP). The HIPC initiative carried the same tough conditionalities as were imposed under previous policy reforms – sweeping privatization and radical tax reforms designed to raise state revenue – before a country would qualify for debt relief.

The IFIs and the donor community in general hailed the HIPC initiative as the ultimate solution to the continent's debt and poverty crises. They did not admit that the new sense of euphoria was misplaced, nor that it was another illusion, for the simple reason that the countries qualifying for HIPC status were already in debt repayment areas, and therefore the proposed debt relief would only have a marginal effect on the fiscal position of the state. Quickly as many as 32 African governments became HIPC. Among them were ten members of the Commonwealth – Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. Each of them had to develop a PRSP with the approval of the Bank and the Fund. As with the SAPs, adherence to the PRSP was strictly enforced. The controversy over Zambia government's privatization of the Zambia National Commercial

Bank illustrates the authoritarian controls that the IFIs imposed on Africa's HIPC's. Funds earmarked for budgetary support could be withheld if a country resisted or reneged on planned privatization.² More significantly, later reports revealed that the external debt of Uganda and Zambia was still unsustainable. Uganda had been acclaimed for its diligence as the first country to qualify for the HIPC status. After years of being a HIPC country, however, it was still unable to service its debt despite debt relief of \$1 billion. The country's external debt had grown at an average of \$108 million annually over the few years following accession to HIPC, increasing from \$3.4 billion in 1998 to \$3.83 billion in June 2002. Zambia also found its debt burden unsustainable. Each year, the government had to pay over \$200 million just to service the country's external debt; in 2003 alone the Zambian government had to find more than \$300 million to service its external debt. Meanwhile it had been estimated that ten more of Africa's HIPC countries would suffer from a growing debt debacle by the end of the HIPC period. It could therefore be argued that the economic reform proposed by the IFIs misled African governments to abandon their "strategic industrial and trade policies that were intended to shape Africa's position in the global trading system ... [thereby] leaving Africa on the low productivity, low growth path" Mkandawire (see Chapter 3). In short, what Africa is experiencing currently is nothing but the failure of liberal economics. This is not to plead African exceptionalism; it is simply to state the limits of a development paradigm that was crafted within a specific historical conjuncture to meet specific social imperatives.

Africa's development crisis has had grave consequences for its peoples. I deal with three of such consequences below. These are (i) spiraling poverty, (ii) violent conflicts and bloody civil wars, and (iii) the development of irresponsible states. There are others which I will not address here for lack of space. Admittedly, poverty is not new in Africa; but, from the day of independence, African governments targeted its eradication as a national priority. By the 1970s, significant gains had been made. The economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s wiped out much of those gains. A recent social survey conducted by the Ghana government under the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 2000), concluded: "though the incidence of poverty has fallen, the

depth of poverty for those who remain poor has increased marginally” . This conclusion is best described as a statistical fallacy, which misrepresents the actual extent of poverty in the country. The heart of the matter is that poverty has become a veritable social crisis for the Ghanaian government as it had for other African governments. Millions of Africans throughout the continent have been denied access to the essentials of life as a result of the austerity measures arising from the liberalization policies. A wide range of public goods, including health services, education, water, electricity, and housing have been commoditized. There was an increase in communicable as well as preventable diseases, illiteracy, and unemployment. The school dropout rate was on the increase and school enrolment declined in several countries as parents found it difficult to meet the financial demands of educating their children. Juvenile delinquency and acts of criminality were also on the increase. Currently poverty is no longer the lack of a stable and adequate income; it has become multi-dimensional, encompassing the lack of access to health, education, housing, potable water, and employment; poor sanitation, and pervasive sense of social insecurity. It has become pervasive (Ninsin, 2000: 18–19).³ In Southern African countries where there are white settler minorities, the sharp edge of inequality runs along racial lines, with the white minority commanding a disproportionate share of the wealth of the nations (SADC, 2000: 18–19). For the majority of Africans, the state is constrained from fully providing them basic social, economic, and cultural entitlements that would guarantee them a secure life.

The profound sense of deprivation and social insecurity that pervades the continent has forced millions of Africa’s peoples to resort to survivalist economic activities in the informal sector. In some countries, it is estimated that the informal sector employs about 85 percent of the urban labor force. The fact, however, is that the informal sector is no longer an exclusively urban phenomenon. It has penetrated the remotest parts of society, and turned entire nations into huge variegated canvasses of penny capitalists – men, women, and children; the better educated, least educated and the illiterate – competing for survival in the same narrow economic spaces of their respective localities and nations.

The expansion of the informal sector is being driven by the state on behalf of capital. Through state policies of unfettered retrenchment from the public sector, millions of unemployed youth are compelled by necessity to resort to penny capitalism (which has recently gained tremendous popularity as the engine of growth in Africa's economies) as an alternative mode of accumulation and survival. By promoting the informal sector, the state is encouraging the extension of capitalist relations to the deep crannies of society and facilitating capital's control of the accumulation process even in such economic ghettos. In the heat of the economic and social crisis, the informal sector has blossomed into an alternative mode of accumulation where the poor and marginalized in the urban and rural areas compete for their own survival. With the active support of the state, capital is employing every available means to penetrate this sector and control the prevailing accumulation processes which are at their most primitive level. Through the explosion of retail trade and other service provisions capital is re-penetrating African societies and controlling an alternative mode of survival that the poor and marginalized have developed for their own survival. In a tragic twist to the destiny of the poor, capital is aggressively capturing them for its own accumulation purposes after expelling them from the formal sector.⁴

Because of the burden of poverty, women and children have rapidly outnumbered men in the informal economy. Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s in Zimbabwe (Ndoro, 1996) and Swaziland (Matsebula, 1996), for example, reported that women were under increasing economic pressure to enter the informal sector to supplement household income or because they have become the sole breadwinners. Female-headed families tend to be poorer thereby putting immense pressure on their female heads to engage in informal economic activity. The poverty of households also accounted for the increasing number of children entering the informal sector. Apart from the explosion of street children of all ages engaged in the most menial and degrading work, children have become extremely vulnerable to all sorts of dangerous 'professions' and income-generating activities. They easily fell into drug peddling and prostitution; they readily became slave workers for farmers and fishermen; or they were employed as servants in the

homes of the wealthy. Some were pawned under the guise of apprenticeship to wealthy people in the cities, or to wealthy farmers. In many cases, such children would suffer these abuses with the complicity of their parents, who might have been forced by dire indigence to stoop to such acts.

Furthermore, it would seem that poverty has become a powerful vector by which Africa's youth are being decimated and their lives degraded. Africa's youth – 10 to 25 year olds – who account for over 50 percent of the continent's population are at risk. Studies have shown that poverty has made the youth highly vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including HIV/AIDS (see, for example, Toure, 2000). Africa's girls and young women have become the most vulnerable to this pandemic. In general, the youth – orphans, school children, street children and juvenile workers – in the formal and informal sectors are at risk (Toure, 2000: 136). In the urban centers, for example, many do not have a stable and healthy family life; they are largely school dropouts, and are barely literate; they are largely unemployed and forced to engage in a wide variety of menial jobs for a pittance; they are the poorest stratum of society. Most of them have grown up to know only street life, which is characterized by chaos, anomy and hopelessness, and is extremely hazardous.

Furthermore, poverty seems to be breeding a culture of morbidity. Many people are gripped by a weird sense of insecurity resulting in interpersonal jealousy and antagonism. Violence of varying magnitudes pervades the entire social fabric. Violence against children, including infanticide, rape, incest, abuse of women, including torture and murder, murder of neighbors, friends or spouses for very petty disagreements, and a sharp increase in armed robbery are among the array of social disorders that currently pervade life in African societies, both rural and urban. Suicide and serial killing are also becoming a more common social occurrence. Accusations of witchcraft and witch-hunting are on the ascendancy, and there is a growing tendency to seek solutions and salvation through the medium of *juju* (black magic), and from Pentecostal and messianic religious cults, sects and movements.⁵ Social dismay, hopelessness, criminality and general lawlessness are combining into an explosive cocktail for social disaster.

In many African societies, the capitalist laws of Social Darwinism are taking a heavy toll on millions whose social experience has become a traumatic script in coping with fear and uncertainty on a daily basis. No wonder, then, that “Africans have remained highly skeptical of the appropriateness of the measures proposed by the peripatetic consultants that scour the continent for new things to do. They could see little correlation between what they said were fundamentals and the performance of economies; and where there were, the cause chain did not necessarily follow the directions suggested” (Mkandawire, in this volume).⁶

Is Africa’s current crisis the result of poor or weak integration into the global system. Samir Amin (in this volume) refutes the popular claim that African countries are poor or underdeveloped because their economies are poorly integrated into the global system. He argues that global trade statistics show that throughout the 20th century Africa’s trade with the rest of the world as a percentage of GDP, is more than the trade of other regions with the rest of the world. The thesis about Africa’s marginalization, he argues, is based on the argument that the continent’s total exports and imports form only a small proportion of total world trade, implying “that the logic of the expansion of the global capitalist economy is the maximization of production (and therefore also of trade)”. He shows why this presumption is false: “Capitalism is not a system which sets out to maximize production and productivity, but one which chooses the volumes and conditions of production that maximize the profit rate of capital. The so-called marginalized countries are therefore the most exploited and therefore impoverished countries; (and not because they are) countries located at the margin of the system.” The problem with Africa is that although it is sufficiently integrated into the world system it is “integrated ... in a passive way ... [that is, Africa is made to adjust to the world system] without playing any significant role in shaping it.”, Africa is integrated into the global system on terms dictated by the developed economies. This lack of aut centrality is at the core of Africa’s multiple development crises, which is a classical case of the development of underdevelopment.

The dialectical effect of global capital on Africa's development has been evident since the continent was 'adjusted' into the world capitalist economy centuries ago. Yet it was only when the fiscal crisis (including the debt crisis) of states undermined their capacity to participate in the world economy as importers of goods and services and eroded their ability to service their external debt, that the continent was designated as the least integrated region of the world. The Berg Report furnished the basis for the redesignation of the continent. It is significant that this report was launched following the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action, which was perhaps the first bold initiative by Africa's leaders to grapple with the unfolding development crisis through a strategy of auto-centered industrialization and development. The Berg Report should be indicted for aborting that initiative and launching the current neo-colonial model of integrating Africa into the global economy.

A major feature of the proposed recipe for the new colonialism is based on the neo-classical trade theory of comparative advantage. Africa should export more of what it is best at producing in order to be able to trade with the rest of the world and pay its debt. The corpus of trade liberalization measures and financial sector reforms which were initiated, and are still being implemented were intended to facilitate Africa's deeper integration into the world economy. The Lomé conventions (with the European Union), the structural adjustment programs, World Trade Organization rules, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act are all different elements of the corpus of instruments designed to achieve this neo-colonial form of re-integration into the world economy. Tekere's chapter in this volume examines the opportunities and disadvantages of the relations between Africa and the European Union (EU) in the framework of the Cotonou trade agreements. He argues, emphatically, that Africa's relations with the developed nations of the world are asymmetrical. Significantly, the EU is exploiting its hegemonic position in this relationship as well as changes in international economic relations to shift the emphasis in Africa-EU relations from aid to trade without conceding any advantage to African countries, which are the ones that need improved access to the EU markets more than the EU needs Africa's markets. He adds, perceptively, that the EU's trade policy with Africa is not driven by the

development needs of Africa. On the contrary, it is intended to create a vast free trade area for its own goods and services in this increasingly competitive world. Equally important is the fact that African countries are demonstrating their legendary weak capacity (or lack thereof) “to determine their own trade and development priorities; as well as the loss of initiative and sovereignty regarding national economic policy formulation and implementation” (Tekere, in this volume).

The fetishism of trade as a decisive factor in Africa’s underdevelopment and marginalization, and must thus be interrogated. Trade should not be dissociated from development. A country’s tradable goods are an index of its level and pattern of development. Since the industrial revolution, the North has gone through a number of technical and scientific revolutions, each of which transformed the material basis of production, including transformations in the organization of production and distribution. Hence, we now talk of the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution, which has transformed production, revolutionized tradable goods, and become the ultimate force that drives globalization ineluctably across every economic parapet of the globe. As a result of the current revolution in information technology, the share of high-technology and knowledge-based goods and services in world trade has shot up. From at least the end of the World War II, trade in manufactured goods has rapidly emerged as “the bulk of non-energy international trade, in sharp contrast to the predominance of primary commodities in earlier patterns of international trade”. This new pattern of trade accounted for about three-quarters of all trade between the 1960s and the late 1990s. Also the contribution of high and medium technology and knowledge-based goods and services to world trade amounted to about 50 percent between 1976 and 1996 (Castells, 2000: 107–109). These transformations in world trade have followed changes in investment practice worldwide. By 1970, foreign direct investment “in the primary sector accounted for only 22.7 percent of total FDI in contrast to 45.2 percent in the secondary sector, and 31 percent in the tertiary sector. In 1994 a new structure of investment could be perceived, as FDI in services accounted for the majority of FDI (53.6 percent), while the primary sector was down to 8.7 percent, and

manufacturing's share had shrunk to 37.4 percent" (Castells, 2000: 120). It is clear that Africa, as a primary commodity producer, has become a less attractive destination for FDI, a global trend that has compounded its lack of competitiveness in world trade.

Africa's abundant natural resources have lost their competitive, as well as strategic, value in the global economy because since colonial times global capital has not revolutionized internal production to any appreciable degree. Therefore, even if Africa has a higher export to GDP ratio compared to the developed economies, because its exports are of low technology and knowledge value, export revenues will continue to be low, and the continent will persist in its poverty. This is the crux of the matter. It explains the continent's worsening terms of trade since the 1960s in spite of the increases in the volume of exports from time to time. Why then should the EU and other OECD countries be interested in Africa's exports if they are of such low value? Rather they would compete for a share of the market for high technology, high knowledge-based merchandise, which is controlled by multinational companies (MNCs) operating mainly in the OECD countries (Castells, 2000: 109–110). The fact is that MNCs have become the primary agents for FDI, driving the internationalization of production, distribution, as well as management of goods and services. This explains why the bulk of FDI has also taken place among branches of the same MNCs despite the worldwide expansion in FDI during the last two decades.

Clearly, autonomous and aggressive forces are driving the globalization process independently of the interest of Africa and Africans. Some of the most powerful forces shaping world history are in the private domain. They command enormous economic and political power, which is often greater than the power of their home states, and definitely greater than the sum total of the power of African states. In addition to the traditional state actors in the international system, globalization has produced a proliferation of private actors other than the pedigree of MNCs. Those that have become part of the international norm, and command a measure of credibility and legitimacy, include international governmental and non-governmental organizations,

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which have constituted themselves into an informal, and sometimes formal, global governance system – some would call them global ombudsmen – acting as referees and exercising considerable influence in Africa’s developmental matters, ranging from politics and economics to human rights and the environment. Some of them, quite shady, are engaged in the rapidly expanding global crime industry. Others are rogue elements with the capacity to inflict massive damage on weak actors in the system.

The emergence of a mix of diverse state and non-state actors in the global system has transformed the structure of global power into a force that is complex, murky and rather mysterious for Africa’s weak states. Depending on a country’s or region’s location and role in the global system, the effects of the choices of such global actors will be either negative or positive. Africa is the object of the actions and choices of most of these global actors. In some cases, the weakness of the African state facilitates their behavior; in others, the state, its functionaries or agents are complicit. But in general, the state seems to have become more or less a pawn in the hands of these powerful global actors.

African conflicts illustrate this situation in which the African state has become the arena where a number of these agents in the global governance system act out their power. For example, humanitarian and human rights INGOs regularly make decisions that are binding on the African state in the management of conflict. Where there is either a humanitarian crisis or human rights violation they override the sovereignty of the state and assume direct responsibility for the situation just by invoking international humanitarian law or human rights norms.⁷ Some of these actors could act in more sinister ways: they could either become accomplices in Africa’s civil wars, or they could exploit the wars for their own benefit. Logan’s chapter (in this volume) provides a powerful illustration of how global state and non-state (formal and informal) actors engage in Africa’s civil wars for reasons that are inimical to the interest of the people or may be vaguely related to the agendas of the warring factions. For some of these global actors, Africa’s wars have become a virtual industry – a business concern that should be managed on a sustainable

basis. They are obsessed with profit for the sake of profit; not peace and development. Of course, there are internal collaborators in this enterprise, ranging from the small local business person who takes advantage of the war situation to rake in small profits, through the political strongmen who solicit foreign weapons to secure the political order and stability of the state, to the ‘majors’ – the “entrepreneurs of violence” who are operate from locations outside Africa. Hutchful (1998) has distinguished the following three types of purveyors of war:

- (i) The “new breed” of statesman – the so-called “African Metternichs” – (Museveni, Kagame, Sehawi, Afewerki, etc.), who are reshaping the regional geopolitical system while at the same time transforming national politics, economies and security structures.
- (ii) The warlord, a new type of African political entrepreneur who links violence, territorial acquisition and business, opportunistically dismembering or reconstituting states. Unlike the citizen-soldier who took to the battlefield and harnessed violence in pursuit of political liberation and social transformation, the warlord is characterized by the almost complete absence of a political program; the deliberate and systematic use of terror and “ethnic cleansing” as a weapon; the use of children and youth (often abducted and drugged) as shock-troops and cannon fodder, and the utilization of violence to colonize natural resources – the exploitation of which in turn drives the war machine.
- (iii) The privatization and commercialization of security and the emergence of the defense corporation and security entrepreneur. The defense corporations are diversified, international concerns combining war and business, and offering a range of services and interlocking ownership and directorates.

The proliferation of conflicts on the continent raises fundamental questions about governance and the character of the African state.⁸ The attainment of sovereign independent statehood imposes on governments the responsibility to provide for the basic needs of their citizens. State responsibility entails the provision of a broad range of entitlements that would enhance the protection

of their citizens from various threats, including threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety, and human dignity. It is the state's responsibility to ensure security for the people by providing them with their most basic and legitimate entitlements which are the "concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives" (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: 15). These elementary concerns are about the identity of individuals and groups as citizens of the political community. When a sense of exclusion, deprivation, or insecurity is perceived as injustice and a derogation of citizenship – when groups have reason to believe that their very existence, that is, their security as a people, is threatened the social contract between them and the state is deemed to have been breached. The prevailing structural inequalities and abuses that characterize the African state are some of the critical triggers of conflict that has led, in some cases, to the collapse of the state or the disintegration of society itself. To put it bluntly, conflict is the result of abysmal failure in governance; it is the failure of the state to develop appropriate and effective policy and institutional mechanisms to address the basic security concerns of its citizens.⁹ It is the failure of the state to function democratically and facilitate self-determination and participation in governance by its citizens.

As argued above, the failure of the state to perform its sovereign responsibility of protecting its citizens is, to a great extent, the result of the dictatorship of the international financial institutions (IFIs) over the public policy structures of the state. These policy controls affect the state's relations with its citizens in a more fundamental way: they depoliticize state-society relations, leaving democratic politics at a very formal instance – politics without popular sovereignty; politics without the voice of the citizens. African governments embark on policies without reference to the interest of their citizens: they do so because loan agreements with the IFIs as well as WTO rules, among other edicts from the world's powerful economic and political actors, oblige them to comply despite its implications for their citizens who might be experiencing severe deprivation in areas such health, food, education, employment, and income. The cost of living in most African countries is forever rising at an astronomical rate while domestic industries are threatened by free trade

practices. African governments pursue free market policies dogmatically because they must abide by free market rules in compliance with external aid conditionalities; they place greater premium on such conditionalities compared to their responsibility to their citizens. The protests, cries, suffering of citizens which are the result of their deteriorating material conditions do not affect public policy making. After all, African governments no longer sovereign in the making of public policy. They have been reduced to virtual recipients and implementors of policies. The vast majority of citizens live eternally in poverty and deprivation. Yet, governments are busy meeting International Monetary Fund and World Bank conditionalities – like privatizing water, health and education systems.

So whose state is the African state? Who does it represent? If the state does indeed represent the interests of its people and should be accountable to them, then the dictatorship of the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) and the donor community over the African state undermines the fundamental principles that undergird the liberal democratic state. Ironically, therefore, African nations are undergoing a transition to democracy without the right to practice democracy beyond operating multi-parties, competitive elections, and formal political rights. The widespread social unrest and political agitations for a new form of politics and for social and economic rights are rooted partly in this contradiction.

Dissatisfaction with the performance of the state does not always lead to civil wars or other forms of conflict. The demands for participation in decision-making structures of the state, for transparency and accountability – for a fundamental reform of the state – constitute a veritable indictment of Africa's ruling classes and a challenge to the legitimacy of the state as constituted today. The actors in what are euphemistically called 'democratization movements' include labor and student unions, ethnic, regional and religious bodies, minority rights and environmental groups as well as gender activists, human rights and civil liberty organizations, and political parties. The thrust of their various demands is the re-engineering of the state on the basis of new institutions based on a new morality and a new ideology that would ensure

that state sovereignty is exercised with responsibility, accountability and transparency.

Three chapters in this volume raise issues around ideology as well as the character of the state and the state-level elites. Cyril Obi's chapter is instructive in this regard. It exposes the complicity of the Nigerian state and the ruling classes with the oil multinationals to suppress minority rights, deny a large section of Nigerians equitable access to the oil wealth of the nation; and further to condone the wanton degradation of the environment and destroy the livelihoods of millions of people inhabiting the oil rich region of that country. Admittedly, the human rights and democratization movements in Africa continue to enjoy support from global civil society and the international human rights movements. But, as Obi's chapter shows, when the state is captured by capital for its global accumulation project, the struggle of Africa's civil society groups for democracy and human rights and social security pales into feeble protests which are easily suppressed or ignored. In a world controlled tightly by capital, the struggle of citizens for identity is a long and tantalizing journey of disappointments and frustrations.

Patricia McFadden's chapter addresses the issue of identity struggles from another perspective: she raises the issue of gender and the nagging question of the rights of women in African societies where male supremacist ideologies dominate, and women continue to be exploited, abused, marginalized and suppressed:

[This is Africa] ... where the state and the key institutions of the society are located and dominated by men as a gender and as the owners of wealth – in both material and social terms. Juxtaposed to the public space where men are 'free to roam', always of course in relation to their status, the notion of the private arises out of the definition of women as the private property of males, located in male-headed households.

She argues that since colonial times the leadership of male-dominated African states has colluded with external powers to fashion institutions that defy with impunity “the centrality of human dignity as [a universal] civic right”, and appropriate universal rights as the exclusive entitlements of men, “persistently excluding women as citizens” of the state. The supine acceptance of the various versions of structural adjustment policies is an example of such self-serving complicity of African leaders to deepen the oppression of women and render them even more vulnerable to poverty and disease, civil wars and other forms of conflict on the continent; and objects of trafficking and prostitution (both national and international), and other forms of violence and atrocities being committed by the forces of globalization.

Boafo-Arthur underscores this collusion between Africa’s ruling classes and the forces of globalization in his chapter on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the current version of the so-called home-grown solutions to Africa’s development crisis. NEPAD, he argues, is a clear case of ideological complicity, where neo-liberalism is the point of convergence between the continent’s ruling classes and the forces of globalization. Therefore, NEPAD, if implemented, could mark the winter of the crisis of survival facing the majority of Africans.

The goal of the various popular reform movements on the continent is to defeat the forces of globalization and their internal collaborators. The women’s rights movements, minority movements, human rights movements, environmental rights movements – all of them converge at one point. This is the point where the forces of globalization intersect with the globalized interest of Africa’s new generation of democrats whose commitment to liberalism has blinded them to all alternative ideas and visions for Africa’s emancipation that the new social movements represent. Unlike the leaders of the independence struggle Africa current crop of leaders understand freedom as liberal democracy decorated beautifully with formal political rights and underpinned by a market economy in which the majority are bonded to a life of economic and social servitude. In contrast, the new social movements are united by a common universal struggle, the struggle for emancipation and

human security. In pursuit of this common goal they challenge the legitimacy of the new ideology of domination and exploitation, the implementation of which has been systematically eroding what is left of the citizenship entitlements won from the state during the first decade after independence.

The issue of ideological convergence between the ruling classes and the hegemons in the global system illustrates the incapacity of the African state to engage in global transactions as an autonomous agent. The African state thrives on a weak economy, its technical and scientific capacity is weak; its political institutions and ideological infrastructure are weak. These constitute the various dimensions of the weakness of the African state, as well as its limited capacity to engage the capitalist world achieve appropriate integration into the world system. Even the limited autonomous capacity that the African state commanded immediately after independence has been eroded by a combination of liberalization, privatization, state restructuring (or downsizing) and related policies. Samir Amin (in this volume) reports, for example, that Germany's reparation payments following its defeat in World War I represented just 7 percent of its total exports, but that percentage was considered "too high" and the 'adjustment' of Germany to the global economy "impossible". Yet, the capitalist world was obliged by the strategic position of Germany in the global power equation to rally to ensure Germany's recovery under much less oppressive terms. From the 1980s to the close of the century, African countries were expected to use between 40 and 60 percent of their export earnings to service their external debt and still be able to adjust effectively into the global economy, and become equal partners in economic transactions. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the demands on them, African governments have not only failed to resist the demands imposed through structural adjustment and other economic reform packages, they continue to submit to more policy dictates from the IFIs.

The magnitude of this material weakness can be gauged from the following contrasting histories. In the 1960s and 1970s, African governments could assert their newly won sovereignty by challenging the hegemony of foreign capital through partial expropriation of foreign businesses. The challenge

they mounted against foreign companies took various forms: as Africanization, indigenization, joint state-foreign enterprises, and in some cases outright nationalization. Some governments – like that of Kwame Nkrumah¹⁰ - could assert the sovereignty of the state over the policy domain by defying the IMF and the World Bank on the question of appropriate economic policy for their countries. Today, governments of the emaciated African states can neither challenge nor defy policy instructions from the donor community, the Fund and Bank to privatize and liberalize their economies. They are sheepishly selling off national assets and opening up their weak economies to the invading forces of globalization, even where the supreme interest of their own people should compel them to refrain from such actions. In a bizarre demonstration of such supine submission to the dictates of foreign capital, the government of Malawi was alleged to have sold its strategic grain reserves on the advice of the Fund and Bank just to raise funds to service its debt. In the end, Malawians were exposed to the severest famine in recent memory.

The weakness of the African state is being systematically exploited at the ideological level. The political and economic elites of the OECD countries are no longer content with preaching the virtues of liberal markets and politics to Africa's political and economic elites from their vantage locations in the North. In recent times, especially since the failure of the first round of economic reform policies, the political and economic elites of the OECD countries, with the support of their intellectual apologists have been touring African countries to engage its ruling classes directly on the merit of liberal markets and politics. During 2001 and 2002 there was a medley of visits to African countries by such powerful representatives of western capital: it was either British Prime Minister Tony Blair or his International Development Secretary Clare Short; or it was Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien; Horst Kohler, Managing Director of the IMF, and James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank; or it was the previous US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. At scheduled meetings with key political and economic leaders of the countries they visited, they spared no effort in affirming the virtues of the free market, liberal democracy and good governance, followed by veiled threats to forfeit

promised economic aid as punishment for failure to submit to this global offensive. The response of Africa's leaders was usually to echo such theological statements with promises to scale greater heights of compliance. Needless to say, this ideological offensive is compounding the weak institutional and economic (including fiscal) capacity of the state already eroded by the economic reforms of the last two decades; the accelerated brain drain which is being legitimized by reference to so-called remittances from African émigrés; and by the enormous scientific and technological gap between Africa and the North (which has been exacerbated by the ICT revolution).¹¹

Clearly, for the African state, globalization is more than the localization of the global, whereby the international becomes part of the fabric of the local and exerts a transformative impact. Rather than become part of the local for progressive ends, the global has captured Africa's sovereign states and their economies. And because unequal partners cannot "mutually condition and constrain one another", the global has taken over the national to advance its hegemonic project.¹²

On the basis of various prognoses of Africa's development crisis, a number of probable solutions have been proposed. Trudi Hartzenberg's chapter (in this volume) raises the trade-development nexus in the context of regional integration, which is considered part of the ensemble of strategic solutions to the continent's development dilemma which is the creation of regional trading blocs. I should recall that Africa has become a non-competitive partner in global trade because it has remained producer of primary commodities. It is therefore inconceivable that trade liberalization, by which African countries will continue to trade in primary commodities, including crude oil, can serve as an instrument of integration of the continent into the global economy as an equal partner or provide the much needed resources for addressing her development crisis.

However, assuming that trade liberalization would serve as an effective instrument of integration and development, what are the costs and

opportunities? Hartzenberg's chapter raises a number of problems in this regard. First, the entry of new investments or new products into the local and regional markets will change the market environment: the intensity of competition will change the prevailing market environment in favor of the new entrants from the developed world, unless governments of the receiving countries enforce unfair competition policies. Secondly, firms from the developed economies will enjoy cumulative advantages from technological innovations (especially in the areas of information and communication, as well as transportation). Local firms will not be able to counter such advantages and are bound to be the losers in the new competitive environment. Thirdly, global trade is characterized by asymmetrical access to markets, which puts Africa at a double disadvantage. The disadvantages are: (i) African governments lack the capacity to bargain for equitable access to markets of the North; (ii) Africa's main exports, which are agricultural products, do not enjoy easy access to markets like the EU's where agriculture is subsidized, and is above all protected from external competition.

Hartzenberg's conclusion is significant: "As firms move from one country to another, those from the more developed countries that move to less developed countries could be the winners and the firms in the (receiving) countries ..., the losers."

I must add that capital will not revolutionize production and productivity, and transform tradable goods and services available in the host country: it will simply concentrate on profit maximization. This could compound Africa's traditional disadvantage in the prevailing international division of labor. It is also implicit from Hartzenberg's analyses that such imports and foreign investments will not change the direction of trade to the benefit of regional markets on the continent. As Tekere points out in his analyses of Africa-EU relations, foreign trade with African countries may actually perpetuate the balkanization of the continent's markets. Above all, local industries that could be developed to foster regional trade and integration may be destroyed by unfair competition from imports. Given the tendency of foreign investors to engage in primary commodity production, it is plausible that in the end the

continent may be left in its ‘original sin’ – as the producer of primary commodities.

Whether or not the trade-development-integration logic will play out for the benefit of Africa, which is a primary commodity producer, must be further examined in the context of the prevailing dynamics of the global economy. It must be recalled that there is a dialectical process of global integration and global restructuring taking place in the world system. On the one hand, globalization is producing a one-world syndrome – a ‘global village’ – while on the other hand, it has characteristically restructured the world economy into ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, producing a world economy that is now characterized by just three dominant economies – the European Union, the US and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Japan. The rest of the world’s economies are connected to this triad in various asymmetrical trade relationships. Even China and India, which are rapidly emerging as independent actors in the global economy do not enjoy parity with this triad, which includes the most powerful economies, accounting for the bulk of total global economic transactions.¹³ In this new international division of labor, the Middle East functions as the producer of oil and North Africa (separate from the rest of Africa) is retained as the satellite of the EU to deter uncontrollable migration from there. Sub-Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of South Africa, is at the bottom of this global economic apartheid system (Castells, 2000: 115) and its economies have become the ‘bantustans’ of the global economy system. This situation makes it imperative that Africa should restructure itself politically and economically as the precondition for re-engineering an autonomous development process.

Rugumamu’s chapter (in this volume) takes up this imperative. He makes a number of pertinent proposals: (i) Africa should be integrated on a function-based cooperation framework “that seeks to implement a few, but carefully targeted and politically visible, development projects or schemes.” Several advantages of this approach are listed. Essentially, this model provides a practical framework for creating “the infrastructure and production capacity necessary for growth and ... a successful entry into world markets.”

(ii) Member states of the union should be prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty to supra-national bodies of the union. Needless to say, the imperative of political union cannot be resisted any more, the various obstacles and constraints notwithstanding. The logics of capital and development require a mega-political framework with a single sovereign authority to support and direct. Already South African capital, for example, is penetrating various parts of the continent. A study, reported in *Third World Forum*, reveals a modest but significant investment in several African countries, particularly those of the Southern African region (see Marais, 1998: 20–23). This is happening with some incentives from the South African government but with little or no pull from the host governments. The report points out that such investments have typically involved merchant capital – retail trade, mining, hotels and leisure industry, and food and beverages. Industrial capital is showing scant interest. Instead, South African capital has targeted the developed economies, accounting for the top 18 acquisitions made in the UK, USA, Germany, Poland, and Israel between 1994 and 1997. Clearly, South African capital is currently going global; but it is penetrating the continent in a typical neo-colonial fashion thereby losing its capacity to function as a catalyst for development transforming African economies into giant industrial hubs. A mega Africa-centered political authority is required to direct South African capital towards the industrialization and development of the continent. A pan-African state commanding the supreme political gravity could also direct and support small industrial capitals from Nigeria and Algeria, for example, to play an equally catalytic role in Africa's industrialization and development.

These limitations notwithstanding, there is a silent integration revolution occurring on the continent, engineered by both state and private sector actors. Recently, for example, Africa's largest game park, covering an area of 35,000 square kilometers (equivalent to the size of the Netherlands), and linking Limpopo National Park in Mozambique, the Kruger National Park in South Africa and Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, was opened by the presidents of these three countries after two years of tortuous negotiations on sharing costs and benefits, as well as rationalizing immigration requirements

and logistics for implementing the project. That event finally brought into being the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park.

Private sector interests are also silently engaged in developing other “transnational corridors and triangles ... These include the Maputo corridor linking the Gauteng to the Indian Ocean and the Trans-Kalahari Corridor linking it to the Atlantic Ocean” (Shaw and Nyang’oro, 2000: 14–28). There are other development projects that are intended to link distant regions into an integrated production and distribution grid throughout Southern, Eastern, and Central Africa. In the West African region, negotiations to construct a gas pipeline from Nigeria, through Benin and Togo, to Ghana have been concluded, paving the way for a major pan-African investment that will supply cheap energy to the sub-region as a whole. All these initiatives are happening without plan and direction, and against huge obstacles from parochial sovereign national interests. But few of the existing regional integration structures capture these private and state-led initiatives. What is required is the integration and rationalization of such haphazard and episodic policy initiatives within a single pan-African framework, and purposefully directing them to engineer Africa’s industrialization and development.

It is for this reason that a supra-national political organ, with the power to make and implement policies, as proposed by Rugumamu, has become a historic necessity. Surely, the establishment of a pan-African state will necessarily negate the existence of separate nation-states whose continued existence and the infidelity of the political elites towards the pan-African idea have been a major obstacle to the attainment of a political union of Africa. Therefore, the ‘negation of negations’ requires “a strong and willing leadership” – a group of leaders imbued with the pan-African spirit that shaped the policies and actions of Kwame Nkrumah who will resolve to unite the continent and drive it into the center of world history.

The problem with the current renaissance leadership, which produced the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), is that it is captive to the neo-liberal development paradigm, which prescribes the worst form of

global integration for Africa trade and aid, that is bound to consolidate the continent's neo-colonial position in the global economy. Surely, dependence on FDI and unequal trade has not paid off; waiting for foreign investment to transform the economies of Africa has been like *Waiting for Godot*.¹⁴ Besides, the effect of the negligible foreign inflows to the continent has been to perpetuate the continent's neo-colonial structure of development and saddled its peoples with huge debt, poverty and disease. Furthermore continued dependence on foreign capital implies depending on MNCs, which are either not investing in Africa or investing mainly in mining industries if and when they do. Therefore, NEPAD is not likely to enhance the capacity of African societies and generate the necessary political and economic capital for accelerated development. There is the urgent need for a new and Afrocentric development paradigm that will "combine the building of autocentered economies and societies with participation in the global system" (Amin, in this volume). A new alternative development paradigm should transcend the Washington consensus; that is, negate the limitations of liberal (procedural) democracy by which the institutional ensemble of good governance and multi-party democracy have become a celebrated substitute for popular power and participation. The popular struggles for democracy that have characterized African politics for some time have been inspired by the need for such a new political architecture that would reflect, and be directed by, the interests and aspirations of the popular masses, and a new ideology that would regulate and legitimize politics in Africa and liberate it from its present history, where it is a mere appendage to the global script.

Horace Campbell's chapter (in this volume) raises what is effectively the role of the popular masses in emancipating Africa from this global apartheid system. In pursuit of this emancipatory politics, the struggles of African women are central to the overall struggle of the African peoples for emancipation from "the despotism of economic relations" and for a new mode of politics. Nationalist politics has reached a dead end, having been constrained by the neo-liberal ideology and its materialism which have bred corrupt, inept and authoritarian political and economic structures, reduced the masses of the people to a slave-like existence; and ignited civil wars that have resulted in

massive material (including environmental) destruction and immense human suffering. We must agree with Patricia McFadden and Horace Campbell (both in this collection) that the current debate on gender, sexuality and social reproduction exposes the limits of this neo-liberal paradigm while at the same time blazing the path for “a new mode of politics and a new mode of economic organization that will validate human life” (Campbell), and in which “everyone will become a complete citizen in both the public and private spheres” (McFadden). For the fathers of the pan-African movement, African unity is an instrument for mobilizing the total human and material resources of the continent for a new anti-imperialist politics that will transform prevailing social relations for improvements in the quality of life of the people.

The failure of the neo-liberal experiment brings us to the end of an era while validating the pan-African agenda and rendering it even more urgent. It vindicates and legitimizes the call for new institutional arrangements that will transcend liberal democracy and entrench popular power and participation as the pivot of the new politics in Africa, and thereby create an autonomous capacity to enable the continent engage the world, aggressively re-enter history, and do so on its own terms. The IFIs succeeded with their momentous economic reform experiments partly because they could change the balance of social forces to the disadvantage of the people and reduce them to a formal source of sovereign power. The most important prerequisite for the success of the new leadership and the new alternative development paradigm for Africa’s renaissance is therefore the reconfiguration of state power such that it would install the people and consolidate their position as the ultimate social power that drives the wheel of emancipation to make everyone a ‘complete’ citizen, in both the public and private spheres.

Notes

¹ This is the text of a popular social studies book that was mandatory for Ghanaian primary schools before independence. The makers of civilization were obviously the nations of the West.

² In December 2003, the IMF resident representative in Zambia, Mark Ellyne, was reported to have warned the Zambian government that the Fund would delay

debt relief of \$1 billion if the government did not sell the state-owned commercial bank. That threat immediately prompted protests from the political opposition, trade unions and non-governmental organizations that had joined ranks to oppose privatization, and caused confusion within the ranks of government: the president announced that the sale was not on, while the deputy finance minister requested urgent talks with the Fund on the matter. Under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) obligations, the Zambian government is obliged to sell off the power company, ZESCO, and the telecommunication company ZAMTEL in addition to others – including the state-owned commercial bank.

³ See also the *SADC Human Development Report*, 2000: 115–120.

⁴ For further discussion of this strategy of capturing the poor, see my essay, 'Africa's New Social Movements and the Limits of Politics', (2001).

⁵ I am grateful to Patrick Twumasi, a medical sociologist, for bringing this phenomenon to my attention in one of the several unscheduled reflections we shared on the African predicament.

⁶ See Mkandawire (1999) and (2004) for analyses that buttress the claim that the economic reforms have disempowered, the African state as well as the citizens of Africa from making sovereign choices in politics, economy and society.

⁷ For a very elaborate analysis of the various international and national developments that have neutralized state claims to national sovereignty and facilitated such foreign intervention, see Deng *et al*, (1996).

⁸ Zartman *et al* (1997) discuss good governance as essentially one of prudent conflict management – that is, managing conflict in a democratic way.

⁹ The failure of the African state to manage conflict in accordance with its sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens is the subject of Deng *et al*, 1996.

¹⁰ Kwesi Jonah (1989) has done an interesting comparative study of the relations between various Ghanaian governments and the IMF since 1960. Submission to the IMF policy directives not only reflects on the character of the state, but also impacts adversely on Ghanaian society and economy.

¹¹ I have discussed in some detail the anatomy of the weak capacity of the Africa state in a paper entitled 'Human Resource Development, International Migration and the Development of Africa' (2002), especially the section on the 'Development Crisis and State Institutional Atrophy'.

¹² For an optimistic view of globalization as 'glocalization' – implying an interaction

among different supposedly equal actors, more or less, in the global setting, that “mutually condition and constrain one another” see Thompson (1999).

¹³ “Between 1980 and 1993, this triad accounted for 75% of the world’s FDI. If ten of the most favoured additional nations are included, this expanded group accounted for 90 percent of the world’s FDI flows over the same period” (Thompson, 1999: 145).

¹⁴ *Waiting for Godot* is the title of Samuel Beckett’s famous tragicomedy.

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Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Africa in the Global System

Samir Amin

It is usually said that Africa is “marginalized”, which suggests that the continent – or at least Africa south of the Sahara, except perhaps South Africa – is “out” of the global system, or at best integrated into it only superficially. It is suggested also that the poverty of the African people is the result of their economies being insufficiently integrated into the global system. I wish to challenge these views.

Let us consider first some facts, which are hardly mentioned by the leading exponents of globalization. In 1990, the ratio of extra-regional trade to GDP was for Africa 45.6 percent, while it was only 12.8 percent for Europe, 13.2 percent for North America, 23.7 percent for Latin America and 15.2 percent for Asia. These ratios were not significantly different throughout the 20th century. The average for the world was 14.9% in 1928 and 16.1% in 1990 (Cordelier, 1997: 141). How can we explain this paradox, that Africa is apparently even more integrated into the world system than any other developed or developing region? Of course the level of development, as measured by GDP per capita, is highly unequally distributed. From that point of view, Africa is the poorest region in the modern world system, its GDP per capita amounting only to 21 percent of the world average and 6 percent of that of the developed countries. Therefore, the high proportion of Africa’s extra-regional trade with respect to its GDP would reflect the small size of the denominator of the ratio. Simultaneously, Africa’s exports and imports represent only a minute proportion of the world’s trade. And this is exactly the reason for which Africa is considered as being “marginal” in the world system, i.e. as having little importance – “The world could live easily without Africa.” That concept, according to which a country or region is qualified as “marginalized” if its quantitative weight in the global economy is small,

assumes implicitly that the logic of the expansion of the global capitalist economy is the maximization of production (and therefore also of trade). This assumption is utterly false. In fact, it matters little that Africa's exports represent only a minute part of world trade yesterday and today. Capitalism is not a system that sets out to maximize production and productivity, but one which chooses the volumes and conditions of production that maximize the profit rate of capital. The so-called marginalized countries are, in fact, the super-exploited and therefore impoverished countries, not countries located at the margin of the system.

The analysis needs therefore to be completed on other grounds. The relatively modest ratio for the developed areas – North America (USA and Canada) and Western-Central Europe (the European Union, Switzerland and Norway) – is related not only to their higher levels of development but also to a qualitative characteristic that ought to be spelled out: namely, all developed countries have been built historically as autocentered economies. I introduce here that essential concept which is ignored by conventional economics. Autocentered is synonymous with “basically inward looking”, not to “autarchic” (“closed”). It means that the process of capitalist accumulation in those countries that have become the centers of the world system has always been – and I submit will continue to be so in the foreseeable future – simultaneously inward looking and open, in most cases aggressively open (“imperialist”). It means therefore that the global system has an asymmetric structure: the centers are inward looking (autocentered) and simultaneously integrated in the global system in an active way (i.e. they shape the global structure). The peripheries are not inward looking (not autocentered) and therefore integrated in the global system in a passive way (they “adjust” to the system, without playing any significant role in shaping it). This conception of the world system is totally different from the one offered by conventional thought, which superficially describes the world as a pyramid, constructed of unequally wealthy countries ranking from the lowest levels of GDP per capita to the highest ones. My conclusion from this conceptualization is that all the regions of the world (including Africa) are equally integrated in the global system, but they are integrated into it in different ways. The concept of

marginalization is a false concept that hides the real question, which is not to which degree the various regions are integrated, but in which ways they are integrated?

In addition, the figures referred to above indicate that the degree of integration in the world system has not dramatically changed throughout the 20th century, as is being suggested by the dominant discourse on globalization. There have been ups and downs, but the process which reflects the degree of integration has been continuous and rather slow, not even accelerating throughout the last decades. That does not exclude the fact that globalization – which is an old story – has developed through successive phases that should be identified as qualitatively different, focusing on the specificities of each phase in relation to the changes commanded by the evolution of the centers of the system, i.e. dominant global capital.

On the basis of the methodology which I have suggested here, we can now look into the various phases of Africa's integration in the global system and identify the specific directions that integration has taken for each of the successive phases. Africa was integrated into the global system from the very inception of that system, in the mercantilist phase of early capitalism (the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries). The major periphery of that time was the colonial Americas where an outward-looking export economy was established, dominated by European Atlantic merchant interest. That export economy focused on sugar and cotton, and was based on slave labor. Therefore, through the slave trade, large parts of Africa south of the Sahara were integrated into the global system in the most destructive way. A good part of the "backwardness" of the continent in the present moment is due to that form of "integration", which led to a decrease in population to the extent that it is only now that Africa has recovered its share of the total global population, which it probably had around 1 500 AD. It also led to the dismantling of larger state organizations that had flourished earlier on, only to be substituted by small brutal military systems that engaged in wars among themselves.

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In America itself the mercantilist form of integration in the world system destroyed the potential for further development in many devastated regions. During that phase of early capitalism the highest rates of growth were achieved in areas such as the Caribbean, Brazil, and the southern part of North America, which were then British colonies. If an expert of the World Bank had visited those areas at that time, he would have written about their “miracle” growth – the value of Saint Domingue’s exports of sugar was, at the time, larger than the total exports of England! – and concluded that New England, which was building an autocentered economy, was on the wrong track. Today, Saint Domingue is Haiti and New England is part of the USA!

The second wave of integration of Africa in the global system was that of the colonial period, roughly from 1880 to 1960. Once conquered, it was necessary to “develop” the Africa in question. At this juncture entered the reasoning of world capitalism – what natural resources do the various regions of the continent possess? It seems to me that, in this context, we should understand the character of each of the three models of colonization that operated in Africa: (i) the trading economy incorporating small peasant economies into the world tropical products markets by subjecting them to the authority of markets controlled by oligopolies, thereby making it possible to reduce the rewards for peasant labor to the minimum and to waste land; (ii) the economy of Southern Africa’s reserves organized around mining, which was supplied with cheap labor through forced migration from the “reserves” to enhance the perpetuation of traditional rural subsistence; and (iii) the economy of pillage which the concessionary companies embarked upon through direct taxation, without the counterpart of commodity production where neither the local social conditions permitted the establishment of ‘trading’, nor would the mineral resources justify the organization of reserves intended to furnish abundant manpower. The Congo Basin belonged to this third category.

The results of this mode of insertion into world capitalism would also prove catastrophic for Africa. First it delayed – by a century – the commencement of an agricultural revolution. Surplus could be extracted from the labor of the peasants and from the wealth offered by nature without investment in

modernization (no machines or fertilizer); without genuinely paying for the labor (which was compelled to reproduce itself in the framework of traditional self-sufficiency); and without even guaranteeing the maintenance of the natural conditions of reproduction of wealth (pillage of the agrarian soils and the forest). Simultaneously, this mode of development of natural resources, which functioned in the framework of the unequal international division of labor of the time, excluded the formation of any local middle class. On the contrary, each time that the latter started the process of its formation, the colonial authorities hastened to suppress it.

As a result, today most so-called less developed countries (LDCs) are, as everybody knows, located in Africa. The countries which today make up this “fourth world” are to a large extent countries destroyed by the intensity of their integration in an earlier phase of the global expansion of capitalism – for example, Bangladesh, successor to the state of Bengal, which was the jewel of British colonization in India. Others have been – or still are – peripheries of peripheries, for example, Burkina Faso, which has supplied most of its active labor force to Côte d’Ivoire. If one looked at these two countries as, in fact, constituting a single region of the capitalist system of the epoch, the characteristic rates of the “Ivory Coast miracle” would have to be divided between them. Emigration impoverishes regions, as these bear the cost of bringing up youth who are lost at the moment they become economically productive, as well as the cost of supporting the old on their return home. These costs, which are much greater than the money orders sent to their families by active emigrants, are almost always forgotten in the calculations of our economists.

There are thus only a few countries that are poor and non-integrated or hardly integrated in the global system. Perhaps North Yemen or Afghanistan might qualify. However, their integration is still in progress – like that of others yesterday – producing nothing more than the “modernization of poverty”: the shantytowns that are home to landless peasants. The weaknesses of the national liberation movement and of the colonial state that preceded it date back to this colonial construction. They are not the products of pristine pre-

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colonial Africa, which disappeared in the heat of colonialism. The criticisms of independent Africa, of its corrupt political elite and middle classes, of the lack of economic direction, of the tenacity of rural community structures, forget that these features of contemporary Africa were forged between 1880 and 1960.

No wonder then that neo-colonialism has perpetuated these features. The form that this failure took was fully defined by the limits of the famous Lomé agreements, which linked sub-Saharan Africa to the European Union. These agreements have indeed perpetuated the old division of labor – relegating independent Africa to the production of raw materials, at the very time when elsewhere, during the Bandung period (1955–1975), the Third World was embarking on the industrial revolution. They have made Africa lose about thirty years at a decisive moment of historic change. Undoubtedly, Africa's ruling classes are responsible for what would start the involution of the continent, particularly when they joined the neo-colonial camp against the aspirations of their own people, whose weaknesses they exploited. The collusion between them and the global strategies of imperialism is, therefore, the ultimate cause of the failure.

Having reclaimed their political independence, the peoples of Africa embarked, as of 1960, on development projects the main objectives of which were more or less identical to those pursued in Asia and Latin America, despite the differences of ideological discourse. This common denominator is easily understood, if we simply recall that in 1945 practically all Asian countries (excluding Japan), African countries (including South Africa), and – although with a few nuances – Latin American countries lacked any industry worth the name, apart from mining here and there; they were largely rural in the composition of their population, and governed by the archaic regimes of land-owning or colonial oligarchies. Beyond their great diversity, all the national liberation movements had the same objectives of political independence: modernization of the state, and industrialization of the economy.

There is today great temptation to read this history as that of a stage in the expansion of world capitalism, which was said to have performed, more or less, certain functions attached to primitive national accumulation, thereby creating the conditions for the next stage, which we are now supposed to be entering, marked by opening out to the world market and competition in this field. I submit that we should not yield to this temptation. The dominant forces in world capitalism have not ‘spontaneously’ created models of development. This ‘development’ was imposed on them. It was the product of the national liberation movement of the contemporary Third World. The reading that I propose therefore stresses the contradiction between spontaneous and immediate tendencies in the capitalist system; the two tendencies are always guided by the short-term financial gain that characterizes this mode of social management, and the longer-term vision which guides the rising political forces, both of which are in conflict for that very reason. This conflict is certainly not always radical; capitalism adjusts itself to it, even tries to profit by it. But it only adjusts to it; it does not generate its movement.

All liberation movements in Africa shared this modernist vision, which for that very reason I qualify as capitalist. Capitalist, by its concept of modernization, expected to produce the relations of production and the social relations that are basic and peculiar to capitalism: the wage relationship, business management, urbanization, patterns of education, the concept of national citizenship. No doubt, other values, characteristic of advanced capitalism, like that of political democracy, were woefully lacking, and this was justified by the exigencies of the initial stages of development. All countries of the region – both radicals and moderates – chose the same formula of the single party, farcical elections, the leader-founder of the nation, and so on. Yet, in the absence of a middle-class of businessmen, the state (and its technocrats) was expected to substitute itself for the class. But sometimes, also, the state replaced the middle class as an economic agent because the emergence of the middle class was held in suspicion on account of the priority that the latter would give to its immediate interests over the longer-term ones under construction. Suspicion became, among the radical wing of the national liberation movement, synonymous with exclusion. This radical wing then

believed, naturally, that its project was one of “building socialism”, which was the Soviet version of socialism.

If we assess the goal of the national liberation movements, that is “national construction”, the results are on the whole controversial. The reason is that whereas the development of capitalism in earlier times supported national integration, the effect of globalization in the peripheries of the system, on the contrary, breaks up societies. The ideology of the national movements ignored this contradiction, having been enclosed in the bourgeois concept of “making up for a historic backwardness”, and conceiving this catching up as passive participation in the international division of labor (rather than trying to modify it by delinking). No doubt, according to the specific character of pre-capitalist, pre-colonial societies, this disintegrating impact was more or less dramatic. In Africa, whose artificial colonial demarcation did not respect the previous history of its people, the disintegration wrought by capitalist peripherization made it possible for ethnicity to survive despite the efforts of the ruling class, following national liberation, to get rid of its manifestations. When the crisis erupted, suddenly destroying the increase in the surplus which had enabled the financing of trans-ethnic policies of the new state, the ruling class itself broke up into fragments which, having lost any legitimacy based on the achievements of ‘development’, tried to create for themselves new bases often associated with ethnic retreat.

A number of countries in Asia and Latin America did embark on industrialization during those decades of development of the second half of the 20th century. These turned out in some cases to be competitive on global markets. But “successful development” (in fact, “growth without development”) kept Africa within the old division of labor according to which it produced primary commodities. The oil-producing and exporting countries are typical in this regard, since other major mineral resources, such as copper, suffer a long structural demand crisis; and so do some ‘tropical agricultural’ producing and exporting countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Malawi. These were often regarded as brilliant success stories. But in fact, they had no future; they belonged to the past from the very beginning of their prosperity.

Hence, most of those success stories turned out to experience unsuccessful growth even within the limits of the old division of labor. This is the case of most of sub-Saharan Africa, which was confronted with difficulties that were not necessarily the product of bad policies, but of objective conditions. For instance, this type of development had already been achieved in colonial times, and had reached its limits by 1960 – as was the case in Ghana. The Ivory Coast ‘miracle’ was just a matter of ‘catching up’ with such unsuccessful growth experiences in colonial West Africa in general.

What followed the erosion of the national development projects of the 1960s and 1970s is well documented. The starting point was the brutal reversal in the balance of social forces, to the benefit of capital, which occurred in the 1980s. Dominant capital, represented by transnational companies, moved into the offensive, operating in Africa through the so-called structural adjustment programs enforced throughout the continent since the mid-1980s. I say so-called because in fact those programs are more conjectural than structural, their real and exclusive target being the subordination of the economies of Africa to the constraints of servicing high external debt, which, in turn, is to a large extent the very product of the stagnation which started appearing in the LDCs along with the deepening crisis of the global system. During the last two decades of the 20th century average GDP growth rates have fallen to roughly half of what they were in the previous two decades for all regions of the world, Africa included, except for Eastern Asia. It is during that period of structural crisis that the external debt of Third World countries (and post-Soviet Eastern Europe) started growing dangerously. The global crisis is, as usual, characterized by growing inequality in the distribution of income, high rates of profits and therefore a growing surplus of capital, which cannot find an outlet in the expansion of the productive systems. Alternative financial outlets have to be created in order to avoid a brutal devalorization of capital. The US deficit and the external debt of Third World countries are responses to that financialization of the system. The debt burden of the latter has now reached unsustainable levels. How could a poor African country earmark half or more of its exports simply to pay the interest on external debt, and simultaneously be “more efficient” and “adjust”? I should recall

that, after World War I, the payment of German's reparations represented only 7 percent of the exports of that industrialized and powerful country. Yet most economists at that time considered the level too high and the 'adjustment' of Germany to the global economy impossible under those payment conditions! Germany could not adjust to a loss of 7 percent of its export potential, but Tanzania is supposed to be able to adjust to a loss of 60 percent of its export earnings!

The devastating results of these policies are familiar: economic regression, social disaster, growing instability and sometimes the disintegration of whole societies (as in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). During the whole of the 1990s Africa's per capita GDP growth rate was negative (at -0.2 percent), Africa being alone in this situation. This is why Africa's share of global trade has decreased. This fact is precisely what is being qualified as 'marginalization'. Instead, more accurately, one should speak here of a dramatic mal-integration in the global system. Conventional neo-liberal economists pretend that this is only a hard transition towards a better future. But how could it be? The destruction of the social fabric, growing poverty, the regression in education and health, and so on, cannot prepare the continent for a better future; they cannot help African producers to become more competitive, as is being demanded of them. Quite the opposite!

This neo-colonial plan for Africa is indeed the worst pattern of integration in the global system. Its only result can be to further the loss of capacity by African societies to meet the challenges of modern times. These challenges are surely to a certain extent new, relating to the long-term possible effects of the ongoing technological revolution and through them, to the organization of labor, its productivity, and new patterns of the international division of labor. What ought to be said in this respect is that all of these challenges are operating in the real world through conflict of strategies. For the time being the dominant segment of global capital – the transnational companies – appears to dictate what is favorable to the progress of its particular strategies. Africa's peoples and governments have not yet developed counter-strategies of their own, similar perhaps to what East Asian countries are trying to push. In the

present situation in Africa, globalization does not offer solutions to any of its problems. Foreign direct private investments in Africa are, as everybody knows, negligible and exclusively concentrated in mineral and other natural resources. In other words, the strategy of the transnational companies does not help Africa to move beyond the pattern of the international division of labor, which belongs to the remote past. The alternative development strategy from an African point of view needs to combine the building of autocentered economies and societies with participation in the global system. This general law of development is valid for Africa today as it has been throughout modern history for all the regions of the world.

It is still too early to know if the African peoples are moving towards that goal. There is talk today of an African renaissance. No doubt the victory of the African people in South Africa, i.e. the breakdown of the apartheid system, has created positive hope not only in that country but also in several parts of the continent. Yet there are no visible signals of these hopes crystallizing in the form of alternative development strategies. To arrive at this alternative would need dramatic changes at various national levels, which will go far beyond what is generally suggested under the labels of ‘good governance’ and ‘political multiparty democracy’, as well as the regional and global levels. Another pattern of globalization would therefore gradually emerge from those changes making possible the correction of the mal-integration of Africa into the global system.

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Chapter 3

Globalization and Africa's Unfinished Agenda

Thandika Mkandawire

There are two ways of losing oneself: by a walled segregation into the particular or by dilution in the 'universal'. (Aimé Césaire, cited in Cooper, 1996)

The title of this chapter is intended to suggest that I will address the problem of the disjuncture between Africa's own 'social projects' and the exigencies of globalization. If for other nations a plausible case can be made that globalization is driven by the invisible hand of market forces or by deliberate policy choices at the national level, in Africa's case it is largely driven by the very visible feet of the international financial institutions (IFIs). Whatever forces drive globalization and whatever gains it may bring to humanity at large, in Africa, globalization has been driven by a narrow set of external forces abetted by omission and commission on the part of national actors, and its benefits are yet to reach the continent. This, however, does not mean that the forces driving globalization are irrelevant to Africa; nor that Africans have been passively inserted into the global order. The whole point of structural adjustment programs is presumably to 'relink' Africa to these processes and to enable the continent to reap the benefits of global competition in terms of markets and investment. Signaling these global forces to look towards Africa is a central aspect of current policy-making in which there are always domestic correlates and anchors to the globalization process. Both the policies pursued by national governments and their supine adhesion to the dictates of the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) have shaped the continent's position in the global system.

My position is that how Africa goes global will be determined not only by the exogenous and putatively ineluctable forces of globalization but also by the

degree of social cohesion that countries can individually and collectively muster. It is this social cohesion that will determine and firm up the internal strategies necessary to make politically viable and legitimate whatever external strategies the countries choose. Failure to come up with adequate internal responses to the external challenges will merely expose African countries to the process of 'immiserizing' globalization.¹ Both internal institutional and political weaknesses and the particular way Africa is being integrated into the global system are likely to lead to this undesirable outcome. The internal problems are the result of internal inconsistencies and conflicts and what Africans themselves generally describe as their betrayal by the leaders of the promise of independence, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the reverberations of foreign pressures on domestic politics, which can alter not only the preferences or ideologies of key actors but also influence the social composition and strength of political coalitions.

Globalization has generally been preceded by either completely ignoring or banalizing localized concerns, histories, problems and the 'social pacts' set up to address them. Indeed, globalization processes and the ideological paraphernalia that goes with it have given the impression that these concerns were provincial, dated and idiosyncratic. In contrast, I have deliberately chosen to judge globalization through the prism of African nationalism partly because I believe that its 'promise' still holds some of the elements for the construction of the social cohesion for Africa's fruitful interaction with the rest of the world and partly because the legacy of nationalism is a recurring theme in African debates. I am aware of the contested meanings of nationalist ideologies in Africa and the existence of both sub- and supra-nationalist ideologies. My reading of the situation is that the ideologies espoused by the African nationalist movements remain the most dominant today. I propose, therefore, to reflect on globalization and Africa in the 'promises' and commitments made at the start of the post-colonial period.

There is considerable confusion about what constitutes globalization: about its origin, date of birth, distinctiveness, geographical spread, intensity, impact, driving force, direction (is it unidirectional or reversible), and its future.

Anthony McGrew (1998) has usefully identified three clusters of interpretations of globalization: (a) the hyper-globalists, (b) the skeptics, and (c) the transformationalists.² For the hyper-globalists, depending on one's ideological predisposition, globalization represents a new epoch in human history full of either great promise or dire consequences – a “world war”, in the words of Robinson (1996). In most such analyses, the presumption is that there is a zero-sum relationship between globalization and nation-states. Globalization is interpreted then as leading to a “hollowing” of the state; leading to de-nationalization in which “national governments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global capital or alternatively catalysts for nurturing mechanisms of governance at the local, regional and global levels that are more compatible with the logic of the global market place”. Conversely, the strengthening of the nation-state is treated as a spanner in the wheels. The skeptics doubt that the existing empirical evidence (in terms of global flows of trade and investments and labor) casts doubt on the newness of the contemporary levels of economic dependence.³ They also doubt that the power of governments or state sovereignty has been eroded to the extent suggested by the hyper-globalists. Indeed, some of these would go further, to argue that globalization is a project of nation-states or is, at least, mediated by domestic state actors. And finally, there are the transformationalists who somehow lie in between, rejecting the hyper-globalists' rhetoric about the end of the state and the skeptics' insistence that nothing much has changed.⁴

Remarkably, most participants in this debate – both the supporters and detractors of globalization – have succumbed to the crudest forms of materialism in which the economy-technology ‘base’ determines the ‘superstructure’ of culture, politics and global governance. However, for all the fetishization, globalization is ultimately the result of human action. The nature of the global that is supposed to emerge is not predetermined by some ineluctable forces but will be the result of a combination of human ingenuity, caprice, solidarity, and greed on the one hand, and resource endowment on the other. However, since different classes, societies and nations are differently endowed in terms of economic, technological and military resources, the imprint which various countries leave on global affairs and processes differs

accordingly. So also does the incidence of costs and gains of these processes at the national level.

At the global level, what may make these processes appear beyond our control is the absence of political structure – social norms and institutional arrangements requisite for global governance.⁵ One ought to have a more nuanced view even on this issue. If for large sections of humanity, anarchy seems to be the guiding principle of globalization, certain actors in the globalization drama have established fairly elaborate mechanisms for managing things close to their hearts or, more accurately, to their pockets. So the issue is not so much lack of global governance but the asymmetric extent of such governance as exists today and is evolving in terms of authority, reach, accountability, and inclusiveness of its agenda.

In much of the writing relating globalization to Africa, most of the nuances in the debate disappear and so the dominant view tends to lean heavily towards the hyper-globalists on the one hand and incomprehensible ‘marginalization’ of the continent, on the other hand. Globalization is portrayed and sometimes lived as an unstoppable train, which African nations fail to board at their peril. No time is allowed to make special arrangements before one’s departure. The boarding process is itself quite disorderly and only the strong and quick are able to board. It imposes itself without individual or social volition; it is facilitated by such ‘exogenous’ factors as technology and a shadowy *zeitgeist*. Minatory language is used to caution those that may, for one reason or another, not be ready for the trip. Thus, Africans are reminded that they are at the crossroads. Either Africa takes the “appropriate measures” (read World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies) or it will be marginalized into oblivion. In the famous words of Margaret Thatcher, “There is no alternative.”

While the first 15 years of this period were marked by significant gains in a number of social indicators, including per capita incomes, the last two decades during which globalization has apparently gained its distinctive characteristics have been labeled the “lost decades” for Africa. Economies stagnated, social conflicts erupted into bloody wars, and famine became rampant; these and

many more became a regular feature of the images that seared television screens worldwide. Economically, Africa was being 'marginalized' as its share in global trade and investment plummeted.⁶ Much of this marginalization has been measured in trade figures, share in world GDP, share in private sector investment flows, etc. The story they tell is generally that the share of Africa in all these has declined over the last 50 years (Cantwell, 1999; Mosley, 1996; Shafaeddin, 1996). Those who called for self-reliance and delinking did not have this forced 'delinking' of Africa's economies in mind. So nugatory has Africa become that some few years ago, in an article on globalization, the British weekly, *The Economist*, observed rather sardonically that were Africa to somehow be wiped out off the face of the earth, no one would notice. In the eyes of the newspaper, the marginalization of Africa has gone so far on its own that Africa has ceased to matter, if it ever did.⁷ And so it would not be missed if it somehow disappeared. Little is said about how Africans would react to their imminent disappearance from the globe. Leaving aside the characteristic cynicism that informs its attitude towards Africa, *The Economist* does, in some sense, reflect perceptions about how Africa is doing in the globalization process. For those whose vision has been shaped by the all too frequent images of appalling human suffering and degradation of Africa that have been copiously supplied to the media, the thought that somehow Africa must go away must be compelling and soothing. But Africa will not go away. Given the geographical immensity of the continent, Africa's disappearance would literally have earthshaking consequences. However, Africa's links are not only geographic – they include too many bonds to recount here.

We should also bear in mind that globalization does not always involve crossing borders as most measures of trade shares suggest; it often entails "relocation of national public governance functions to transnational private arenas and ... the development inside national states – through legislative acts, court rulings, executive orders – of the mechanisms necessary to accommodate the rights of global capital in what are still national territories under the exclusive control of states" (Sassen, 1998a: 5). And, therefore, however small the impact of Africa on global affairs may be, the processes of

globalization have enormous implications on African societies beyond the purely economic.

Uncompleted Tasks: The Nationalist Commitments

Of the many self-allotted ‘historical tasks’ of African leaders, I believe five stand out as the most widely accepted at the time. These are: complete decolonization of the continent, nation-building, economic and social development, democratization and regional cooperation. These were, if you like, the key constituent elements of the nation-state project of African nationalism, a much abused and now badly tarnished ideology which I will, nevertheless, use as a prism through which to view the processes of globalization and the promise they hold for Africa’s accomplishment of the historical tasks. Of the five, only the first one – decolonization – has been completed.

National Sovereignty and Nation-building

In the African case, one unresolved problem is that of nation-building. A number of factors have contributed to the non-completion of this vital task. Here, I can only discuss them telegraphically. One of these has been the premature abandonment of the nationalist preoccupation with nation-building due to internal political struggles and the adjustment to what are purveyed by the Bretton Woods institutions as the exigencies of the global system. For some of the hyper-globalists, this may not only be welcome but prudent in light of the inevitability of the erosion of the nation-state.

The internal factors undermining nation-building constitute the ‘original sin’ of African nationalism. For understandable reasons, African nationalism became a totalizing ideology to combat real and imagined fissiparous forces such as the divide and rule strategies of the erstwhile colonial governments and the tribalism of some of its own leaders. Confronted with the social pluralism of their countries, the nationalists had two theoretical options. They could either ride roughshod over social pluralism and produce political uniformity, or design structures that produced a political pluralism accommodative of the social pluralism of their societies. In the event, most

chose the former option which, combined with the centralization of power that it entailed, has meant that issues that could be easily sorted out at the local level acquired a menacing national importance by overloading the national decision-making process.

The African elites tended to equate nation-building with state-building and over the years the latter completely overshadowed the former. The authoritarian nature of state-building and neo-liberal state-phobia combined to give an impression that the state-building enterprise should be abandoned or drastically curtailed. Whether the theology of the withering away of the state ultimately holds, it should be borne in mind that until then, for better or worse, the state was a key player in the lives of much of mankind. And although states can and do foment conflict, often by omission rather than commission, they still remain the single most important mediating institution. The forced incapacitation of states is therefore dangerously premature and misguided.

In addition, there has been the failure of ruling elites to pursue the task of nation-building in a serious and consistent manner. This can be attributed in part to the end of elite consensus, which led to conflicts that engulfed whole nations and led to horrible deeds, a trend which was part cause and part effect of the political and institutional failure to creatively deal with the pluralistic nature of our societies. One should bear in mind that African leaders' understanding of the nation-state was colored by their colonial experience. None of the major colonial powers in Africa was multi-ethnic or federal in character. But also, in the post-colonial era, there was little rethinking of the notion of the nation-state and its relationship with contiguous states with whom they may be vying for or sharing civic identities.

Meanwhile, the rhetoric of the nationalists has become increasingly hollow and less convincing if for no other reason than the demographic changes that have taken place during the last 30 years. In 70 percent of post-independence Africa, the call for national unity has been taken for granted and often dismissed as rhetoric, because it has been used in a mystifying manner. In addition, the economic crisis exposed a culture of gross mismanagement of

national resources that led to considerable erosion of the legitimacy of the national project. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the ruling elite was compromised by the authoritarian direction of nationalist politics, which alienated significant segments of society. The abuse and mystification of nationalist ideologies and symbols have undermined such ideologies as rallying points for Africa's young population. The uninhibited interference by foreign powers in national affairs not only added to the incoherence of national politics but also has had the tendency to trivialize them by severely attenuating national choices and relegating national institutions to a secondary role.

It was in the midst of this beleaguered nationalism that pressures of globalization came to be felt, further undermining the cohesive force of nationalism. In the immediate post-colonial days, African countries were confronted with the reality of neo-colonialism, opposition to which was most cogently formulated by Kwame Nkrumah (1965). It was this that made Africa the perfect breeding ground for nationalist theories about dependency. In the 1970s, with the dramatic rise of OPEC (the Oil-Producing and Exporting Countries) and the distinct possibility of establishing cartels for other primary commodities, prospects for the Third World appeared bright. "Self-reliance", "Delinking", and a "New International Economic Order" were slogans suggestive of a real possibility of deepening political independence and extending independence to the economic sphere. This is when the developed countries began appealing for non-confrontational *interdependence*. However, recession and restructuring in the developed countries and the indebtedness of many leading developing countries aborted the need for the proposed new partnership. Once again, many developing countries found themselves in the grip of the BWIs. Developed countries shifted from the rhetoric of interdependence, with its intimations of cooperation and global solidarity, to globalization in which competition and profit assumed center stage.

Nationalism, already entangled in its own contradictions, had to bow to the demands of external powers. Nationalism has its own preferences in terms of economic policies. It seeks to view the nation as its platform for action; it prefers some form of national control over economic activities either through

nationalization or through 'indigenization'; it tends to engage in redistributive policies to hold the nation together. Such policies as pan-territorial pricing and regional allocation of economic activities were essentially redistributive; they were aimed at cementing the nation together. Some of these policies were to contribute to the fiscal crisis that made these nationalist objectives no longer sustainable. Because of the corruption and mismanagement that surrounded these policies, they were indiscriminately relegated to the realm of rent seeking and patron clientelism that presumably accounted for Africa's decline.

However, globalization too has become entangled in its own contradictions. For while its key actors demand political stability, its reach is extremely disruptive of social cohesion. One of the effects of patterns of post-colonial development has been increased social differentiation along class or income lines. The current crisis and the adjustment policies have exacerbated these fissiparous pressures emanating from social inequalities, especially with the indiscriminate rejection of the redistributive elements of nationalist policies mentioned above. This has increased the potential for intra-ethnic conflict. The paradoxical consequence of such intra-ethnic conflict is the placement of a premium on ethnic cohesion and ethnic chauvinism through inter-ethnic competition as elites opportunistically harp on their ethnic ties with the poor. Hence, in the crisis years we have seen devastating ethnic conflicts in Africa. With the one ideology that has so far provided a modicum of political stability severely eroded, claims of sub-nationalism have reared their head, hanging menacingly over the processes of both nation-building and globalization.

The current situation has also spurned new leaders – entrepreneurs of perverse nationalism. Associating nationalism with the corrupt regimes they have replaced, these new leaders tend to embrace globalization uncritically and have been much less concerned with legitimacy at home. Indeed, the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s has made 'dependence' so normal and commonsensical (pragmatic is the word often used) that it has ceased to require theoretical explication or to evoke convincing political dissent.⁸ The 'success stories' proudly parade their dependence on foreign tutelage and do not object being

referred to as good pupils by foreign masters.⁹ This attitude is supposed to be a measure of pragmatism in adjusting to the exigencies of globalization. Denationalization does not only apply to institutions, but also to individuals and ideologies. Governors of central banks, for example, proudly flaunt their membership of external “epistemic communities” of global financial networks. Some, empowered by the global networks of capital, acquire greater political leverage at the national level. Those who see globalization as the panacea to all our ills bemoan the exclusion of this group from power. Thus Holman (1998: 7) of the *Financial Times* writes:

Well-educated, articulate young Africans, unburdened by colonial complexes and at ease with the concepts of free trade, capitalism and globalization, are being kept from the instruments of power.

Of course, not all educated Africans are neo-liberals. Judging from the behavior and characteristics of some of the new leaders, the promise is not as bright as the *Financial Times* suggests. The so-called new leaders have so far come to power through military means, have not been able to establish inclusive national coalitions at home, have little time for democracy, and take to guns quite easily. With their eyes fixed on external legitimation, they tend to be less sensitive to domestic politics. At one time or another they are involved in one war or another, contributing to political instability and negating the conditions for globalization.¹⁰

Economic Development

The objective of eradicating the unholy trinity of poverty, ignorance and disease was a salient feature of nationalist political platforms. And so the material correlate of the nation-building project was economic development, and the ideology of developmentalism which inevitably assumed a national character. A central element of that quest for development was industrialization. If one could talk about globalization in the post-war period, then Africa’s position in the global division of labor continued to be that of exporter of raw materials. There was some inflow of capital into the manufacturing sector but this remained derisory, compelling African states,

regardless of their ideology, to engage in direct productive economic activities. Contrary to myth, African socialism involved little nationalization for the simple reason that there was not much to nationalize.

African leaders were conscious that even though development would be national, the context had to be international. There were of course considerable differences as to what should be the class character of the national project and the state-capital nexus that underpinned it. Vaguely, development was to involve some import substitution, some indigenization, and the attraction of foreign capital through "industrialization by invitation". In devising their development strategies Africans relied heavily on exports and history. Here, we should also bear in mind that Africans were always confronted with idealized histories of how other ruling classes had developed by pursuing nationalist policies in the context of rapid internationalization of economies. In the 1970s, they idealized the process of nation-building in Europe and North America where the emergence of a national bourgeoisie had catalyzed the development process. In sharp contrast, there was Africa saddled with a "dependent", "petty bourgeoisie", an "incomplete" national bourgeoisie that managed "overdeveloped", "periphery", "dependent", "neo-colonial", "client" states. If dependence was a condition afflicting all key actors in the nation-building project, it was difficult to see how Africa would get out of the bind and participate in the global economy in a meaningful way. One consequence was a discourse in which bouts of pessimism about the prospects for change within the existing system were soothed by extremely voluntaristic calls for delinking or revolution. An analysis that elaborated on the ineluctable process of social differentiation was interspersed with calls for a new international order.

By the 1990s, the image of the ideal history had shifted. It was no longer Europe and North America that lived the right histories whose path we would have to diligently trace but the high-performance East Asian economies with their 'developmental states'. Such states were characterized by an ideological commitment to development, a political capacity to articulate and impose a national development project, and an efficient and honest bureaucracy or

technical elite insulated from avaricious interest groups. In sharp contrast, the African state, captured by interest groups or wallowing in debilitating patrimonial relationships, was incapable of pursuing the national agenda of development.

The developmentalist project has not been without its distracters, critics and, of course, victims. The following criticisms need to be addressed. The first is that development has been raised into an ideology that has sanctioned the destruction of cultures and violations of human rights by national governments on the one hand, and has been used as a license for interference in the affairs of other nations by foreign powers or donors, on the other hand. It has been used as camouflage of such sordid deeds as corruption, xenophobia and the destruction of the environment.¹¹ To the extent that these charges contain large doses of truth, they ought to be addressed by those of us who still swear by development.

African policy-makers are accused of failing to heed the lessons of trade theory and for exhibiting an anti-trade bias (e.g., World Bank 1981). This accusation follows from the fact that initial industrialization was focused on import substitution as opposed to export orientation presumably pursued by the more successful economies. This assertion involves considerable distortion of the history of economic policies of developing countries and tendentious reading of the strategies of the 'success stories'. First, the dichotomy of export-oriented versus import-substitution industrialization is misleading as even the most successful exporters continue to pursue import substitution. Second, import substitution was not a strategy for autarchy but for the diversification of the export base away from primary products toward industrial products. Finally and more significantly, Africa's marginalization is not because of an anti-trade bias. Rodrik (1997b: 5) argues persuasively that:

Africa's marginalization in world trade is primarily due to the continent's lagging performance in terms of output growth. It is not due to trade ratios (relative to GDP) that are low by cross-national standards. African countries trade on average as much as would be expected by

international standards once their individual characteristics (such as income level and size) are taken into account. It is because they have failed to expand their economies at sufficient rates that their importance in world trade has shrunk.

Maladjusting Africa and Shifting Goals

Until 1973, many African countries enjoyed positive rates of growth. In fact, the differences in performance between Asia and Africa were not that remarkable. Then came the 'oil' crisis and the subsequent fall in terms of trade. Initially, a number of countries thought the crisis was temporary and could therefore be financed by borrowing. In any case, with negative interest rates caused by the need to recycle petro-dollars, it did sound prudent to borrow to tide one over the crisis. This was also the advice of the BWIs, who accused African countries of being too prudent in their borrowing habits and therefore under-borrowed. A number of African countries, such as Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria, were thus chaperoned to the financial markets by both the BWIs and private financial syndicates.

Africa's borrowing problems were compounded by the use to which borrowed funds were put. Some were put in long-term productive investments whose viability was premised on the continuation of good times. An embarrassingly high proportion of this went into wasteful public consumption in the form of airports, palaces, new governments building, arms, and so on, thanks to the avarice, self-aggrandizement and megalomania of African leaders as well as lenders awash with excess liquidity and desperate for outlets. By the end of the 1970s and certainly following the Mexican financial crisis in 1982, such borrowing was clearly unsustainable and African countries found themselves frozen out of the private financial markets – an exclusion from which they have yet to escape.

African countries were compelled to seek aid initially in the form of balance of payments support. To obtain this aid, they have had to accept a cascade of conditionalities all intended to make state policies "market friendly". This led

them to a new era of policy tutelage that is unparalleled in terms of the extent of involvement of foreign governments in the affairs of sovereign states; in terms of the arrogance of those who administered the nostrums; and in terms of the non-accountability of those who time and again were proven wrong in both diagnosis and prescription. Much of the advice and tutelage given has involved an incredible experimentation with a package of policies for which there was no prior experience. The result has been the construction of a policy edifice by an ad hoc accretion of “necessary conditions”, resulting in an unwieldy system and ultimately the accumulation of self-defeating conditionalities.

The learning curve has been extremely steep partly because of lack of transparency of the experimentation and teaching processes, and partly because success stories have been rare and ephemeral, while failures have been discreetly buried before any embarrassing autopsy could be conducted. Over the years many African countries have, at one time or another, been touted as success stories or model pupils, only to inexplicably disappear from the honors’ list, never to be heard of again. The lack of transparency resides in the fact that the letters of intent, spelling out what agreements have been reached and what are the means and targets, are kept confidential. One should add here that Africans have remained highly skeptical of the appropriateness of the measures proposed and of the knowledge of the peripatetic consultants that scour the continent for new things to do. There has been little correlation between what they have said were fundamentals and the performance of economies; and where there was a correlation, the chain of cause and effect did not necessarily follow the direction suggested.

The Experience

If one were to summarize the key experiences of policy-making during the adjustment period, it is that the process has lacked developmental objectives. The focus has been on stabilization and financial sector reforms rather than development. Even the issue of poverty has received little attention, except perhaps when it has seemed politically expedient to be seen to be doing something to mitigate the negative effects of adjustment. That adjustment has failed as a prerequisite for development, let alone as a “strategy for

accelerated development” (World Bank 1981), is now widely accepted. No less a person than the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, has called for the transcendence of the Washington consensus so as to place development back on the agenda (Stiglitz, 1998).

Such admissions from the top echelons of the IFIs do not seem to affect the policy pronouncements that are meant for African consumption. It is still insisted that adjustment is working; and when it is not working its advocates are always able to find a reason why it is not, which makes it an essentially non-falsifiable discourse. If a country is doing well then it is adjusting; if not then it is not adjusting. Consequently, the continued poor performance of African economies after more than 15 years of the tutelage of international financial institutions is squarely blamed on non-compliance with conditionalities or recidivism. Good performance has been rare and when it was sighted, the BWIs rushed in to claim paternity. Thus a former deputy managing director of the IMF, Alassane Quattara, could say the following about Africa's 1994–95 good performance: “A key underlying contribution has come from progress made in macroeconomic stabilization and the introduction of sweeping structural reforms” (Quattara, 1997). This is regardless of the fact that most of these gains were of a one-off nature and attributable to a whole range of factors that have little to do with policy reforms. Improvements in terms of trade and a favorable climate (as shown in fluctuations in agricultural output) explain much more than the structural adjustment policies. The recent shift in terms of trade following the Asian financial crisis clearly demonstrates the fragility of African economies and their continued vulnerability to external factors. Already by 1997, the growth rates had begun to falter and were likely to fall further in the wake of the Asian crisis.

Recalling that Africa's dwindling share in the global economy is not due to anti-trade bias but due to rates of growth, there is also the ominous fact that investment, a key and robust determinant of long-term growth prospects, remains very low. The servile diligence of African governments has not led to the inflow of capital on a massive scale, leading to a spate of studies in which the “African factor” enters as the dummy variable in equations designed

to answer the following question: How much does being African explain the divergence between actual results and the predicted ones? Domestic savings have also declined during the adjustment years.

Advocates of globalization claim that participation in world markets would lead to a process of convergence of economies and productivity, as predicted by neo-classical trade and growth theory, and that the policies of adjustment were the right medicine for Africa's marginalization. Markets have been liberalized, economies made more open, public enterprises privatized. Thus far, at least, the African experience is that policies explicitly designed to ensure that this would happen have failed. As a result, "Africa represents the most stark example of ... 'limited convergence': the tendency of poorer developing countries to experience deteriorating relative income levels, in spite of having access, in principle, to higher rates of return on capital and higher possibilities for technological catch-up" (Mosley, 1996). Instead, structural adjustment in Africa has, thus far, meant reversing some of the structural changes that African governments sought to induce; they have been driven back to the production patterns of the colonial era through "back to the future" adjustment policies and through the process of de-industrialization (Mkandawire, 1988; Singh, 1987; Stein, 1992; Stewart, 1994). Ghana is back to being the 'Gold Coast', and Zambia is desperately trying to cling to its copperbelt, among other examples.

African economies were the quintessential "late, late comers" in the process of industrialization. I have argued elsewhere that African economies have somehow been out of step with developments in other parts of the globe (Mkandawire, 1988). When most economies embarked on import substitution industrialization by borrowing, much of Africa was under colonial rule, which permitted neither protection of domestic markets nor running of deficits. And even later, when much of industrialization was being financed through petrodollar loans, Africans were generally reluctant borrowers, so that eventually much of their borrowing was not for industrialization but to finance balance of payments gaps. The period of import substitution industrialization has been very short, although it is often wrongly equated in both content and

duration with that of Latin America. Yet the SAPs have called for policies that have prematurely exposed African industries to global competition thereby inducing widespread de-industrialization. Evidence that more successful cases have had shown kind of “industrial policy” has been dismissed on the grounds that African countries neither had the type of government nor the political acumen to prevent the ‘capture’ of these policies by rent seekers and patron-client networks. We have learnt from the ‘new trade theories’ and studies on technological development that countries run the risk of being permanently ‘locked in’ on a slow growth trajectory if they follow the dictates of static comparative advantage theory. Governments have introduced policies that generate externalities for a wide range of other industries, thereby directing the economy toward more growth-inducing engagement with the rest of the world. The overwhelming evidence, however, is that the dismissal of deliberate, strategic, industrial and trade policies that will shape Africa’s position in the global trading system runs the distinct danger of leaving Africa on the low productivity, low growth path.

Waiting for Foreign Capital

Perhaps the most persuasive promise made by the BWIs is that swallowing their nostrum would attract foreign capital. This, more than anything else, was the most attractive part of the adjustment package. To the seeming surprise of the purveyors of these policies, however, the response of private capital to Africa has been disappointing. But such a poor response among private investors – both domestic and foreign – should not have surprised anyone given the contraction of domestic markets through deflationary policies, increased competition from imported goods, the collapse of public services and infrastructure, and the political uncertainty engendered by policies that have undermined the ‘social pacts’ that hitherto provided a modicum of social cohesion and political stability.

The BWIs seem to be unaware of how their comings and goings are a source of uncertainty among businessmen. Contrary to IMF claims that compliance with its policies would signal credibility and attract foreign investment (Dhonte, 1997; IMF, 1997), the African experience has been that the IMF seal of approval

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is not taken seriously by the business community – and this was before the Asian crisis (Bird, 1997a; Bird, 1997b; Killick, 1995). The little foreign investment so far received has largely gone into mining (especially oil and gold extraction) in a few countries, and much less of it into manufacturing. This is understandable in the light of the now established history that economies placed on the IMF intensive care list never seem to recover.

Africa has a serious image problem, given the fact that it has to contend with the ‘Tarzan image’, which has proved surprisingly indelible in the minds of many. Some of the bad publicity is the making of Africa’s ‘enemies’ (the incurable racists), but much of it is either made by Africans themselves or their ‘friends’. The latter contribution to this image problem has taken two forms. One is the capacity of African leaders to produce incredible disasters that nourish the insatiable demand by the outside world for horror stories about the ‘dark continent’. The second is the mendicant tendency our leaders exhibit at international conferences. This posture is reinforced by our friends, who must incessantly harp on our misfortunes to drum up support for aid. I suspect that it is the combination of this mendicant attitude of our leaders and the paternalism of our ‘friends’ that has disqualified Africa from the global financial markets. A glaring example of this is that through the Economic Commission for Africa, African governments declared that they could not pay their debt at a time when their debt service ratios were much lower than those of the heavily indebted Asian and Latin American countries. The World Bank then lined African countries up for a blood transfusion of aid even though they were not anemic. Instead of exploring the very good African record of no default, Africans highlighted their minor weakness, presumably so that this would lead to debt write-offs. The wailing and clamor may eventually pay off, but only after they have discredited themselves as ‘the sick continent of the world’.

With such an image, Africa is unlikely to benefit from foreign savings for its accumulation purposes. Economic theory and empirical evidence support these conclusions. Africa’s image problem overshadows the ‘pull factors’ designed to attract foreign capital. We should add here that Africa’s repressive

regimes also cast a pall of censorship that makes the continent a still less attractive investment destination. We should not overlook the fact that in situations where the price system is limited, economic relations are often governed by contracts and reputation. The upshot of all this is that Africa will be hard put to attract investment outside of speculative activities and 'traditional' activities like mining, where conventional wisdom has always suggested that fabulous profits can be made.

Aid, Debt and Globalization

The most conspicuous form of Africa's presence in the global village is as a recipient of aid, which has increasingly taken a humanitarian form channeled through non-governmental organizations, partly to circumvent local state elites. The particular means chosen to assist or force African countries to adopt a particular method of adjustment has intensified Africa's aid dependence to such an extent that one now hears talk about African countries' 'addiction' to aid. In 1978, aid accounted for an average of 28 percent of central governments' expenditure, 48 percent of Gross Domestic Investment and 21 percent of imports of goods and services. By 1993, the figures were 62 percent, 99 percent, and 38 percent respectively. These are obviously unsustainable levels of dependency; and significantly, such ratios were at that time declining in other developing countries which relied more on private capital than official aid (Mosley, 1996).

At the end of 15 years of adjustment, African countries find themselves more heavily indebted than ever. Between 1980 and 1992, when export revenue was lower by nearly \$3 billion, sub-Saharan African debt to the IFIs increased by \$43 billion. Although the debt burden of African countries is minimal by world standards, the debt overhang it has produced for each country dims any prospect of recovery. It was Keynes who noted that if I owe you ten dollars I am in trouble, but if I owe you one million dollars you are in trouble. One characteristic feature of the African debt is that it is owed to official rather than private institutions. Second, the size of Africa's debt relative to total world debt poses no threat to the global system and will not lead to the emergency packages that we have seen for some Latin American and Asian

countries, or Russia. Yet the negotiations on what to do with Africa's debt have been conducted at a scandalously leisurely pace when compared with the sense of urgency with which rescue packages have been cobbled together for other parts of the world.

Democratization

One of the promises of the nationalist struggle was democratization. Indeed, the nationalists invoked the liberal ideology by which the imperialists swore to demand independence. However, no sooner had the nationalists come to power than they declared democracy an alien ideology and resorted to the variety of authoritarian regimes that have since then dominated much of Africa. In most cases the imperatives of nation-building and the exigencies of economic development or its ideologies of developmentalism were used to justify the authoritarian turn. Although the adherence to those ideologies by a number of leaders may have been opportunistic, there can be no doubt that they reflected widespread perceptions of the problems of the 'modernizing' state in Africa. The intellectual support for these positions was impeccable. It was conventional wisdom that nation-building in ethnically divided societies required a strong central authority: charismatic leaders and strong states would be needed to knead these diverse and putatively fissiparous identities into one.

Development and developmentalism also made the same demands on the political regimes that emerged. It was argued that the accumulation of capital needed a strong government for at least two reasons. First, it was necessary to hold in check the revolution of rising expectations and the myopic vision of the masses who sought instant gratification and failed to see that rapid growth would require the deferment of current consumption. It was taken as a matter of faith that democracy would tend to favor macro-economic populism, which would lead to high levels of public consumption and to fiscal crises as states sought to please their short-sighted voters. This trade-off between democracy and development was considered part of conventional wisdom. As a leading text of the time stated, the "political economy of development ... poses a cruel choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes" (Bhagwati, 1966:204).

The arguments still resonate in current discourses. Thus Krause (1995) argues that for the purpose of pursuing a path of rapid industrialization, a bureaucratic authoritarian regime is superior to other forms of authoritarianism and has performed better than democratic regimes.¹² Other more recent formulations of the same thesis are informed by the public choice school's skepticism about the rationality of democratic policy-making outcomes. Stephen Haggard (1990) has adduced this argument with respect to the ability of authoritarian regimes to pursue adjustment policies. Haggard (1990: 262) argues that

since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy from distribution pressures, they increase the government's ability to extract resources, provide public goods, and impose the short term costs associated with efficient economic adjustment. Weak legislatures that limit the representative role of parties, the corporatist organization of interest groups, and recourse to coercion in the face of resistance should all expand government's freedom to manoeuvre on economic policy.

More recent empirical tests have cast doubt on this 'iron law' of the trade off between democracy and development.¹³

By the 1990s, the struggles for democracy had intensified and a significant number of gains had been made. Donors also began to urge African countries to "get their politics right" if they were to receive any aid. However, democracy in Africa still has to contend with a redoubtable set of economic constraints, the ponderous interference of external institutions, and a dogmatic attenuation of available choices that produce what I have elsewhere labeled "choiceless democracies" (Mkandawire, 1999:119-137). What is the nature of these constraints and interferences?

Globalization and Democratization

A singular feature of the era in which attempts at democratization are being made is, of course, globalization. There are different views as to what globalization entails for democracies in the developing countries. On the one

hand, the ‘opening up’ of economies and societies, the political conditionalities transmitted through global institutions, and the solidarity from movements in global civil society are generally supportive of democratization efforts in many developing countries. In contrast, the demands of globalization, especially the erosion of national sovereignty and the absolutization of what are considered ‘fundamentals’ in economic policy, limit the range of options for democratic regimes. Those who hold the first view regarding the dominant effect of globalization consider democracy and economic liberalization as simply two sides of the same coin – the edification of a liberal order – and a natural convergence of processes that mark the triumph of the liberal capitalist order and “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992) – an end-state towards which teleology has dutifully moved all of us along and which so much of humanity has foolishly and futilely resisted. This ‘good-things-go-together’ approach is often derived from first principles where liberal democracy and free markets always go hand in hand since both processes entail the dispersion of power and the emergence of a bourgeoisie – both of which are said to be good for democracy. Those who subscribe to the other side of the globalization coin argue that since “liberal democracy was premised on the sovereignty of nation-states and assumed that the state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and limits imposed upon it by actors, agencies and forces operating within its territorial boundaries, by eroding national sovereignty globalization undermines a central tenet of liberal democracy” (Held, 1991: 141).

I have argued elsewhere that there is distinct danger that the “silent compulsions of market forces”, the constriction of social imagination through the peremptory foreclosure of options, and the economic conditionalities imposed by the IFIs are producing “choiceless democracies” where the governing elites have no power over economic policy, which is a central arena of democratic politics (Mkandawire, 1999). Globalization in a sense seeks to extrude the state from its local moorings, producing states that are not beholden to local interest, and that are autonomous, not with respect to the global, but with respect to the local. States seeking to signal foreign capital that they are in charge are tempted to assign maintenance functions to

institutions immune to liberal democratic political control. Central banks are a good example of institutions of state that pursue essentially maintenance activities beyond the reach of democratic control (Maxfield, 1997). Politicians have been quick to exploit these features and exigencies of globalization to shirk their responsibilities to the citizens and transfer all the blame to outsiders. As Evans (1997: 72) aptly states:

The effect of global ideological consensus (sometimes aptly labeled the "Washington consensus") on individual states goes well beyond the constraints imposed by any structural logic of the international economy. The fact that becoming more actively engaged in trying to improve local economic conditions risks the opprobrium, not just of powerful private actors, but also of the global hegemony makes any state intervention a very risky proposition. An ideology that considers such action neither possible nor desirable does, however, release the local state from responsibility for whatever economic woes its citizens may suffer at the hands of the global economy.

On the understanding that strong governments attract foreign investors, a number of leaders have not hesitated to engage in demonstrative violence, especially against protesting urban populations, to attract foreign attention. Leaders who are not fundamentally democratic are identified or symbolized as 'new leaders' who will carry forward Africa's renaissance.¹⁴ Such leaders are then armed to ensure the 'stability' of the state they control. A consequence of all this is the extroverted search for legitimacy by which the state is more preoccupied with external appreciation than domestic support.

This is far more serious in countries seeking to consolidate their newly established democratic regime. Such consolidation requires enhancing the credibility of democratic institutions and the legitimacy and respect of elected bodies. One aspect of this is that such bodies must be seen to be making meaningful decisions that apply equally to all citizens within the jurisdiction of the nation-state. Practices that suggest that there are authoritarian enclaves,

which are beholden to foreign interests and not accountable to local constituencies, erode the trust in democratic institutions and persuade citizens to seek options other than democratic ones. States must not only take measures to promote capital accumulation, but must do so in a politically legitimate and sustainable way. A state that only pays attention to policies that stimulate accumulation regardless of equity considerations will find its growth project falling apart as political strife undermines stability and scares off foreign capital. Equally, a state that focuses more on redistributive measures would eventually find itself with nothing to distribute. If African countries erred in the direction of the latter, they are now being pushed in the opposite – but equally futile – direction. Modern states must walk the tight-rope of accumulation and legitimation.

A surprising discovery for emerging democracies has been the rather lukewarm attitude of Western countries. The geopolitical concerns of the major powers have counted for more in the choice of African allies than adherence to a putatively similar ideology. The favored countries have been those who have some strategic importance or who pursue ‘market-friendly’ policies, regardless of their sordid human rights reputations or undeniably authoritarian tendencies. But even when donors have seemed to favor democratic regimes, they have preferred a ‘tropicalized’ version shorn of all the fundamental elements of democracy.

Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that the current direction of globalization, Africa’s own internal conditions and the manner in which Africa is being ‘adjusted’ to the exigencies of the world economy (globalization) are not supportive of the ‘historical mission’ that African nationalism had set for itself. Globalization has tended to paralyze the reformist impulses of the nationalist agenda, rendering them unviable in the face of the judgment and sanctions of international markets. There is, of course, nothing inevitable about all this. Close to 70 percent of Africans who are alive today were born after independence. Consequently, they are much less burdened by the colonial experience which tended to polarize responses to foreign interventions – either one was totally subservient (the much bemoaned “colonial mentality”) or

one was viscerally suspicious of any foreign solicitations. Freed from either of these historical burdens, the new Africans have a much more hard-headed appreciation of their condition. They find Africa's humiliating position unacceptable. There are at least three possible (but all equally wrong) ways of reacting to such an attitude: to escape into xenophobic 'fundamentalist' or 'nativist' positions, or to engage in blind celebration of the 'universal' or an uncritical embrace of globalization. These would constitute three ways of being lost, as suggested in the epigraph. And all three responses are, alas, not absent in Africa. The fate of Africa must not lie either in the rejection of those historical tasks and commitments, or the fatalistic embrace of forces of globalization, or in a retreat into some kind of nativism. Instead, it lies in a collective rethinking of Africa's unfulfilled humanistic tasks in the light of what has transpired and the concrete situation today, so as to recast them into key elements of development, social justice, solidarity and equality, to enable us to reconnect with the rest of world on our own terms, and in a mutually beneficial way.

We need to place on the agenda some of the key concerns of nationalist politics – such as equity, nation-building, and sovereignty – and we need much more creative institutional design to respond to the peculiarities of Africa's social pluralism. We may also have to rethink the attributes of the nation-state in Africa in terms of cultural diversity and territorial flexibility in order to give greater substance and authority to regional arrangements as the framework for the tasks of nation-building, social justice and solidarity.

The list of things to be done is daunting. However, our own recent history and the gains made by others who have faced similar problems should give us hope that these objectives are eminently attainable. Even more compelling is the argument that the plight of our people demands more imaginative responses and strategies to reconstruct societies and economies that would permit Africa to benefit from interactions with the rest of world.

Notes

¹ The importance of conflicts and their management was, of course a central feature of the theories of modernization. It now enters as a new variable in endogenous growth models. A systematic empirical analysis of this model will be found in the work of Dani Rodrik (1997a; 1998) in which he runs a series of regression analyses to test the hypothesis that the manner in which social conflicts interact with institutions of conflict management plays a central role in determining the persistence of a country's growth, its response to volatility in the external environment, and the magnitude of the growth collapse following a negative shock.

² A similar classification of models of the relationship between globalization and the state is proposed by Eatwell *et al* (1998).

³ See for example Bairoch and Kozul-Wright, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1996.

⁴ See for instance Held, 1991; Rosenau, 1998.

⁵ For an informed discussion of some of the implications of "governing without governments" see Reinicke (1998).

⁶ Those with a more historical view of Africa's development will note that the continent's current share of global trade is in fact what it was at the beginning of the century. What has happened is that Asia has regained its share, which it lost during the tumultuous 1930–50s period.

⁷ The invisibility of Africa in international affairs is not only confined to the world of journalism. In a survey of teaching courses in international relations studies in the USA, Dunn (n.d.) observes that Africa was "incredibly underrepresented" in the courses of some of the leading American universities. He gives the following rather shocking bibliometric information:

- In several cases, there were more readings on Antarctica than on Africa.
- Of the 91 readings listed in MIT syllabus, not one was on Africa – not even in the section on "ethnicity".
- Nor were there any readings on Africa among the 238 courses or readings at Columbia University,
- Harvard University had 116 readings, none on Africa
- Duke University had nothing on Africa out of 161.5.
- Yale had three out of 277.
- Brandeis did the best, with three out of roughly 250.

⁸ It is, however, ironic that the putative demise of *dependencia* should occur precisely as Africa entered the intensive care of neo-colonial tutelage during which the continent was to be most dependent on foreign institutions. The brighter prospects cast a revealing light on dependence. Could this be suggestive of the fact that 'dependence' is only a concern and independence imagined when Africa was most likely to break it? Interestingly, the new sensitivity to dependence is spurred not by economic relations but by political struggles. Democratization and the prospects of participation in policy-making have sharply brought out the conflict between democratic demands and the exigencies of policy dependence defined by a tantalizing number of conditionalities. Democratically elected governments have to contend with global forces that severely constrict the choices of policy-makers. Dependency now takes the form of "lack of ownership" of policies ensured by a cascade of conditionalities.

⁹ The extent of this dependence is highlighted by the case of Uganda where the World Bank is even assigned the task of soliciting funds from other donors for national projects, prompting Himbara and Sultan to go as far as referring to Uganda as a "bantustan state" (Himbara and Sultan, 1994). Polemics aside, the issues they point out are of general validity and have been recognized in the growing concern over 'ownership' of policies.

¹⁰ For a wide-eyed, celebratory account of these leaders, see Connell and Smyth (1998).

¹¹ Kwame Anthony Appiah is absolutely convinced that "The National Bourgeoisie that took on the baton of nationalization, industrialization, bureaucratization in the name of nationalism, turned out to be a kleptocracy. Their enthusiasm for nativism was a rationalization of their urge to keep the national bourgeoisie of other nations – particularly the powerful industrial nations, out of their way" (Appiah, 1992).

¹² This is far from an isolated view. For a discussion of similar views see Errson and Lane, 1996; Findlay, 1988; Leftwich, 1996a; Leftwich, 1996b; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Przeworski and Limongi, 1995; Sorensen, 1993.

¹³ For example, see Bardhan, 1993; Errson and Lane, 1996; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Przeworski and Limongi, 1995.

¹⁴ For this perspective on the "new leaders" see (Connell & Smyth, 1998).

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Chapter 4

Globalization and Africa's Future: A Case for Regional Cooperation and Integration

Severine M. Rugumamu

Introduction

As we begin a new millennium, the African continent remains marginal to almost all the major global transactions. Particularly during the last three decades, the share of African countries in the global distribution of wealth and power has shrunk almost irretrievably. Whatever aspect one considers – security, foreign investment, aid, trade, the information revolution, or the skilled labor force – Africa's prospects give little cause for jubilation. While the dynamics of intense economic competition, technological advancement and economic integration were underway in much of the world in the past two decades, Africa's economies and politics experienced one crisis after another. Not surprisingly, the short and medium-term prospects for most African countries are depressing, while the challenges to be faced in order to survive are equally daunting. It has become increasingly clear to most analysts and policy-makers across the continent that in order to arrest and reverse the scourge of marginalization and exclusion, Africans have to embrace fully the strategy of cooperation and integration as the *primum mobile* for sustainable social and economic development. The Abuja Treaty on African Economic Cooperation and Integration and the more recently adopted Sirte Declaration on African Political Union speak eloquently to the urgency of this development strategy.

Moreover, the ongoing processes of globalization, regionalization and liberalization are posing entirely new sets of complex challenges to the politically unstable, debt-ridden, aid-dependent, and technologically backward African economies. The individual countries' capacity to function effectively

and in a sustainable manner is becoming increasingly impossible. Particularly since the late 1970s, the social and economic conditions on the continent have been widely rated as the most deplorable in the world. This has been unambiguously reflected in weak growth in productive sectors, poor export performance, mounting debt, deterioration in social conditions, environmental degradation, and increasing decay in institutional capacity. Of the 47 countries classified by the United Nations as the least developed, no fewer than 32 are in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1992, the UN General Assembly added Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the former Zaire), and Madagascar to the list of the least developed countries. Botswana and Mauritius were the first two African countries to graduate from this club of the destitute (Harsh, 1992).

Even more telling, the incidence and depth of poverty have been on the rise since the 1970s. It was estimated that about 50 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's population live in abject poverty. The World Bank (1993) predicted in the early 1990s that given the continent's high population growth rates – over 3 percent a year – and low economic growth rates, as many as 100 million more Africans could be living in poverty at the turn of the 21st century. Commenting on this gloomy scenario, the 1997 *Human Development Report* concluded: “in a global economy of \$25 trillion, this is a scandal – reflecting shameful inequalities and inexcusable failure of national and international policies” (UNDP, 1997: 2).

What then are the implications of the New World Order for Africa? Does the end of the Cold War imply that there will be a peace dividend for the world at large, including Africa? How can the reality of the continent's appalling circumstances and the growing sense of despair be turned into hope and opportunity? How can African political economies, singly and collectively, position themselves strategically to minimize the costs of globalization? If African unity is the continent's sole salvation, what kinds of cooperation and integration arrangements are likely to secure its economic and political emancipation in the emerging global economy? What sorts of internal restructuring are needed to empower the region to take advantage of the current and future changes in the global order? What framework of rules and institutions

should be put in place to preserve the advantages of global markets and competition while ensuring that globalization works for people and not just for profits? These and similar questions structure the arguments of this chapter.

Framework of Explanation

The chapter employs a political economy approach to examine Africa's position and role in the world economy, and to analyze possible future scenarios. I follow Andrew Sayer in defining political economy as "approaches, which view economy as socially and politically embedded and as structured by power relations" (Sayer, 1995: iv). This construct also posits that one cannot isolate the processes of change in Africa from those occurring in the world economy as a whole, especially in view of the external economic and social penetration that have characterized African political economies from the colonial period to the present time. The approach seeks to situate contemporary developments in a historical trajectory, in order to account for current arrangements. Globalization is understood with respect to the global and national distribution of wealth, power and development and to the way in which political and economic struggles are waged over global resource distribution.

One of the objectives of this chapter is to propose future development scenarios for the African continent. Arguably, information about possible futures can help policy-makers take informed decisions, create new alliances and design new development policies and strategies. In his book, *The Future of the Future*, John McHale states that "by assuming the future, man makes his present enduring, his past meaningful" (1969:3). In other words, with a vision of the future, the past assumes meaning, and historical processes become clearer. However, as Tim Shaw poignantly observes, the "science" of social, economic and political forecasting remains an extremely primitive one. The forecasts that are usually produced represent only possible, not probable, futures (Shaw, 1982b: 38). This is rather obvious. The quality of the resulting analysis and policy prescriptions depends largely on the quality of the working assumptions that are made. One has to identify, on the one hand, elements that are likely to remain the same through the next two decades or so and, on the other hand, elements that are likely to change and head off in a different direction.

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Continuities and mutations are the ingredients of one's working assumptions. Unfortunately, basic assumptions are heavily dependent on certain conditions remaining constant, which is unlikely to be the case in today's fast-changing world. Of greater importance is that difficulties in attempting to predict Africa's future are further compounded by the continent's extreme dependence on the dynamics of the global political economy, which bring into play volatile external factors such as commodity prices and erratic flow of resources. Nonetheless, futuristic studies, despite the inherent flux of their fundamental bases, are likely to improve decision-makers' awareness of possible opportunities and challenges, and how best to respond to them.

Most forecasting projects are based on computer simulation models. They deal with a large number of interrelated factors when making forecasts of a particular phenomenon. These models command a significant legitimacy because they are quantitative, dynamic, and interactive. Central to quantitative methodologies in futuristic studies are trends, events and their impact. However, the construction of events or trends is problematic since both are possible only within peculiar, modern definitions of time and space. In addition to the probabilistic values assigned to the occurrence of an event, and acknowledged by the futures literature, there is a problem with the social construction of 'event', in that an event does not exist independently of an observer and his or her epistemology. The argument that both time and event are constituents of and not independent states outside perceptions and history damages any notion of objectivity that is the hidden thought behind the effort to develop a complex forecasting model. Central to these models is the view that there is a real world and, more of it can be captured or explained by more variables and increasingly complex interactions (Inayatullah, 1990; Armstrong, 1985).

Recognizing the time, data requirements, and personnel that would be required to develop a complex model, this chapter has settled for a less ambitious but more practical alternative. It presents an interpretative analysis of the continent's futures by discerning critical development trends: Africa's recent political economy, dynamics and key players, and the interest of these players in the global, regional and national political economies. Unlike earlier studies

of Africa's futuristic studies undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s, which were driven by the growing sense of economic crisis in the West (Shaw, 1982a; Mytelka and Langdon, 1979), this study has grown largely out of a sense of Africa's marginalization, exclusion and alienation, trends engendered by the processes of globalization. Since the end of the Cold War, evidence abounds to demonstrate that the quality and quantity of bilateral and multilateral aid to Africa has declined, portfolio flows and commercial lending are visibly bypassing most African economies, the new international trade regime is driven by rigorous World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and the continent's onerous foreign debt burden is given casual attention as Africa's geo-strategic significance has increasingly become marginal at best, or irrelevant at worst. It is therefore argued that the massive shift in the global balance of power that has followed the collapse of communism will have profound implications for the development prospects of African countries. It is important that these implications are studied, explained and exposed.

Recent Development Trajectories

The dominant explanation of Africa's poor economic performance was attributed largely to its allegedly state-centered approach to development. In its 1981 report, *An Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action*, the World Bank argued that, although structural and exogenous factors had contributed to the worsening of the sub-region's economic crisis, in a large measure the crisis had been exacerbated by inappropriate government policies that had adversely affected the efficient functioning of markets. In the Bank's opinion, by removing government-engineered distortions, increasing internal efficiency, and creating a stable macro-economic environment, governments could strengthen prospects for long-term productivity improvements, thereby helping to check the effects of adverse international conditions. These policy reforms came to be known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Viewed retrospectively, it was through the implementation of structural adjustment programs that African economies became part and parcel of the new wave of globalization. As David Reed concludes, structural adjustment policies virtually became economic policy instruments for the globalization process:

The impact of structural adjustment has transcended the national context for which it was designed and has played a fundamental role in restructuring the world economy. Policy lending, coupled with a new trade regime, has been the driving force in realigning major sectors of the developing world and Central and Eastern Europe in their relations with the highly industrialized nations, opening new capital and commodity markets, altering the functions of the state, and changing the terms on which working people offer labor. (Reed, 1996: 19)

Beginning from the early 1980s, most African governments reluctantly agreed to implement the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies and accepted direct outside interference in their economic policy management in exchange for desperately needed external aid. This development caused a sudden change in the role of the state, relative to both local and regional governance on the one side, and multilateral institutions and NGOs on the other. From then onwards, the international financial institutions took effective control of the continent's economy, and imposed a comprehensive programme of currency devaluation, privatization, market pricing, and macro-economic stabilization. Moreover, SAPs challenged the political as well as the economic sovereignty of African states by limiting the resources available to leaders to provide basic social services and public security, as well as political patronage. In due course, the international donor community added political accountability to the economic conditionalities already imposed through SAPs. The disbursement of donor aid came to be conditional on greater institutional transparency, broader political representation, government accountability, and democracy, broadly defined. The World Bank's 1989 report advised African countries of the need to attack corruption and mismanagement, promote the autonomy of the judiciary, and create an enabling environment for resource mobilization, democracy and participatory politics (World Bank, 1989).

Within Africa, civic groups and opposition politicians seized the opportunity created by the weakening of the existing autocratic regimes, and the more

supportive international environment, to push for political change. In Benin, and later across West Africa, national conferences were held to renegotiate the fundamental social contract that legitimized political power. A return to civilian rule, elections, and multi-party democracy followed these conferences. Elsewhere in Africa, pressure for political reform, particularly multi-party elections, made democratic procedures a crucial new element in African politics. Non-state actors that played an ever-larger role in the affairs of the continent further eroded the sovereignty of nation-states. In addition to international financial institutions and organizations such as the United Nations, others such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch, exerted enormous influence on what were once considered the prerogative of the state. Committed to high principles, and unwilling to make allowances for context, human rights non-governmental organizations, for example, have been critical of almost all African governments. Most telling, particularly from the mid-1980s, Africa became the largest recipient of food aid and humanitarian assistance, and NGOs became the main agencies for delivering and managing such aid, to the extent that in net terms, NGOs collectively were transferring more resources to the South than was the World Bank. This trend has been encouraged mainly by the increasing willingness of Northern donor governments and multilateral institutions to direct official aid away from African states, and through NGOs. Typical relief programs, for example, involved a contractual relationship between an international bilateral or multilateral donor and an NGO, whereby the latter would act as an implementing agency for the former in an agreed program of assistance (Duffield, 1994:58-60).

The dynamics of globalization have steadily undermined the African state's ability to provide public security. While there is an imperative for developing countries to integrate into the global economy and reform their economies, the policies that African governments have been encouraged to adopt have often undermined political stability and public security. The downsizing of the police force, as a result of either a cessation of conflict or the adoption of economic policies that necessitated reduced military expenditures, has given rise to a security dilemma, including the proliferation of private security

companies that provide security services to individuals. In addition, inappropriate demobilization and integration of ex-combatants in post-conflict situations has led to the growth private armies and other mercenary forces seeking employment in foreign conflicts.

Kalevi Holsti (1996) has observed that the end of the Cold War left weak states not only bereft of internal legitimacy but also unable to manage military challenges from warlords, unruly strongmen, rebel movements, mercenary forces or frustrated subjects. Once such destabilizing spirals of violence reach a critical threshold, they often generate traumatic conflicts, lawlessness and state collapse. In order to defend themselves from such threats, some African states have resorted to private armies, security companies, and even mercenaries. By the same token, in the absence of adequate and reliable public security, private businesses and prominent individuals in society have become increasingly reliant on the services of private security firms for their protection.¹ The Angolan government, for example, has recently made it part of its constitution that foreign investors provide their own security arrangements (O'Brian, 1999: 54). This clearly shows how far some weak African states have been forced to privatize national security!

As Africa's national armies and police forces were shrinking in size and effectiveness, the demand for the services of private military companies and security firms rose exponentially. The provision of national security was increasingly and exclusively reserved for specific individuals and influential groups while being virtually denied to the rest of society. At the same time, the privatization of public security engendered a proliferation of non-state armed actors, including rebel movements, insurgents, warlords, guerilla groups, and mercenary forces. For these groups, security is undertaken for and on behalf of certain sections of the population, and not for others. A convergence of influences and actors, including the availability of small arms and war entrepreneurs, has led to the militarization of society, which undermined peace efforts in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As will be discussed presently, with the increasing reluctance of the West to intervene militarily in African

conflicts, especially where they do not have any major strategic interests, new types of security entrepreneurs have been employed to fill the security and defence gap. Some of the most popular private security companies include Military Professional Resources Inc. and DynCorp from the United States; Defence Systems Ltd and Sandline International from the United Kingdom; and Silver Shadow and Levadan from Israel. The South African-based security firm, Executive Outcomes, had the greatest success in Angola and Sierra Leone, where rebel forces had jeopardized the integrity and stability of the state and undermined diamond production. In these two cases, sovereign states invited a private security company to assist in maintaining state security (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). As Jean-Francois Bayart and colleagues have perceptively concluded in their essay on kleptocracy in Africa, "one of the consequences of this particular conjuncture of factors is an erosion of the very foundations of political regimes ... of states themselves" (Bayart *et al*, 1999: 1). Even more ominously, some African states have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within their jurisdiction. In short, Africa's future lies, among other requirements, in re-conceptualizing innovative strategies of national security and development. In the following pages, an analysis is made of Africa's role in the emerging global economy.

The Globalization Thesis and Its Critics

Globalization is one of the most contested issues of today. It is everywhere in public discourse. Surprisingly, for such a globally dominant process, there is no single or unanimous definition. Like all popular phenomena, globalization has many meanings. It means vastly different things to different people. To some, it is synonymous with the growth of global corporations, whose far-flung operations transcend national borders and allegiances. To others, the term is closely linked with the information revolution and the mobility of money, ideas, labor and new technologies that have been instrumental in bringing the world economy closer together. Given such a diversity of meanings, no simple and straightforward definition can be offered. Globalization, however, denotes movements in both the intensity and extent of international transactions: in the former sense, globalization overlaps to some degree with related ideas of integration, interdependence, multilateralism, openness, and interpenetration,

in the latter sense. It points to the geographical spread of these tendencies and is cognate with globalism, spatial compression, universalization and homogenization. The political and economic dynamics in the European Union, North America, and Japan clearly exhibit these tendencies (Clark, 1997: 1–3).

The globalization processes, writes Anthony McGrew, “stimulate forces of opposition which may just as readily lead to an increasingly fragmented world” (1992: 23). In this sense, therefore, fragmentation is a dialectical response to globalization. It represents an opposite tendency which has two dimensions: on the one hand, it suggests disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure and isolation; on the other hand, the trend is towards nationalism, regionalism, spatial distention, separatism, and heterogeneity. It is important to emphasize the fact that the anti-systemic forces that bring these about may take a plurality of collective actions, all of them having a high destructive potential. The first, and the most visible, of their strategies is to establish new, yet less conventional linkages with the world economy via the criminal economy: drug production and trafficking, illegal arms trade, smuggling, and trafficking in human beings (women and children in particular), or even in human organs for transplants in the private clinics of the North. A second reaction is the cause of utter desperation through widespread violence, either individual or collective, which has transformed major cities in the South into savage, self-destructive battlegrounds. In Africa, the collective frustration over the disintegration of economies and societies often expresses itself through ethnic conflicts, bloody civil wars and collapse of states. The third reaction that is rapidly developing in African countries is the rise of ideological or religious fundamentalism, easily associated with terrorism. The logic of exclusion embedded in the process of globalization is met with reciprocal appeals for exclusion of the dominants by the excluded. The shift from economic exploitation to sheer irrelevance among marginalized sections of the African population, in relation to the dominant dynamics of the system, leads to the breakdown of any positive relationship between the North and South (Castells, 1993: 38).

The ardent proponents of globalization depict it as a process driven by irrefutable economic laws or logic, irrepressible market forces, and irresistible

technological developments. In common language, however, these notions refer to the corporate production and investment strategies of giant transnational companies and other enterprises, as well as the world-wide investment strategies and speculative financial transactions such firms. Partly because of greater competition associated with the expanded role of the private sector, and partly because of the impact of new technologies, they claim that many firms, markets and entire industries have become global in nature. Some major firms' value-adding activities occur in numerous countries, both developed and developing, and within as well as across regions. While finance is an example of a globalized market, automobile and consumer electronics are examples of globalized industries in which transnational corporations integrate, coordinate and control cross-border value-added activities. Sources of comparative advantage – capital, know-how, experience and technology, for example – are thus transferred across borders in greater quantities, as more and more countries participate jointly at various stages of the value-adding processes of an industry (UNCTAD, 1992: 102–104).

The most eloquent proponents of the extreme view of globalization assert that since the 1980s the global processes in which national cultures determine a greater part of social life, national economies and national borders are dissolving. Central to these assertions is the notion of a truly globalized economy. The emergence of such a system, it is claimed, makes distinct national economies and, therefore, domestic strategies of national economic management irrelevant. Finally, it is claimed that globalization engenders efficient production, financial discipline in the economy, cheaper products and services in a greater variety, and a global approach to problems of unemployment and welfare. The rapid growth of financial markets, new technologies, world trade, and foreign direct investment over the last two decades are the principal manifestations of the globalized world economy. This phenomenal integration of the world economy, it is argued, has largely been promoted by a worldwide wave of economic liberalization – lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade, encouragement of foreign investment, and the deregulation of financial markets (Ohmae, 1990).

Globalization is not only an analytical concept, but also a highly emotive and ideological one. At a political level, the appeal is partly to liberal and democratic hopes for the spread of democracy and peace throughout the world. It is also emotive to more right-wing dreams about the final destruction of socialism as a luxury that one cannot afford any more, in the face of the global competitive threat. For the right, such dreams are a vindication: communism has been defeated; and capitalism has triumphed. The “end of history” has been announced and “market triumphalism swept the board” (Fukuyama, 1992). At the ideological level, Gill argues that there has been a dramatic shift towards a neo-liberal, disciplinary world order. It involves the growing strength and positional power of neo-liberal ideas, their application in the practices and organizational forms of key social institutions, and the reconfiguration of material power relations and a redistribution of wealth. He relates the distributive justice of this system to a verse from the Biblical Gospel according to St Matthew: “to him that hath shall be given, from him that hath not shall be taken away” (Gill, 1995).

In more recent years, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations and the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994 contributed immensely to a rapid institutionalization of the so-called new world order by extending the realm of free markets well beyond international trade matters. The WTO has presided over a world-wide wave of economic liberalization, by lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers in international trade, encouraging direct foreign investment, and deregulating financial markets.² The ambit of trade liberalization under the WTO has been expanded to include services, intellectual property rights, agricultural commodities, and textiles. Other critical players in the integration of the global economy include transnational corporations and transnational banks; multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the European Union (EU); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);³ and other the powerful states in the global system. Less widely recognized but also significant is the ascendancy of a new legal regime in international business transactions that is dominated by US firms and Anglo-American conceptions of business (Sassen, 1996). With knowledge, prestige, and

resources at their disposal, these organizations have promoted the ongoing globalization process as an objective truth among their members in the West and the rest of the world. African states and societies, in particular, have been advised to liberalize and integrate as quickly and fully as possible into the world economy in order to receive as much foreign aid and trade preferences from the rest of the world as possible.

According to some scholars, the new wave of globalization began during the prolonged economic crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, which ended the post-World War II era of prolonged economic growth and full employment in the North. A number of developments in the world economy precipitated this. The first was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the OPEC-induced oil crises of the 1970s. To compensate for domestic uncertainty, major financial institutions sought wider investments outlets for the Eurodollar, increased and flexible bank lending to the South, and additional markets. Secondly, there was a gradual shift from Fordist production methods to a more flexible system. Thirdly, there was change in the organization of production – from the single, large, nationally rooted, oligopolistic corporation toward a more complex, globally organized, multinational enterprise with a less rigid structure and relying on smaller firms for its operation (Reich, 1989).

A number of Western governments began, one after another, to tear up old social contracts by abandoning Keynesian employment policies and the equitable distribution of income, tightening credit, cutting back on social spending, and attacking organized labor. The objective of this neo-conservatism, the centerpiece of which were neo-liberal economic policies, was to create a new environment for growth and private accumulation. The effect of these policy shifts on most political economies of the South in general, and of Africa in particular, was catastrophic and long lasting (Loxley, 1998).

However, critics of the globalization thesis who address the longer-term aspects of capitalist development are experiencing *déjà vu* in the alleged novelties of the recent changes in the global economy. The current changes, while significant and distinctive, are not unprecedented, and do not necessarily

entail a transition to a new type of economic system. The basic criticism arises from a commonsense but often forgotten observation; namely, that the international economy is not global yet. For example, markets for strategic industries and major security firms are still far from being fully integrated. Capital flows are still restricted by currency and banking regulations; the mobility of labor is undermined by immigration controls and xenophobia; and multinational enterprises still keep most of their assets and their strategic command centers in their home countries.

The notion of globalization has come under spirited attack from many quarters. Specifically, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1999), David Held and others (1999), and Ankie Hoogvelt (1997) have argued that, in fact, globalization is not a supra-human process created by abstract and unchallengeable market forces, or by intangible and uncontrollable technological forces. The emerging global system is a societal construct, driven and shaped as required, by national, international and transnational players. Moreover, they demonstrate that the present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented. It is one of several distinct conjunctures of the international economy that have taken place since the industrial economy extended its reach to other parts of the world from the 1860s. These critics review the historical evidence of world trade and capital flows in relation to output, the degree of financial and monetary integration, and the character of governance in the international economy. They come to the firm conclusion that, in fact, the level of integration, interdependence and openness of national economies in the present era is not unprecedented. Capital markets were by some measure more integrated at the beginning than at the end of the 20th century. Finally, multinational enterprises are still confined to their home territories in terms of their overall business activity, that is, in terms of location of sales, affiliates, declared profits, research and finance. In some respects, they maintain, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914.

Others also argue that capital mobility is not producing massive shifts of investment and employment from advanced to developing countries. Rather,

foreign direct investment, technological capacity, industrial production and markets are highly concentrated among the advanced industrial economies of the European Union, Japan and North America. These three major clusters of economic power have the capacity, especially if they coordinate policy, to exert powerful governance pressures over the financial markets and other economic tendencies. Global markets are thus by no means beyond regulation and control, even though the divergent interests of the great powers limit the current scope and objectives of economic governance. The Third World countries, apart from a minority of newly industrialized countries, remain essentially marginal both in terms of investment and trade. Some studies have projected that losses from globalization could be outweighed by gains; but invariably those losses will be concentrated in the group of countries that can least afford them. For example, the least developed countries as a group, largely concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, stand to lose up to US \$600 million a year in the next five to eight years (Harrison, Rothford and Tar, 1995: 38–40; UNDP, 1997: 82).

Admittedly, earlier theoretical insights like those of accumulation on a world scale (Amin, 1974), the development of underdevelopment (Frank, 1978), the world system thesis (Wallerstein, 1974), unequal exchange (Emmanuel, 1972), and dependency theory (Rodney, 1972) sought to provide various frameworks to explain the inner structure and dynamics of capitalism as well as the nature of the relations between the “center economies” and the “periphery economies” of the same system. In this regard, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argue that “if the theorists of globalization mean that we have an economy in which each part of the world is linked by market sharing close to real-time information, then it began not in the 1970s but in the 1870s” (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 9–10). More pointedly, Giovanni Arrighi (1999: 55) argues that the economic expansion and transformation of the last two decades should not be construed as novel except for their scale, scope and complexity.

As discussed earlier, the impact of globalization is uneven. On the one hand, some countries, but even more so corporations, have been considerably more

able than others to reap the benefits from trade, investment, and technological and scientific transformations arising from global restructuring. Globalization forces have led to creative processes producing new technologies, devising more and better tradable goods and services, and expanding the range of opportunities. For example, human development indicators such as literacy, school enrolment, infant mortality, and life expectancy have enormously improved world-wide in the past few decades. However, the major beneficiaries are the OECD nations. Moreover, the Cold War has ended and the prospects for the peaceful settlement of old disputes have improved markedly from West Asia to South Africa and Northern Ireland. Democracy has spread throughout the world and has replaced many autocratic regimes.

On the other hand, the relative reduction in the power of national governments world-wide, combined with the spread of free markets and of technological innovation without the corresponding authority to regulate and hold them accountable, has contributed to the marginalization of large regions and groups of people. Unemployment, poverty, inequality, social exclusion, gender inequalities, and alienation are increasing the world over, partly as a result of the current wave of globalization. Crime, drugs, terrorism, violence, civil wars, disease and environmental destruction are becoming globalized (UNDP, 1996). The greatest opportunity for the businessmen-cum-warlords who drive the continuing conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia is trade through the parallel global economy. This alternative form of global trade often provides both the incentive and the means for continued conflict. In a sense, therefore, globalization has fueled conflicts in the marginalized parts of the global system.

Moreover, the IMF/World Bank-sponsored policies have forced African economies to the very fringes of the global economy, and left the majority of citizens living in poverty and misery. International competition for market shares and jobs has forced African governments to reduce taxation, and either withdraw subsidies for or privatize the social services that protected the poor, and cut those public services and regulations that protected the environment. Above all, globalization has forced governments and firms to 'downsize' or

‘restructure’ to ensure that the cost of labor is kept low. These anti-poor, anti-environment policies are the source of widespread resistance to globalization on the continent. They have spurred the development of a wide spectrum of non-governmental organizations that are at the forefront of efforts to block reforms. Some labor unions and opposition political parties have mobilized against neo-liberalism. In some countries, revolutionary groups have emerged with the explicit objective of rolling back market reforms. Governments thus have to grapple with protests and demonstrations, strikes and work stoppages, land seizures, riots, and civil disobedience and even armed rebellion (Streeten, 1998; Onimode, 1989).

As the 1996 *Human Development Report* perceptively observed, globalization is not a positive-sum game but rather “a two-edged sword ... with winners and losers” (UNDP, 1996: 82). The distribution of costs and benefits is asymmetrical across countries, sectors, firms, social groups and classes as well as individuals. The policies that are promoted in the name of globalization have not addressed human development problems; nor has the expansion of trade and foreign investment benefited developing countries. Indeed, globalization is distributing wealth and opportunity in the wrong direction – from the poor to the rich instead of the opposite. As the Oxfam submission to the UK government on globalization concluded, “this is morally indefensible, economically inefficient, and socially unsustainable. Left unattended, extreme economic inequalities between countries are likely to generate political instability and undermine the very foundations of multilateralism” (Oxfam, 2000: 2).

The neo-liberal orthodoxy has become the only development model and mobilizing ideology in Africa. It is claimed that globalization is inevitable; it is part of the inexorable rise of the global village. There is no alternative to the rationality and efficiency of the free market. In the words of Francis Fukuyama (1989: 3) “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to western liberalism”. According to this thesis, the only hope for the rest of the world is to imitate the most successful countries as quickly as possible and abandon all ideas of alternative approaches, solutions and visions. In this regard, the

deregulation of markets and prices, privatization of enterprises, the downsizing of governments, and the liberalization of trade have become indispensable policy initiatives that are expected to enhance both efficiency and welfare in all countries. In these circumstances, the capacity of African countries to create and sustain alternative economic niches in the global system is, to say the least, very limited. As the following section demonstrates, the continent lacks not only the requisite policy instruments and the institutional and technical capacity to reap the much-heralded benefits of globalization, but, most especially, individual national economies are too weak to respond decisively to the rigorous demands of the world economy.

Africa's Future

Scenario 1: Muddling Through the Status Quo

Addressing possible futures in Africa is admittedly full of pitfalls. As already noted, even though prediction techniques and instruments have been substantially developed, the future is, as ever, uncertain. The art of prediction is largely dependent on the assumption that certain conditions will remain constant, which, in today's rapidly changing world, is unlikely to be the case. Nonetheless, in an attempt to construct and predict Africa's future, several assumptions have been made. We start with the assumption that the development pattern in the global political economy will be increasingly guided by the neo-liberal economic doctrine. It is also assumed that despite considerable diversification of economic links by African states in the last three decades since independence, Europe will remain the most significant economic partner for most of Africa. It should be briefly mentioned that Europe will probably strive to multilateralize its African relations largely through the WTO. It is further assumed that African economies will not formally join any of the three major trading blocs. However, singly and/or collectively, African countries will be vertically integrated into the EU and North American (NAFTA) markets through the post-Lomé Convention and African Growth and Opportunity Act arrangements respectively. As relatively weak actors in the prevailing system, the behavior of African states is likely to be reactive rather than proactive.

The globalization of production and markets pose an entirely new set of challenges to public authorities, economic agents, and social actors in both the developed and developing parts of the world. This is particularly so as the global economy diversifies internally into three regions and their related areas of influence: North America, the European Union and the Asian Pacific region. Around this triad of power, wealth, and technology, the rest of the world becomes organized in a hierarchical and asymmetrically interdependent web, as different countries and regions compete to attract capital, human skills, and technology to their shores. Barbara Stallings (1993) has proposed an insightful analysis of the simultaneous concentration and regionalization of the global economy by arguing as follows:

Present data show that trade and investment are increasing rapidly both within the so-called triad area (the US, Japan and Europe) and between these blocs. Other areas are being marginalized in the process ... The concept is non-hegemonic interdependence. The different types of capitalism that exist in the three regions have given rise to different economic performance. The result is conflict and cooperation, divergence and convergence.

Moreover, the present first and second tier of newly industrialized countries (NICs) can be expected to continue to enjoy relatively high rates of growth, while a small number of countries in the South, such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and India, may graduate to that status. However, economic relations between the triad and the NICs have revealed that African countries should not expect any charitable treatment from the world's powerful economies. Moreover, there is little to suggest that these countries will willingly open their markets to labor-intensive manufactured goods should Africa decide to industrialize aggressively. Nor are they likely to have any significant interest in Africa's tropical agricultural products. As already pointed out, other than petroleum, gold and uranium, most African primary exports will continue to experience increasingly low demand from the North. The persistent policy recommendation by the World Bank to increase Africa's primary commodity exports and diversify into non-traditional primary

commodities (World Bank, 1989: 132) is thus, to say the least, hypocritical, myopic and dangerous. Such policy initiatives will lead Africa deeper and deeper into economic stagnation, reinforcing systemic risks, and speed up the process of its marginalization.

Under this scenario, African states will gradually decline in terms of relevance to the EU, so that the latter will lose real interest in maintaining the traditional “special relationship”. The EU, under increased pressure from the WTO, will slowly but inexorably phase out the trade preferences that the African countries have enjoyed over the past three decades under the Lomé Convention. WTO rules will also systematically undermine the Lomé Convention’s multiple privileges and preferences, which have allowed Africa’s goods unfettered access to European markets. Already the EU has liberally interpreted the WTO’s free trade requirements to mean that at least 90 percent of imports on both sides should be free of tariffs and that no sector should be completely excluded. This means that African governments will be allowed to retain for a while their current preferential access to the EU market, but in return they will have to progressively open their own markets to EU imports. This transitional process would be completed within ten years of the agreement. After the transitional period, African economies will be expected to compete with the EU on the basis of productivity, product quality, timely delivery of orders and the like (Yeats, 1995).

The very idea of a transitional period of ten to fifteen years, by which time African economies are expected to advance to the level on which European and American firms compete, is absurd. This idea contradicts both logic and history; it undermines the very spirit behind the special and preferential treatment provided under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Evidence from the 1997 UNDP *Human Development Report* indicates that, if anything, the gap between rich and poor nations is widening, not narrowing. The world is characterized not by the equal distribution of wealth and well being among nations but by a growing polarization between rich and poor nations, and between people within countries (UNDP, 1997).⁴ Such relatively short transition periods therefore show clearly the EU’s lack of real interest

in the African continent. Secondly, this new thinking reflects the EU's increasing desire to exchange foreign aid for market access in its future partnership with developing countries. Thirdly, and as earlier noted, with the decline in the geopolitical, ideological, and security significance of African countries for Europe following the end of the Cold War, and with the enlargement of EU membership to include countries with little or no colonial or traditional links with Africa, the old arguments for non-reciprocity are no longer compelling.

Whereas Africa used to account for the largest share of EU aid disbursements, it has experienced a sharp decline from 70 percent at the beginning of the 1970s to less than 40 percent by the mid-1990s. Moreover, slow and complex disbursement procedures in Brussels have compounded the absolute decline in the quantity of aid. In addition, OECD countries, in more recent years, have been parading the argument that the shortfalls in official aid flows will be compensated by private capital flows. But as pointed out earlier, Africa's share of global flow of direct investment fell from 21 percent in 1980 to only 5 percent in 1997. For most prospective investors, Africa is a bottomless sinkhole that swallows money with little or no returns. Not surprisingly therefore, during the 1980s, for example, 43 out of 139 British firms with industrial investment in Africa withdrew their holdings, mostly from Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Some observers have predicted that this trend is likely to continue in the future if Africa's investment climate does not improve appreciably (Callaghy, 2000: 47).

Colin Leys projects Africa's future in a similarly pessimistic vein. He argues that some states in Africa – the small, poor, island, land-locked, disadvantaged, highly indebted, and ethnically divided – cannot compete in the increasingly sophisticated international market. He adds:

Most observers accept that significant parts of the former Third World, including most of sub-Saharan Africa, are more likely to regress than to advance in the new global economy; it is in the nature of unregulated competitive systems that this will happen. Not every country has the

capacity to compete in the market; a few will succeed, while others will decline and some will collapse into civil wars or anarchy, as Uganda, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda already have in Africa, at different times.
(Leys, 1995: 42)

According to this scenario, the current international economic relations will remain essentially unchanged throughout the foreseeable future. Most of Africa will continue to find itself marginalized and excluded from the world economy, but highly dependent on it. As already pointed out, under the economic regime of globalization, most countries in Africa will have limited capacity to respond flexibly to external competition and will experience a diminished demand for their traditional exports. But we should add that the trajectory of development of individual countries would also be directly affected by internal political and economic configurations. More than any other actor, the role of the state will be paramount. Its overall capacity – the technical, regulatory, extractive and administrative capabilities – to provide the essential political and economic infrastructure, as well as formulate and implement proper economic policies, will be critical. These capacities will be decisive in facilitating the positioning of respective countries in the international political economy and in taking advantage of new mechanisms of global economic governance. They will also be critical in influencing a country's effectiveness in bargaining and interacting with all types of actors – private business groups, states, the international financial institutions and NGOs. It is therefore predicted that African countries that are likely to reap any significant benefits from the emerging global economy are those which will develop and nurture strong institutional capacities, seek to keep pace with technological development, create and sustain efficient and competitive production structures, and respond flexibly and imaginatively to changing tastes and trends on demand in the global market.

Very few African countries are likely to benefit through limited trade, manufacturing sub-contracting, or investment. In the process of the globalization of production, multinational enterprises are likely to relocate

segments of their integrated processes to some African countries. A few relatively dynamic political economies, such as Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Senegal, Tunisia, and Egypt, are likely to become favoured locations for a segment of industries such as automobiles, semi-conductors in electronics, and data entry in insurance, for example. In the process, these economies may become significant players in the relevant industry. Sources of comparative advantage – capital, know-how, experience, and technology, for example – will thus be transferred across borders in greater quantities, as more and more sectors of various national economies participate in various stages of the value-adding process of industry (UNCTAD, 1992: 104). However, as various studies have shown, the benefits accruing to the countries that thrive on low production costs at the lower end of the global manufacturing assembly line (for example the Bangkok area or the *maquiladora* industries in northern Mexico) are not sustainable. Cheap labor is no longer a sufficient comparative advantage when the IT revolution has easily replaced unskilled labour while also improving quality (Castells and Tyson, 1989). Consequently, constant technological upgrading will be required in order to remain attractive to foreign investors.

The North's tariffs and non-tariff barriers on textiles, clothing, and other products of particular importance to developing countries in general and to African economies in particular are also not likely to come down as quickly as might be expected. Important sectional lobbyists in the North are likely to prolong their protection for many years to come. It is also anticipated that new kinds of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions, export restraint agreements such as the Multi-Fiber Agreement, and direct subsidies, will not go away as quickly as might be expected. In short, whatever gains some African countries expect to make from the present liberalized trading system are likely to be not only small but also short-lived. In a world economy of stiff competition, the weak are likely to die before their time!

As for the rest of the non-oil-producing African countries, especially those that are aid-dependent and debt-ridden, the future prospects are dismal,

suggesting a lack of growth possibilities, and of development and choice. The simultaneous processes of global exclusion and dependence are likely to continue and will probably deepen their marginalization. The negative impact of the deteriorating terms of trade will be particularly severe for these poor African countries, partly due to their higher dependence on price-volatile primary products and partly due to their relatively low accessibility to capital, which might help ride out these negative shocks (Helleiner, 1993). Given the current trends in external financial transfers, the losses from deteriorating terms of trade are not likely to be offset by future aid and loan transfers. The debt burden will continue to cause untold havoc for most poor African economies. At the same time, in order to stay healthy, the North will need Africa largely as a dumping ground for the disposal of its garbage: such as toxic waste, low quality goods and pornographic material, kitsch art, outdated and polluting technologies, surplus food stocks, and dubious business people. Many African countries, strapped for cash, or burdened with corrupt governments, or both, are likely to become a safe destination for such garbage from the West. The resultant social and environmental consequences could be truly calamitous.

The perpetuation, and even intensification, of dependence on Northern institutions and economic systems is likely to pose considerable problems for decision-makers in the years to come. Claims regarding the triumph of bourgeois rationality and the “end of history” do not portend tolerance of alternative pathways to development. Donors, no longer preoccupied with security considerations, are likely to push aggressively for political and economic liberalization, disallowing any distinctive local paths to democracy and development. Moreover, fresh opportunities for opening up democratic spaces under such inauspicious conditions are bound to have a catalytic effect on identity expressions, and ethno-regional or religious demands. These forces may violently challenge incumbent regimes as much as notions of citizenship and territoriality. Networks based on so-called primordial attachments are likely to emerge in response to the decline in state capacities, not least with respect to the preservation of civil peace and individual security. Worst of all, structural forces embedded in predatory economic strategies and the

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inequitable distribution of income and wealth will further feed the spiral of violence.

*After looking at what was taking place in West Africa, Robert Kaplan's sensational article in the **Atlantic Monthly** portrayed the entire continent as a "prototype of the coming anarchy". He described a continent mired in endemic political chaos and collapsed states, filth and new epidemics, population explosion and massive slums, "unprovoked crime" and lawlessness. All this, he argued, would rise from a degenerative African political culture, one festering in the crucible of a life-and-death struggle by a mushrooming population that fights over a shrinking natural resource base and that causes massive environmental degradation. Kaplan predicted that, "Africa's immediate future could be very bad. The coming upheaval, in which embassies are shut down, states collapse, and the contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering" (Kaplan, 1993: 110–116).*

Viewed retrospectively, Kaplan's predictions are probably close to the mark when one considers in particular two major regional wars that affected the African continent for more than a decade: the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, involving ten countries, and the war that has raged within the Senegal-Côte d'Ivoire axis involving over five other countries. Such protracted conflicts undoubtedly usher in a trail of violence, institutional breakdown, corruption, state erosion, and economic decay. The consequences of civil conflicts invariably spread beyond the country's borders. Regional security is undermined; small weapons proliferate; communities and trade are interrupted, especially if sanctions are imposed; and environmental damage becomes severe. Approximately 8.1 million of the world's 22 million cross-border refugees live in Africa, with many more millions of internally displaced persons. It is apparent that neither the United Nations nor the African Union

can deal effectively with the conflicts racking African countries. The Hobbesian political logic of “war of all against all” is the most likely proposition in a good number of African countries.

Meanwhile, low-intensity conflicts simmer in Burundi, Rwanda, Chad, Djibouti, Uganda, Congo (Brazzaville) and several other countries. Besides these an overwhelming number of African states are characterized by a high degree of political instability and a real risk of state collapse. In these states, legitimacy is constantly being contested. For most of the time, the state machinery is preoccupied with regime survival. Some of these states, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola and Côte d’Ivoire, have had periods of relative stability and political tolerance, and could overcome their present difficulties with creative leadership. However, the pull toward instability and violence is strong because the overall institutional environment of democracy, good governance, peace and stability remains highly tenuous, if not volatile.

In another sense, Kaplan’s sensational predictions are well captured by the challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. About 90 percent of the estimated 33 million people infected with the HIV virus in 1999 live in the South, where drugs designed to mitigate the effects of the disease and where prophylaxes to prevent its spread are too costly for all but the few wealthy countries. Structural adjustment-induced budgetary cuts in health services and the lack of generic drugs due to strict patent laws deprive poor people of life-saving drugs. AIDS is now the major cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 1995). In Zimbabwe, for example, before the onslaught of the AIDS virus, life expectancy was 65 years; by 2015, it is projected to fall to 39 years. What is even worse is that the problem has the potential to alter the demographics of the continent, particularly in the area of gender balance, to a degree not seen since the slave trade: about 60 percent of the total infected population are women. With more than one-fifth of the adult population infected with the virus, Africa is likely to lose many of the agronomists, engineers and teachers necessary to sustain development. Above all, the incidence and spread of malaria and other communicable diseases is rising throughout sub-Saharan Africa, causing ill health, reducing life expectancy,

generally undermining the health status of the population, and drastically reducing the trained manpower available for economic development. The long-term impact of HIV/AIDS will inevitably erode the gains accruing from the development of health services during the first three decades after independence (UNDP, 1995: 4–6).

Kaplan's portrayal of anarchy in Africa is, perhaps, best reflected by the traumatic episodes of collapsed and collapsing states on the continent. These are situations where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart. Recent examples include Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Almost invariably, state collapse is a product of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of control over the political and economic space. In economic terms, not only do these collapsed states disrupt the growth process; they also result in the deterioration of human and physical capital as well as the curtailment of the prospects for future investments. Worse still, war-torn states have harmful spill-over effects on neighboring countries. The overflow of refugees, heightened ethnic tensions in some cases, and the resulting diplomatic conflicts engage substantial resources and efforts from the relatively stable countries that share borders with collapsed states (Zartman, 1995: 1–5).

Finally, but still of importance, one of the most devastating challenges in Africa in the coming years and decades relates to the management of violent conflicts within states. It should be emphasized that the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution will have neither the organizational capacity nor the resources to contend with the anticipated descent into anarchy. It is, perhaps, in this regard that Ali Mazrui (1994) and William Pfaff (1995) have called for the institutionalization of a “disinterested neo-colonialism” over some African states. As Ali Mazrui emphasizes, “some dysfunctional states will need to submit to trusteeship and even tutelage for a while”. He further proposes the formation of an African Security Council composed of five pivotal regional states – namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria – which would presumably provide the capability for such intervention. These proposals, however, have been roundly dismissed as unfeasible (Sisk, 1995).

Although it is the least preferred, this otherwise nightmarish scenario is the most likely future scenario for the African continent if extraordinary measures are not taken to preempt it, and chart a purposive development path. Both the ruling classes in Africa and the international community seem to be religiously committed to pursuing the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies and programmes. Understandably, the peasants, working classes and small but emerging middle classes in Africa are too weak and poorly organized to successfully challenge the status quo. Thus, the prospects for a more positive future will depend largely on how decisively or otherwise Africa's leaders could grapple with the fundamental issues raised in this scenario.

Scenario 2: The Imperative of Cooperation and Integration in Africa

Not to draw lessons from (that) experience and to seek an alternative that will address the continent's fundamental economic malaise is to court further disaster in the years ahead. To refuse to seek a way out and to persist with what has not worked, and what independent studies have concluded will not work, as presently conceived and implemented, is to act contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests. (Adediji, 1989)

The second scenario seeks to strategically reduce Africa's formal ties with the West and maximize closer economic cooperation and integration as a prelude to the AU's penultimate goal of continental political union. As Bade Onimode (1992: 153) poignantly put it, "the unfolding mega-trends of the world system have transformed African cooperation from a regional necessity into a continental imperative – the urgent strategic basis for the corporate survival of the African economy". If developed and large economies like those of the United States, Germany, Japan and France find it important to engage in regional integration and collective security arrangements, then the case for underdeveloped Africa, with its small and weak economies, must be compelling indeed. The African countries are too fragmented and too miniscule to be economically viable. It is also emphasized that Africa's new cooperation arrangements with the West should not be limited simply to the

so-called new global concerns of protecting the environment, drugs control and population issues, important as indeed these issues are. Rather, as the previous scenario has proposed, the united African nations should press for the restructuring of international political and economic organizations, trade regimes, technology transfer, finance and debt. The emergence and development of regionalism on a global scale clearly indicates that individual states operating outside major economic and security blocs will find themselves slowly but inexorably cast aside. If Europe needs economic and political integration for strength and prosperity, Africa needs it for survival. Through integration the continent can effectively respond to the multifaceted challenges posed by the processes of globalization.

The second scenario is based on three basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that Africa's new emancipatory development strategy will be driven by a visionary political leadership which will be guided by a common commitment to social democracy, social justice, and regional economic integration. Most African countries are too small in terms of geographical and economic life, as well as size and income levels, to assure a self-reliant, endogenous, and self-sustaining development. There are more than a dozen countries that are land-locked and whose development is inevitably tied to the opportunities for economic cooperation with other countries in their respective regions. An integrated pan-African political economy will surely widen internal economies, exploit the economies of scale, enhance industrial efficiency, reduce the continent's external dependency and promote collective self-reliance.

The root of this proposal is the belief that Africa cannot rely for its economic growth and development on demand driven from the West (see *South Commission Report*, 1990). Western economies will no longer pull Africa's economies at a pace and comfort that will meet the material needs of its people. Consequently, the continent needs to develop its own internal strength in order to assert itself effectively in the international system. This internal strength can only come from the successful implementation of a collective development strategy of self-reliance. In order to do this, concerted efforts should be made to eliminate progressively obstacles to a dynamic development

path. The major obstacles include weak and illegitimate states, disintegrating societies, internecine civil wars, interstate conflicts, and various obstructions to regional cooperation and integration efforts.

Finally, it is assumed that economic cooperation and integration is likely to maximize Africa's collective bargaining power vis-à-vis other external actors as well as to minimize duplication and wasteful competition. A united Africa will be able to negotiate more favorable economic relations with other regional blocs and the world's major economic powers. In the current global environment, it is impossible to resolve the problems posed by external debt, commodity trade, growing poverty, and environmental degradation on an individual country basis. This dictates the imperative of implementing, and not just adopting, concerted and collective political and economic positions on these questions. A united Africa would also be in a position to consume what is produced internally, market regional products and services such as tourism and transport services, and develop joint rules for foreign investment. Ultimately, a politically united, stable, and economically integrated Africa will be capable of assuming its rightful place in international political and economic relations.

The previous integration practice in Africa was variously based on functionalist assumptions. Behind functionalist thought is the belief that progress in international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for the elimination of political conflicts and wars. The theory posits a reduction of conflicts as cooperation expands to cover different spheres of activity, eventually reducing individual dependence on the state (Senghor, 1990). Paradoxically, both the French and the British colonial empires set up several economic groupings in the form of colonial federations. As part of their effort to harmonize their policies and maximize the gains from their respective colonies in the region, they created supra-national and transnational institutions to bind the former colonies to themselves. These included the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the East African Common Services Organization, French Equatorial Africa, and French West Africa. To be sure, these efforts were meant more for the convenience and protection of the

mercantilist interests of the colonial administrations than for the benefit of their respective colonies.

With the coming of political independence, African heads of states and governments, under the umbrella of the OAU, made different declarations and commitments to continental cooperation and integration. The 1973 Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence, and the 1979 Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-reliance, were landmark statements on the subject. The Monrovia Declaration was preceded by a symposium on the 'Future Development Prospects of Africa Towards the Year 2000'. At the end of the symposium, the participants concluded that African unity is "neither a slogan nor an irresponsible ambition. It is a necessity, and not simply a noble and hopeful dream." They therefore called upon the OAU to make the necessary arrangements to initiate action to create an African common market based on progressive coordination and integration, which would evolve in the form of concentric circles, reflecting the economic regions existing on the continent. African leaders took the challenge seriously.

At the second Extraordinary Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1980 the OAU's Assembly adopted the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa up to the Year 2000 and the Final Act of Lagos. In the preamble to the Lagos Plan of Action, the heads of states and governments of Africa declared:

The effect of unfulfilled promise of global development strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in any other continent of the world...Thus, Africa is unable to point to any significant growth rates or any satisfactory index of general well being in the past twenty years. Faced with this situation, and determined to undertake measures for basic restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance. (OAU, 1981:5)

The Lagos Plan of Action outlined a comprehensive program for the economic and social transformation of Africa through the modernization of the agricultural sector, industrialization, the management of natural and energy resources, expansion of intra-African trade, and the development of human resources. As a supplement to the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos was intended to address the problems of Africa's balkanization, and the promotion of regional economic communities, with the ultimate objective of establishing the African economic community by the year 2000. The background studies, preparation of the draft treaty, and approval of the final treaty took about ten years. But for the entire decade of the 1980s, the Lagos Plan's vision of collective self-reliance remained in limbo while almost the entire continent was held captive to IMF-World Bank policies of structural adjustment and debt restructuring. It was not until 1991 that the Abuja Treaty – the treaty establishing an African Economic Community (AEC) – was finally signed. The treaty came into force on May 12, 1994, followed by the adoption of a number of protocols.⁵

One of the primary and core objectives of the Abuja Treaty was to promote economic, social, political, and cultural development as well as the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance, self-sustained development and political stability. For the first time in Africa's history, the treaty provided not only the legal, institutional, economic and political framework for economic cooperation and integration; it also stipulated a comprehensive list of principles to guide the conduct of member states. As would be expected, the pursuit of those principles was expected to create an enabling environment for regional cooperation and integration. In addition, the treaty designated the General Secretariat of the OAU as the secretariat of the AEC. Its institutions included the annual conference of the heads of state and government, the council of ministers, the parliament, the economic and social committee, the court of justice, the general secretariat, and the technical or specialized committees.

In very broad terms, the treaty outlines various strategies for achieving its goals. Specifically, at the economic level, Article 6 provides a flexible plan

for a step-by-step establishment of the economic community in six stages of variable duration. Stage one involves strengthening the institutional framework for the existing sub-regional groupings and creating new ones where they do not exist within the five years after the treaty comes into force. During the second stage, concerted regional action will be focused on liberalizing intra-African trade, reinforcing sectoral integration, and coordinating and harmonizing activities of different sub-regional communities within the ensuing eight years. The third stage, covering ten years, would be devoted to setting up a sub-regional customs union, to be merged in the following two years, during the fourth stage, into a regional customs union. By the end of the fourth stage, it was believed that the time would be ripe for transforming the regional customs union into a regional economic market and that this could be accomplished within a period of five years, which was to be the fifth stage. The common market would involve common economic policies and the free movement of persons within its jurisdiction. The common market was expected to develop automatically in the sixth stage, covering five years, into a pan-African economic community, wherein the economic sectors will be integrated, and economic and monetary union established along with the African Monetary Fund, African Central Bank, and a common currency. The African Parliament was to be established in the final stage.

However, as Teshome Mulat (1998a: 119) has argued, the “path toward the AEC is neither clear and predictable nor devoid of twists and turns”. The treaty has a number of serious shortcomings, the first of which concerns the rigid timetable it set for such a long-term development objective. The treaty specified the timeframe of each phase up to the year 2025, which is impracticable. The process of planning and programming a continental project is likely to be difficult at best, and almost impossible in an uncertain African context. In an environment of frequent civil wars, a tendency toward state collapse, persistent structural disequilibria at both the economic and social levels, and amid pervasive poverty and crippling debt, a rigid time-table was not the best option. Going by past experiences, the ambitious objectives of the treaty seem to be far beyond the capabilities of African governments. The requisite institutional capacities, as well as human and financial resources are simply non-existent. In this regard,

Ahmad Aly (1994:94-95) has observed that “all these factors combined ... [had] the negative effect of blurring one’s vision and thus making it extremely difficult to assess the continent’s future accurately”.

According to the implementation schedule of the Treaty, by 1999 the first stage was supposed to have given way to the second. However, without the courtesy and formality of prior rigorous assessment of the progress already made, the African heads of state meeting in Sirte, Libya in 1999, decided to establish the African Union. In particular, Article 8 of the Sirte Declaration called for the stepping up of the implementation process of the Abuja Treaty through a *reduction* of the original time frame of 34 years. It also called for the immediate establishment of all institutions provided for under the treaty. The institutions in question are the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the Court of Justice, and the Pan-African Parliament. If almost all the regional economic communities are still standing on very shaky grounds, it is difficult to see how the mere restructuring of the existing time-frame for action would be effective. The Sirte Declaration does not really seem to have benefited from the lessons of history. Nonetheless, it is troubling that the intractable political and economic problems that have frustrated the establishment of sub-regional cooperation and integration arrangements in Africa in the last four decades seem to have been simply wished away. To be sure, there are absolutely no shortcuts towards an African economic community or to African political union!

The Abuja Treaty recognizes the sub-regional economic communities as the pillars of the future continental community. At the moment there are six designated regional economic communities: the Arab Mahgreb Union (AMU), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These RECs were to be restructured, to rationalize and harmonize their policies, and to coordinate their programmes in line with the objectives, principles, and priorities of the Abuja Treaty. In practice, establishing and

consolidating the RECs, as “pillars of the continental community” has been fraught with serious institutional, administrative, and policy problems. There are the few regional economic communities – like SADC and ECOWAS – that have demonstrated appreciable progress toward regional cooperation and integration. These have a relatively longer history than the rest, and have developed comprehensive protocols dealing with various aspects of cooperation and integration. Both communities have gone beyond looking at economic cooperation and integration merely as the liberalization of trade. The two have moved away from trade liberalization, as most African countries do not have sufficient locally produced goods and services to participate in such intra-regional trade; and also because in both RECs, a few countries are most likely to emerge as dominant players in a sub-regional market. These two RECs are therefore embarking on measures to mitigate such problems. First, member states are making concerted efforts toward equitable development, integration, and rationalization of productive structures throughout the sub-regional economic space, especially in sectors such as basic industries and agriculture. Secondly, various sub-regional efforts are being directed at mapping out a comprehensive development program to upgrade and harmonize their physical infrastructure (roads, railways, port facilities, telecommunications, and energy). Thirdly, they have been engaged in trade liberalization through progressive reduction and phasing out of tariffs and other barriers to internal and intra-regional trade, harmonizing external trade regimes; and in general, integrating national markets into a sub-regional market.

There is another group of RECs that are either in the early formative stages or are simply non-functional. IGAD, for example, which attained recognition as a REC only in 1996, is in the initial process of establishing the basic administrative infrastructure for effective economic cooperation and integration. ECCAS has been dormant, chiefly due to the recurring political and economic destabilization of the region. On the other hand, the OAU and now the AU have faced enormous difficulties in working with the AMU because Morocco, where AMU headquarters are located, left the OAU in 1982 over the question of independence for the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic; it is still not a member of the AU.

In addition, many African states have concurrent membership of two or more RECs and other economic cooperation arrangements. For example, the majority of COMESA member states are also members of SADC or IGAD. South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and all of them, except Botswana, are members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA). Furthermore, there are separate bilateral trade agreements between Botswana and Zimbabwe, Malawi and Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania, Namibia and South Africa, and between South Africa and the following countries: Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Invariably, multiple membership of RECs is bound to make coordination and monitoring difficult and confusing. One study summarized all these anxieties in the following words:

There is no clear evidence that they (RECs) have a long-term continental integration in view; although trade liberalization is in the forefront and there seems to be an acceptance of the need for the rationalization and program harmonization ... in many cases. (Mudenda et al., 1994: 18)

All in all, although the process of economic integration in Africa would appear complex and intractable, the difficulties involved are not insurmountable. Nor should they discourage ongoing reforms and progress toward cooperation and integration. The existence of many integration organizations, in itself, should not be perceived as constituting a serious impediment to reform. They should be understood as the initial drive toward the ultimate goal of integration. They can all contribute, in various ways, to the realization of the AEC Treaty, if carefully designed harmonization and coordination policies are undertaken along the way. In the light of this, the AEC Summit in Harare, in June 1997, adopted the Protocol on the Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities. This protocol has the objective of strengthening the RECs and harmonizing intra-REC relations with a view to facilitating progress toward the AEC. It calls for the realignment of macro-economic policy and institutional frameworks. Hopefully, the realignment mechanism will also manage economic, political and social tensions that may arise from the process (Mulat, 1998b).

For this protocol, as well as others, to achieve the envisaged integration objectives, a fundamental restructuring of the framework and mechanisms for integration should be undertaken. I must also quickly add that a new theoretical and policy orientation should be adopted to guide the way in which cooperation and integration arrangements are conceived and implemented. Following McCarthy (1995), I propose that a modest function-based cooperation be seriously considered. This, broadly defined, is a cooperation arrangement that seeks to implement a few, carefully targeted and politically visible development projects or schemes. Integration becomes a minimalist and incremental approach, which does not make unrealistic demands on institutional, technical and political capacities of African states. Among the advantages of this integration strategy are its flexibility and pragmatism in circumventing the problems posed by nationalism and equity in the distribution of costs and benefits. It is also better suited to deal with many fiscal, physical and technological barriers to trade that cannot be addressed instantaneously.

In this regard, the initial cooperation and integration projects to be considered should include cooperation in the provision of transport and communications infrastructure, electricity generation and distribution, the development and management of water resources, and cooperation in the provision of educational and research facilities. Many of these products and services require substantial investment, which is likely to yield a lower unit cost if provided on a regional scale. The targeted nature of this approach also serves as a practical means of inducing and thereby neutralizing the demands of domestic interest groups, and is suited to the creation of the infrastructure and production capacity necessary for growth and intra-regional trade, and a successful entry into world markets.

Secondly, states will be obliged to surrender a measure of their sovereignty to a supra-national body. This implies the exercise of political will to relinquish control over economic policy management to a central authority of the whole region. Indeed, this would be the litmus test for a genuine political will and commitment to any regional integration effort. In the previous integration projects, Africa's political leaders jealously guarded their state sovereignty

and were unwilling to cede part of it to a supranational body. As a result, national political agents were the ones who determined the nature and pace of their participation in the integration project. The surrender of partial sovereignty (that is, real political power) will go with functions, and will vest in sub-regional secretariats not only the necessary legitimacy but also the political authority and capacity to make and enforce critical policy decisions. It will also enhance their ability to plan, strategize, coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of regional projects and programmes. Peter Anyang Nyong'o (1992) has even proposed that the Executive Secretary should have the same rank as Head of State with a cabinet to run the affairs of the union.

The effectiveness of the supra-national power would require the full support of the broad political, economic and social forces in respective member states. Ideally, the will and commitment to integration endeavors are affected, in the first instance, by expectations of gains and losses that member states perceive would be derived from participation. If one of the main objectives of integration is the balanced development of the region, then every effort should be made to ensure that this is achieved. The Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) seems to have done better than most regional schemes precisely because of the two relatively prosperous members, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, have been willing to shoulder a large compensatory burden. SACU also derives its success as a customs union from the compensatory payments that South Africa makes to smaller members of the union (McCarthy, 1999: 25). In short, the imperative of political will would constitute another important test of commitment to an integration project.⁶ This also calls for strong institutions at the national level to ensure the implementation of regional policies and projects.

Most successful regional cooperation and integration initiatives world-wide have thrived on a strong and willing leadership, which Robert Keohane (1980) aptly describes as necessary for "hegemonic stability".⁷ The presence of a regional core or nucleus will command the capacity to serve as a positive force for developing and nurturing a viable economic cooperation

arrangement, as well as building a regional peace and security system. At the maximum, leaders are expected to assume a disproportionate cost burden of the integration project as well as serve as the paragons of compliance of the regime's rules, norms and procedures. It is not unusual in integration schemes to tax the wealthier member states in order to aid the poorer. At the minimum, hegemonic leadership entails being able and willing to provide a mix of incentives and disincentives to the members of a cooperation and integration regime. The hegemonic leaders' economic strength and political stability, for example, would bolster the region's economic vitality and political stability. It should also champion the cause of cooperation and integration by pulling the less willing and less able countries along, as it may not be possible for all countries to move at the same time and pace. The roles of the United States in NAFTA, Germany in the European Union, and South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union are excellent examples. By the same token, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya have the capacity to play this strategic role in their respective sub-regions.

By almost every measure, South Africa is the undisputable economic and military power in the Southern African sub-region, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Its GDP was US \$130,000 million in 1995. Its economy accounts for about three-quarters of the region's GDP and an estimated 57 percent if one includes the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa. Zimbabwe's economy, which comes a distant second, was only \$6,000 million (*Africa Confidential*, 1995: 7). As with economic might, so it is with military might. The Republic of South Africa has no challenger in the region. It enjoys a marked supremacy on almost all counts: artillery, infantry, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters and warships. Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya display similar superiority in their respective sub-regions. The OAU should consider promoting aggressively the role of such hegemons in the various sub-regions. The failure of previous integration schemes in Africa is usually attributed to both the scarcity of resources to finance integration programs, and overdependence on foreign aid. On the one hand, member states were unable to honor their financial obligations because of their dire financial situation. On the other hand, too much dependence on foreign aid has rendered many

integration projects and programs unsustainable and unviable. To resolve such chronic financing problems, African economies will have to attempt increase their levels of domestic savings. In addition to various forced-savings schemes, governments must devise strategies to encourage citizens with foreign savings to repatriate them. For countries such as Nigeria and the DRC, whose citizens hold billions of dollars of plundered national wealth in foreign private bank accounts, any program that encourages the repatriation of such funds could accumulate enough capital to unleash the required momentum for growth in selected strategic sectors (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999: 115–116). Above all, African governments have to devise and implement innovative self-financing mechanisms as well as upgrade the capabilities of national and regional financial institutions. In this regard, it should be recalled that in 1996 UEMOA presented its member states with ‘tax options’ and the formalization of revenue transfer to the REC’s coffers. It is too early to assess the success of this scheme; it is nonetheless worth considering.

At the same time, regional and sub-regional financial institutions such as the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund and the Nigerian Trust Fund will have to be strengthened and equipped in order to play a catalytic role in the mobilization of resources from the private sector, as well as from bilateral and multilateral development institutions. Admittedly, their previous combined record in promoting regional integration leaves a lot to be desired. Although the statutes of the African Development Bank clearly define regional economic integration as one of its major functions, resources devoted to regional integration projects have, over the years, been not rising in line with total loan commitments (Otieno, 1990: 72–73).⁸ As a practical and strategic issue, it should be emphasized that no serious national development endeavor or indeed integration program should be premised on excessive dependence on foreign assistance. Continental institutions, private or public, should be the principal source of development finance. Alternatively, Africa should develop the capacity to translate donor aid into programmes and projects for self-reliant development, notwithstanding the hegemony of international capital in the continent’s politics and economy (Mandaza, 1990: 151).

Ideally, these regional financial institutions should provide not only the core development finance but, most importantly, serve as centers of excellence in offering development policy advice and technical assistance. They should, for instance, assist national and sub-regional economies to put in place sound macro-economic policies. Through policy dialogue, the ADB has, in recent years, succeeded in persuading most African countries to become members of the convention establishing multilateral investment guarantees (MIGA) and the Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other states. Furthermore, on the advice of the ADB, many African countries have established investment promotion agencies to address the problem of negative image abroad and attract investment. In the SADC sub-region, for example, all 14 member-states have established such agencies. In addition, since 1995, investment promotion agencies from 25 African countries joined the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) in order to benefit from an exchange of information on best practices in investment promotion (ADB, 2000).

In order to make Africans genuine actors in the process of cooperation and integration, and also facilitate cross-border dialogue toward the attainment of the pan-African ideal, the Abuja Treaty calls for the popular participation of civil society. Effective participation of the broader civil society – business, labor, church, youth, women's groups and other pan-African interest groups – will be the most important way to build a broader support base for regionalism. Unquestionably, the process of cooperation and integration is too important to be left to the state bureaucrats alone! To this end, African states may consider engaging the media to increase awareness of the African cooperation and integration project. In addition, it would serve a good purpose to introduce a course on regional integration in all schools and universities of member states as well as teach English, French and Portuguese. All these efforts would help create an enduring intellectual foundation for the movement toward African unity among the continent's youth (Asante, 1990: 132–133).

Several empirical studies have also shown that countries that have a similar composition of gross national product and similar structures of manufacturing

tend to be one another's best customer (Wannacott and Lutz, 1989; Maasdorp, 1992). This conclusion broadly reinforces the conventional view that economic integration has the best prospects if it occurs among countries that are at similar levels of industrial development, have competitive industrial sectors, and have the potential to develop complementary industrial sectors. In most African integration schemes, member states differ widely in terms of size and capabilities. Understandably, they demonstrate dissimilar abilities to take advantage of specialization, economies of scale, augmentation of factor inputs, and opportunities to improve market structures. Economic integration then, tends to yield costs and unequal benefits for different member states. Foroutan (1992) describes economic differences among sub-Saharan African countries as the major obstacle to realizing trade and factor market integration. These economic differences, he argues, cause concern that the benefits of integration will gravitate toward those countries whose manufacturing sectors are relatively more developed countries, such as Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe in COMESA; South Africa and Zimbabwe in SADC; Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal in ECOWAS; and Cameroon in ECCAS. These concerns have given rise to compensation as well as selective liberalization schemes.

One of the major causes for the demise of the East African Community, which is often overlooked, is the unequal sharing of benefits from cooperation projects. It is important that when strengthening RECs, deliberate and corrective policies and mechanisms are designed to ensure equitable and balanced development. Several devices for addressing unequal distribution of benefits are available in the regional integration literature.⁹ The choice may be between income transfers and instruments that seek to effect a change in the emergent patterns of trade, and development, which income transfers may not address. Under the latter option, there is a choice between instruments that rely principally on the market, and instruments that rely on deliberate, planned rationalization of industrial development. In either case, the chief objective is to bring about profitable specialization, subject to the requirements of balanced development (Robson, 1983: 20–21). Once again, the role of sub-regional leaders becomes crucial. They would be expected to shoulder the burden of facilitating the cooperation and integration project.

Conclusion

The foregoing analyses of the alternative projections for Africa's future have important implications for African policy making and Africa's position in the world system. The continent's position in this system in the short and medium term is likely to deteriorate further from its present precarious state. Its overall economic growth will be slow and at times regressive; trade will exhibit both product and partner concentration; terms of trade are likely to worsen; the debt crisis will deteriorate; the incidence and scope of poverty will increase; population growth will accelerate; and deadly diseases will continue their spread. There is also a clear danger that natural and man-made disasters will increase in scale. The intensification of the continent's marginalization and dependence will therefore pose considerable problems for policy makers. It is also evident from the analyses that, in the immediate future, grand development achievements will be out of the question. There is, therefore, an urgent need for innovative responses to the continent's present predicament.

There is an urgent need to identify and analyze the critical factors that will decisively shape Africa's future. Of such factors, this study has noted that the political ones stand out as fundamental. The lack of stable democratic regimes, political accountability, and respect for human rights and the rule of law are factors that remain central to the continent's war against marginalization, exclusion, and alienation. As the African Leadership Forum (1991) observed, Africa's "shattered economies" will not be able to recover in the absence of peace and political stability. One need not be reminded that sustainable development will be impossible under the conditions currently reigning in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Liberia, and Burundi. Sierra Leone and Angola, which have just emerged from protracted and devastating civil wars, also provide ample evidence that war is no asset for development; war sets the hand of development back several decades, thereby compounding the problem of development both in the short and long term. This study has argued that cycles of political instability and economic mismanagement are inimical to large-scale investment, both domestic and external, and stifle entrepreneurial dynamism.

Closely related to the above argument is the need to create economic spaces in which states can, and must, play an active role in guiding their economies to make them responsive to their peculiar social, cultural and political circumstances. To play this role, societies have to develop and nurture appropriate ideologies and a high degree of national institutional cohesion. States also will have to play a key role in the definition of property rights and financial regulations, as well as the financing of long-term social and economic infrastructure, the development of technological capabilities, and the pursuit of dynamic comparative advantage in industry. The role of the state is indispensable, particularly when there are large potential learning externalities and high barriers to market entry. Above all, states have to effectively manage potential sources of social conflict so that these do not destroy the very possibility of improved economic efficiency and human welfare.

The evidence has shown that the process of globalization and liberalization poses multifarious challenges, while also offering various opportunities. Given Africa's realities, a single-minded pursuit of the World Bank-IMF export-oriented development strategy will end in total disaster. Already the signs to this effect are ominously clear. This study has shown that the increasingly low demand for traditional exports will not enable the export sector to function as the engine for Africa's development in the coming decades. Nor can the non-traditional export of flowers, fruits, and vegetables serve as the dynamic engine for sustainable economic development. The challenges posed by globalization to Africa's economies and societies require more than reactive adjustment to the consequences of marginalization. The days of regional integration on a voluntary basis are long gone. Integration is now a continental imperative. Africa's response to the current development crisis calls for the reconceptualization and revamping of regional economic integration within the broader context of a coordinated sub-regional and regional security plan. The dialectical relationship between economic integration and regional security must be grasped and pursued in unison.

It was further noted that Africa's future depends not only on the radical transformation of its internal national and regional policies and institutions;

it will also significantly depend on fundamental changes in its relations with the industrialized economies of the North. African countries and other countries in the South should actively work with the North in order to change some of the policies that undermine the development efforts of the South. It was therefore suggested that the North must be urged to change its policies and consumption patterns, which are responsible for rapidly depleting resources and degrading the environment. Only when there are realistic changes in the global economic framework and responsible development cooperation strategies could Africa stand the chance of achieving structural stability and sustainable development.

Sustainable development goals can be reached only when development policies integrate economic planning with natural resource management. A new sustainable development regime must also embrace a strategic imperative to fully involve its citizens in the development process and recognize that culture is a precondition of development and progress. Special attention must be given to the involvement of women, youth, and the labor force in the decision-making that affects their lives, livelihood, the environment and living spaces as articulated in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (ECA, 1990). In a similar vein, we should hasten to add that if development is to be in any sense sustainable, then the subordination of women must be accorded full citizenship entitlements, which in turn means that African political economies must change radically at all levels – administrative, legal, political, and most difficult of all, cultural.

Notes

¹ The majority of private security companies are used in a crime prevention capacity to protect businesses and property in non-conflict situations. However, the demand for security services in conflict regions has escalated in recent years as the state's ability to provide security in insecure areas has diminished. Some examples of these companies include Defense Systems Ltd., Lifeguard, Group 4 and Securicor from the United Kingdom, and Gray Security and Coin Security from South Africa.

² The increased trade linkages are clear: in almost every year since World War

11, international trade has grown more rapidly than global production, resulting in a rising share of exports and imports in the gross domestic product of virtually every country. In the past 15 years, cross-border financial flows have grown even more rapidly than trade flows. Foreign direct investment (in which foreign capital gains a controlling interest in a cross-border enterprise), in particular, has grown even more rapidly than over-all capital flows. For more details see Sachs (1998).

³ Most of these international institutions are not managed democratically. They are run by technocrats and supervised by high government officials. Only in a most attenuated sense is democratic control exercised over major international organizations. Key negotiations in the WTO are made in closed sessions. The IMF negotiates in secret with potential borrowers and it has only begun in the last few months to provide the conditions it imposes on recipients.

⁴ The extent of this impoverishment is evident in the fact that 50 of the poorest countries, which together have 20 percent of the world's population, control only 2 percent of world income (UNDP, 1997).

⁵ These include, among others, free movement of persons; rights of residence and establishment; transport and communications; rules of origin; customs cooperation within the community; industry; trade promotion; solidarity, development and compensation fund; food and agriculture; science and technology; pan-African parliament; and human resource development.

⁶ Going by the EU example, the Maastricht Treaty put in place strict convergence criteria to be fulfilled by member states before being accepted into the monetary union. Africa would be better advised to take advice from the EU's convergence instruments.

⁷ The theory posits that there are two important capabilities necessary for the regime leadership, namely, its capacity to act given its size, power, economic strength, and administrative efficiency and the second, its responsiveness. This is the ability of its political system to control its own behavior and redirect its own attention. For details see Deutsch et al. 1957: 40.

⁸ The African Development Bank Group has attributed the inability of countries to access the Bank's resources mainly to the pervasive weaknesses of sub-regional organizations and national governments in identifying and promoting multinational projects, as well as to widely differing perceptions among participating countries

regarding the costs and benefits of regional projects. For details on the role of ADB in regional cooperation see Otieno (1990), Ndiaye (1990), and African Development Bank, 1999.

⁹ Theoretically, these imbalances could be resolved through one of the following: (i) proportional distribution of benefits according to the differential growth rates of respective economies; (ii) the “uncontrolled” sharing of benefits, with more accruals to the strongest and fastest growing economies; (iii) distribution of benefits in favor of the poorer and slower growing economies; and (iv) equal distribution of benefits. For more discussion on compensatory schemes see Mshomba (1999).

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Chapter 5

Diamonds are not Forever: Globalization, the African State and Resource Exploitation

B. I. Logan

Introduction

Globalization is a process that continues to elude clear definition: it possesses different meanings for different groups. The lack of clarity surrounding globalization imbues it with a certain degree of contentiousness that generates serious debate among scholars as well as policy-makers (see, for example, Arrighi, 1999; Barnett and Cavanagh, 1994; Cheru, 1996). This debate assumes some stridency when it is directed at African development at the cusp of the millennium because it takes on shades of earlier discourses, for example, north-south, dependency, world systems, and post-colonial, to name just a few (Cheru, 1996).

In this chapter, I explore the interlocking relationship between globalization, resource exploitation and political stability in Africa. I make these connections in the broad context of the role of diamonds in the demise of the African state. Although I use Sierra Leone and Angola as prime examples of this process, the broad patterns I describe could easily apply to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, another diamond-rich, politically unstable country; or to other sites with contested resources on the continent. The discussion is presented in general conceptual rather than specific empirical terms, weaving a broad thematic tapestry that connects global capital, diamonds and political instability. Since the subject is rather broad and unwieldy, I have kept the discussion within the confines of three particular themes that enable me to capture the effects of globalization on the resource-poverty-environment nexus in Africa. These are: (i) resource exploitation and the African state; (ii) resource exploitation and civil society; (iii) resource exploitation and the environment.

It bears pointing out that these issues are closely interlinked, so that where one ends and the other begins is extremely difficult to determine under the broad aegis of globalization. To set the discussion in proper context, I preface it in the next section with a brief commentary on the implications of globalization for Africa's development.

Considering Globalization

Much of the energy expended on the current debate on globalization centers on determining whether the process is merely another stage in the inexorable march of capitalism, or a distinct and *nouvelle* experience which locates capitalist expansion within a broader political, environmental, social and cultural superstructure to a greater extent than earlier global excursions of capital. Strong globalizationists, those who argue that the current globalization is a distinctly new phenomenon¹, make the point that previous periods of capitalist expansion into Africa lacked the speed, technological sophistication, economic integration and ideological universalism which are the hallmarks of globalization in the twenty-first century. Soft or weak globalizationists, on the other hand², describe current global processes simply as another stage in capitalist expansion. They insist that technology merely makes the process more efficient, not different from earlier phases, in its fundamental characteristics and objectives. This school further contends that the current globalization is merely a hiccup in Western hegemony or, at best, a modification of the structures that underpin that hegemony. The phenomenon is not new, it has merely been recast in the scintillating hues of 'high tech'; the internet may have replaced ocean vessels, but the basic operations of accumulating resources at the core remain essential to the process. While the global political economy of the immediate post-World War II era may have required the formalization of strategies at Bretton Woods, the new order is more flexible. It continues to use the agency of the Bretton Woods Institutions, but is particularized by the speed of communication and information technology whose versatility allows global forces easy access to African economies.

The scholarly exercise of differentiating between weak or strong globalization may not be so relevant from an African perspective, which is more concerned

with the effects of the process on the region's political, economic and social stability. Whether weak or strong, as in earlier historical episodes, the encounter between capital and Africa has not been a meeting of minds. On the contrary, the process has always been a specific drama orchestrated by strong hegemonic forces to consolidate capitalism worldwide. New rules of admission and engagement are constantly being formulated with the express purpose of excising ineffective/inefficient regions and peoples. In the process, African economies and peoples are constantly being fragmented, rediscovered, restructured, repoliticized and resocialized as selected sectors and classes are co-opted into the global system.

Perhaps, at the heart of the present conundrum over what globalization might imply for Africa's development is the fact that the term attempts to appropriate for itself precedence in meaning that may be unfounded. Clearly, this is not the first incidence of contact between venture capital and Africa. In fact, the present round of globalization shares several attributes with its antecedents, among them, institutionalized resource expropriation and the perpetuation of a social organization that creates a large peasantry that remain marginalized from mainstream, 'capitalized' segments of their economies.

Similarly, the present phase of globalization shares a number of paradoxes (simultaneous polarizing processes) with its earlier counterparts. First, there is integration and marginalization, which is marked by the exclusion of large sections of Africa from the cutting edge of research, technology, management and communications. Even as some obviously significant worldwide dynamics are occurring, African economies are being systematically relegated to oceans of poverty connected to the capitalist mainland only by the narrowest strip of economic activity located in a few capital cities, export processing zones, and miscellaneous mining and agricultural projects. In the second place, globalization of production and regional specialization, marked by the increasing relegation of African labor to unskilled activities. Export processing zones, using cheap, unskilled labor are often localized, islands of economic isolation within the host countries. Third, globalization of culture and cultural isolation is a paradoxical process by which socio-cultural convergence (for

example, through CNN, Microsoft, the London Times, electronic mail) seems to spawn a simultaneous process of cultural alienation. Global cultural homogenization has succeeded in integrating a small segment of African societies into the global family; effectively disconnecting them socially and culturally from their counterparts in their own countries. As a consequence, African societies are increasingly differentiated in standards of living, quality of life and lifestyle. Lastly, the post-Cold War era is breeding both one-worldism and political polarization: at the same time that democracy is being hailed as the solution to Africa's political instability and a mark of its return to political civility, it has become a means for entrenching existing ethnic and other destructive political divides. The one-person-one-vote franchise is being exploited by the political elite on the continent to sustain and legitimize their authority (several military dictators have been quite successful at this) while, at the global level, the same forces that champion global democracy flout these principles at their selective behest (the voting structure within the United Nations is a splendid example). These same forces are also not averse to shelving their commitment to democracy on a selective, regional basis in order to protect their economic and security interests. The unequal standard of operation underlying the geopolitics of globalization is reflected in the policies of global ombudsmen like the G8, United Nations and a host of international NGOs (Rwanda, Burundi and Sierra Leone are not Bosnia or Yugoslavia; Africa is not part of continental Europe).

The four global polarities described above (integration and marginalization, globalization and regional specialization, cultural homogenization and cultural isolation, political one-worldism and political isolation) may, rightly, give African analysts and policy-makers cause for introspection. After all, there are reasonable grounds to argue that the single most consistent impact of globalization on the continent over the past five or six centuries, since the so-called "Age of Discovery", has been the emasculation of local institutions and their replacement by those of foreign capital. Although some may argue that this process has initiated modernization, there can be little doubt that modernization (however defined) has been accompanied by socio-economic disarticulation, which has fettered economic development on the continent.

It bears pointing out that, notable similarities with its precursors notwithstanding, globalization in the twenty-first century does have the potential to produce results (positive or negative) for which there are no historical precedents. The dissolution of the state-market wedlock may have new and interesting implications in the social arena. Will widespread privatization of education, health, electricity, water supply and other basic services improve standards of living in Africa? Similarly, current attempts to weld democratic reform to economic reform have ambiguous implications. What mechanisms exist for African countries to achieve ‘a free market in a free democracy’? What are the commonalities and mutualities between these ‘freedoms’ and how do the freedom to ‘consume’ political participation and the freedom to ‘consume’ the products of the global market place coexist in poor economies of Africa? What happens when/if the state abrogates all its obligations to its people in favor of establishing an enabling environment for the market?

The present globalization is also characterized by its insistence on human rights as a necessary condition for political and economic change (certainly, this is a new engagement since dehumanization characterized earlier global extensions of capital into Africa). As with democratic freedom, the role and status of human rights in a free market requires serious contemplation, since advocacy for humanitarian benevolence comes amid admonitions to the state to abdicate its welfare obligations. Ostensibly, the private sector will provide social services, either for profit or out of benevolence. Unfortunately, there is some opacity in this argument. It is neither clear why the market should wish to provide some services out of goodwill, nor how the poor will be able to afford privatized welfare. It is also unclear how or why the state should disengage from its broader welfare role and be humanitarian only in terms of certain political functions designed to enable market operations. Can the state function effectively if it implements social austerity, advance political liberties, and liberalize the market, all simultaneously? Essentially, can the body politic be kept together with all these agendas that are sometimes at distinct cross purposes? It also merits mention that the same global forces that promote human rights ignore such rights when their economic and political interests are at stake. Human rights, like democracy, is selectively expendable in the globalization agenda.

Another interesting aspect of the current globalization saga is the role of the international financial institutions (IFIs), multinational organizations like the United Nations and a host of multilateral and bilateral organizations as well as international and local NGOs. Local and international civil society and the IFIs have become key players in the formulation and implementation of national policy at various geographic and social levels. The activities, especially of the latter, have often forced the African state to relinquish some of its sovereignty. This is especially significant with the structural adjustment agenda of the IFIs over the past two to three decades. In many instances, the objectives of these globalization agents are quite inimical to the welfare of local populations. The number of public protests associated with structural adjustment programs demonstrates this point.

The present wave of globalization is also characterized by a mixed array of issues – the environment, gender rights, debt relief, AIDS, the rights of children/child soldiers in civil conflicts, the role of minerals in financing civil unrest and other destabilizing activities, the international transfer of arms and military expertise in the form of mercenaries, nuclear terrorism, immigration, etc. Each of these issues is a priority for one international group or another. Yet, the agendas of the various groups do not always converge; on the contrary, they tend to contribute to the complexity of the globalization process and what it may portend for African economies and societies in general. The ambiguities and unforeseen implications surrounding globalization in the twenty-first century are clearly reflected in the diamond triangle – a dangerous axis, which links global capital, at the apex, to the state and rebel groups at the base.

Diamond Control as Political Ideology

It is a well known fact that diamonds have been used to exploit deep seated ethnic and regional divides in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola (Braathen et al., 1999; Reno, 1998; Richard, 1999; Smillie and Lansana, 2000). Although the case in each country is different and possesses its own unique complexities, (for example, in Angola, post Cold War dynamics and ethnic differences are prominent while in Sierra Leone, the conflict is philosophically, ethnically and politically inchoate), the contesting for diamonds has played a

significant role in the unfolding tragedy of each civil war. In each country, the insurgents have failed to enunciate a political ideology or agenda that is distinctly different from that of the state; in each country, control over diamond resources has been pivotal to initiating the political processes that resulted in and have fuelled the civil conflict. In fact, a reasonable case can be made that, both in Sierra Leone and Angola (albeit to different degrees), the contesting by the insurgent factions is not as much over the state, *per se*, as over the diamond-producing regions of the state.

Contours of Resource-Induced Civil War In Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leone civil war may be traced back to the form of democracy that the country inherited from Britain, a democracy that ignored the crucial importance of ethnicity to national stability.³ Ethnicity was, and continues to be systematically exploited by the political leadership to ensure its own power and legitimacy. There are two fundamental dimensions to this issue: first, the majority ethnic group happens also to inhabit the most resource-rich regions of the country, including, the diamond fields; second, and related to the first, the majority ethnic group believes that this demographic advantage and the resource-rich space it occupies should guarantee them the political leadership of the country in perpetuity. The simmering discontent around these factors was influenced by two trends that were inconsistent with the expectations of the majority ethnic group, which plunged the country into the civil war. First, political power was wrested from this ethnic majority control by a coalition of smaller ethnic groups during the 1970s. Second, the natural wealth of the region never trickled down to the local population; there was therefore a sense that the region's wealth was being used to benefit the capital city, Freetown. These feelings of inequity set the conditions that were exploited by Foday Sankoh to initiate the civil war, although he does not belong to the majority ethnic group and does not seem to make ethnicity part of his platform. A brief chronology of the major signposts in the political evolution of the Sierra Leone civil war is outlined below.

- 1991 – the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by a former army corporal, Foday Sankoh, started a civil war against the government of army Brigadier Momoh.

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- 1992 – Momoh’s government was overthrown by a group of junior army officers, and Valentine Strasser was named the new leader of the country.
- 1996 – Strasser’s government was overthrown by army officers led by Bio, one of Strasser’s own lieutenants.
- 1996 – The first ‘free and fair’ elections in over two decades were held; and Kabbah was elected president.
- 1997 – Kabbah’s government was toppled by the army led by Johnny Paul Koroma.
- 1998 – Kabbah was re-instated by West Africa’s ECOMOG forces after they had driven the rebel forces out of Freetown.
- 1998 to 1999 – The RUF, soldiers loyal to Koroma, and Liberian forces formed a coalition that waged war against government forces and occupied Freetown briefly before they were expelled by ECOMOG troops.
- 1999 – The Abidjan Accord was signed bringing a fragile truce to the warring factions.
- 2000 – The Accord crumbled; RUF forces took UN peacekeepers hostage and Sankoh – the RUF leader – was arrested to await trial before an international tribunal on charges of crimes against humanity.

The major actors in the Sierra Leone civil war reveal the global dimensions of the conflict. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces, Executive Outcomes, a South African mercenary group (which received payment in diamonds), and the British government (a major diamond trading partner of the Sierra Leone government) were on the side of the government of Sierra Leone. On the side of the RUF were Libya, said to have financed the initial stages of the rebellion (the Libyan interest is quite opaque); Liberia’s Charles Taylor (accused by the UN of being a major recipient of illicit diamond revenues from Sierra Leone;⁴ Burkina Faso and Togo, accused of being surrogates for Libya by providing the training ground for the rebels in return for cheap petroleum;⁵ East European mercenaries (who receive payments in diamonds); and East European arms dealers (also paid in diamonds).

De Beers, Diamonds and the Angolan Conflict

The political chronology of the Angolan civil war is better known than the Sierra Leonean case and therefore does not require repetition here. The diamond connection in Angola is also more established in the global system than that of Sierra Leone, and exposes in bold relief how global capital exercises immense control over the African state. For that reason, the complex inter-relationships between forces engaged in the Angolan conflict could be seen as stereotypical of the plight of a resource-rich African state under siege by global capital (Shaxson, 1999). A prime actor in the global diamond network and in Angola's diamond industry is the De Beers cartel, which controls 80 percent of the international diamond trade and buys much of the diamonds produced in Angolan mines. De Beers mines diamonds in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, and produces half of the world's uncut stones, while its Central Selling Organisation (CSO) values and sells over three quarters of the annual global production of diamonds (Knox, 1999). So powerful is De Beers, that the CSO has become the sole channel for marketing diamonds in the global market. De Beers is headquartered in Antwerp, Belgium, which is recognized as the diamond capital of the world, notwithstanding the fact that Belgium does not produce any diamonds of its own. Antwerp handles about 50 percent of the world's diamond trade annually, an activity that is promoted and protected by the Belgian state through a generous system of tax breaks.⁶ The city, together with De Beers, has established a Diamond High Council (DHC) whose obligation is to project a positive image of the diamond industry and to regulate the market to ensure that prices do not collapse. Within the DHC is a Diamond Office, which handles all the administrative requirements for the sale of diamonds. This highly centralized system is designed to exert maximum control over the global diamond industry and to control supply and demand to ensure maximum profits.

As post-Cold War support from the West waned, the rebel movement UNITA was forced to turn increasingly to diamond revenues to sustain its war effort. De Beers admits to having spent US \$500 million to buy legal and illegal diamonds originating from Angola. Through the 1990s, De Beers purchased 80 to 90 percent of all diamonds coming out of Angola, much of that controlled by UNITA suppliers. UNITA is reported to have obtained \$3.7 billion between

1992 and 1998 from diamond sales (Global Witness Report, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c).

The Diamonds for Arms Network and Civil Conflict in Africa

The present global diamond network spreads from Sierra Leone to Angola, linking them to Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana, South Africa, Australia and Russia. A large proportion of the gems bought in Africa goes through London, Israel and Antwerp. In the final stages of the global diamonds for arms network used by rebel factions in Africa, the gems are laundered in Antwerp and from there the 'clean' cash is used in Bulgaria to purchase arms. The international political community is attempting to suffocate the network by banning so called 'blood diamonds'. As Asser (2000: 2) points out:

Campaigns against 'conflict diamonds' or 'blood diamonds' have successfully raised public awareness in the capability of diamond smuggling to provide the finance and indeed the motive for vicious civil wars. Fearing that they might find themselves in a similar position to the fur trade, a luxury product stained by blood in the minds of consumers, the big players in the diamond industry have recently responded by promoting 'ethical diamonds' ... If the main cutting centers in Belgium, Israel, India and the US could be obliged to accept only diamonds of clear origin, conflict diamonds could be squeezed out of the industry. But with millions of dollars to be made, there is no sign of this happening yet.

A number of important points regarding the diamond ban must be noted. First, the industry has not adopted its position out of moral rectitude. On the contrary, the industry has been well aware of the links between diamonds, poverty, civil wars and death in Africa for decades. Rather than control the illegal, parallel trade network, the international diamond industry has exploited it to its own advantage and profit. For instance, UNITA rebels are reported to have sold diamonds at 30 percent below market rates in order to gain a quick

infusion of cash for their war chest (Asser, 2000). The conscience of the diamond industry has been pricked to distance itself from 'blood diamonds' only as a public relations strategy designed to maintain sales and profit. As the Global Witness (2000: 1) reports, De Beers' conscience originates from:

...an attempt to prevent the flow of Angolan gems from destabilizing world prices...the [diamond exchange system] has resulted in unaccountability and created an opaque screen, enabling the diamond industry to buy diamonds regardless of ethical considerations, such as suppliers could be combatants and/or terrorists in warring countries.

It has even been suggested that the importance of the diamond industry to the Belgian economy creates difficulties for effective implementation of a ban against 'blood diamonds'.

Second, even if there is a political will to cut the links between diamonds and civil conflict in Africa (and even this is a problematic assumption) that does not mean that a similar *economic will* to do so exists. The main actors in the sale of diamonds, especially the rebels and their allies, are not party to the political negotiations to ban 'blood diamonds'. It is likely that, rather than acquiesce to a ban, these actors will devise new strategies and avenues to sell their product. Like the drugs for arms trade, the diamonds for arms trade is likely to continue with or without the approval of the United Nations or other international political institutions. Diamonds, like drugs, are part and parcel of the present wave of globalization and can only be understood in the larger context of this process. That they represent the seamier side of globalization makes them no less integral to the process and no less important for understanding that African economies have been located (marginalized) in the unfolding global order according to a regional specialization and comparative advantage in political instability.

Third, the conscience of the global political leadership is always underpinned by political and economic calculations of the greatest advantage. There is every reason to believe that the West's shift from solid support for UNITA to

a pro-state stand is directed partly by the political conditions of the post-Cold War era, and partly by the economic conditions introduced by the discovery of huge petroleum reserves in Angola. In a period of instability in the global oil industry, the West, especially France and the US, which have direct petroleum interests in Angola, have every reason to opt for supporting the Angolan state, essentially choosing oil over diamonds.⁷ Thus, the Angolan state's war is being financed by petrodollars and with the support of the West, while UNITA's war is being financed by diamond dollars with the surreptitious support of De Beers and non-state actors in Belgium, London and Israel. As with every other resource-based and foreign-orchestrated conflict in Africa, this combination of actors sets the stage for a very complex politico-economic puzzle for which there is no easy solution. Little surprise then, that the Angolan conflict continued to elude resolution for several decades.

Diamonds and the Various Faces of Globalization: A Summary

In the previous section, I noted that the present wave of globalization is marked by a number of attributes and paradoxes, including integration and marginalization, globalization of production and regional specialization, cultural homogenization and cultural isolation, political one-worldism and political isolation. These key attributes of globalization are reflected quite clearly in the diamonds-arms nexus that undergirds the civil wars in both Angola and Sierra Leone. Integration and marginalization (both politically and economically) can be seen in the different treatment accorded the state, on the one hand, and the rebel factions, on the other, from different elements of the international community – the United Nations, the G8 leaders, regional political organizations (like the OAU, SADC, ECOWAS, and the Commonwealth), regional allies, the international diamond industry, and the international parallel diamonds-for-arms industry. In large part, the two states now enjoy the full support from the international political mainstream, although this has been a recent phenomenon for the Angolan state. By acceding to the demands of one-person-one-vote democracy, the Angolan and Sierra Leonean states under siege received the blessings of the major global political actors, which have assumed the role of guardian for fledgling democracies. At the same time, in a process of mutual exclusivity, the major global actors

have excluded the rebel factions from the world community and completely marginalized them to the extent of threatening sanctions against their regional allies. UNITA, which used to enjoy G8 support during the Cold War, has now become an international pariah; once Savimbi was invited to give a speech to the American congress, but he was later blacklisted as a rogue leader who did not deserve recognition. At the same time that the global political mainstream was marginalizing the rebel factions in the two countries, the latter's governments received support from other sources, especially neighboring countries, which benefited from the unrest. Countries that supported the rebel factions had strained relations with the state. For example, Liberia's support for the RUF had negative consequences for its diplomatic ties with the government of Sierra Leone. Of course, the same processes by which the rebel factions were politically marginalized by the global political mainstream, also ensured their more complete integration into the parallel global system comprised of the gems-for-arms and gems-for-mercenaries sector. Essentially, the same complex web of events and consequences also ensured integration and marginalization at historically specific moments. When the state is recognized by the mainstream, it is automatically rejected by parallel global forces and vice versa.

Another key element of globalization that marks the diamonds-for-arms linkage is the growth of distinct labor specializations within a global labor network. This occurs in several dimensions. At the most macro global level, the diamond-arms nexus has spawned the need for a phalanx of peacekeepers (despite the fact that the peacekeeping forces in both countries originated from specific geographic regions). The second level of labor specialization within the global network would include the diamond smugglers and cutters, arms dealers, and mercenaries. The third is at the local level involving the rebels themselves as well as the civilian population that supplies each side with a wide range of goods and services. All these production and service specialists are connected in a global labor chain in which comparative advantage is strictly defined and defended.

Globalization and the African State Under Siege

In the next three sections, I explore the three themes introduced in section one: globalization and state stability, globalization and civil society, and globalization and the environment. The objective here is to comment on the various ways in which globalization manifests itself in the character of the state, the ability of the state to defend itself and its citizens, the capacity of the state to protect its resources and its environment. The argument outlined in the three aspects of globalization discussed here is that the state is under siege; that is, the state is caught between the interests of global capital and that of local insurrection and is incapable of protecting its own interests and that of the majority of its population. Although the majority of African states have been weakened by the onslaught of globalized economic and political forces, the state under siege is further burdened by the need to consolidate its local political authority. This limits its capacity to turn to other social welfare obligations in order to protect its population from the vicissitudes of globalization.

Diamonds, the Market and the State Under Siege

A critical process of linkage between the African state and global capital is the drive towards market liberalization and privatization on the continent. This process has transformed market freedom into a comparative advantage that may be as important as natural resources, a fact reflected in the Heritage Foundation's index of economic freedom as the reference point by which investors are guided to safe havens for capital investment. The definition of economic freedom by the Foundation covers a wide array of issues, including market liberalization, labor decontrol, and a catch-all imperative to remove government limitations on private sector operations. To put it more vividly but less subtly, economic freedom has come to mean that free-wheeling, free-dealing and fast-moving capital must have the freedom to control state policies. States that do not conform to the neo-liberal dogma run the risk of being blacklisted as international economic and political pariahs.

As the state reacts to these new rules of economic engagement, it has been encouraged/coerced to withdraw from many of its traditional roles in promoting employment and social welfare. In this process, has the African

state become an extinct or nearly extinct behemoth, which cannot cope with the onslaught of globalized economic and social processes?⁸ Arguments that global economic activities are taking place in a 'stateless' arena are underpinned by observations that it is impossible for the African state to function effectively in an age of footloose capital. These observations are further buttressed by the logic that control over and dispensation of resources is a zero-sum game; essentially, enhanced freedom of the market can come only at the expense of state control. Concessions made by the state to the market, therefore, do not merely fail to attract foreign direct investment, they undermine the health of the state and signal its death knell.

There are those who take the contrary position that the Third World state is alive and well. According to this view, the strength of the state is reflected in its ability to reconfigure itself in response to reconfigured capital. In the twenty-first century, the viable state is one that effectively reconfigures itself to meet the challenges and demands of capital by accomplishing three highly interconnected goals: significant withdrawal from resource allocation, market liberalization and political liberalization (democracy and human rights). Thus, state retrenchment from economic activities, far from being a sign of weakness, is a sign of its adaptability and strength, as it grapples with its new triple roles while also trying to address the needs of the poor. Only a flexible and strong state can maneuver through the non-coincident requirements of global capital and the welfare needs of the poor. As recent examples of massive demonstrations in Third World cities against price increases have shown, this is a difficult balancing act for many governments.

What is the nature of the state with respect to the international diamond trade? Both Sierra Leone and Angola face a number of different economic and political pressures at different levels of the global hierarchy. Economically, the major transnational diamond interests (in the case of Angola, this includes petroleum interests as well) are active in the formulation and implementation of policies through their influence on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As noted earlier, global capital, in the shape of De Beers was active in shaping policy, especially in Belgium, while global

petroleum interests were also instrumental in shifting Western support from Savimbi to the Angolan state. Is the African state therefore weak and powerless in the face of such onslaught by capital? In both Angola and Sierra Leone, the answer seems to be yes. It is unreasonable to expect that the state of either country has the means or authority to design and implement policy that would be at the behest of its own peoples and against the interest of capital and the market. Both states are too weak to counter the dominant influence of global market forces.

The political dimension of globalization further underscores this economic dilemma. State policy in both Angola and Sierra Leone were influenced strongly by political decisions made (with or without their approval) at the United Nations, G8, Commonwealth, the OAU and other regional political organizations and states. State policy in Sierra Leone, for example, was strongly influenced by decisions taken in Nigeria, Britain and Liberia, while Angola's was orchestrated primarily from Washington. As a result, the Sierra Leonean state has very little leeway to devise policy that could be directed at solidifying its position *vis-à-vis* the market or to protect the interests of the poor. The same is true, to a greater extent, for Angola, where the economic and political stakes are much higher for the different actors. The Angolan state has had to redirect policy to fit not only the post Cold War era, but also the post apartheid and post Mobutu eras in the region.

These arguments are not meant to suggest that any country can frame its policy in isolation of international agendas. Rather, African governments that are under siege, as in the case of Sierra Leone and Angola, are further weakened because of the global forces which seek to integrate their resources into the global capital network while excluding their populations from the benefits of resource exploitation. These two paradoxical processes, which are orchestrated at the political and economic spheres at several levels in the global hierarchy, weaken the ability of entities like the Sierra Leonean and Angolan states to frame policy that protects their populations from the excesses of the market.

The Role of Civil Society in a State Under Siege

If the state under siege in Africa cannot protect the poor, does civil society have a role to play in this important area of economic development? In the more recent past, there has been a lot of optimism regarding the potential role of civil society in championing the cause of the poor against the excesses of global forces (see, for example, Cox, 1999). This optimism is often based on the activities of individuals, communities, local NGOs (for example, church and community groups) and international NGOs. Such groups are seen as possible conduits for the formulation and dissemination of strategies to meet the rigors of the liberalized economic and political environments that have been ushered into Africa by global forces (Kasfir, 1998).

Civil society has adopted state transformation as one of its top priorities. There is a sense among these groups that political transformation that empowers rural communities may be the first step towards poverty alleviation. In many African countries, students, church leaders and women's groups have been very instrumental in bringing about democratic change. These groups have also been quite successful in forming global alliances to tackle the excesses of the state; elections are now often held under international observation; local reporters affiliated with major international broadcasting corporations are able to disseminate news about local politics and economics more freely than was possible in the 1970s and 1980s; the judiciary in many countries has obtained real independence; and the state even engages in its own house cleaning by taking legal/administrative action against leading political figures. These are all laudable achievements that mark the vigor of civil society from Cape Verde to Djibouti; and from South Africa to Egypt.

More recently the same international alliance of civil society has started to turn its attention to the excesses of the market, as evidenced by the following highly publicized activities: (i) The Jubilee 2000 Petition was launched during the 1998 G8 summit in Birmingham, England. The demonstration reportedly involved 70,000 people linked together in a chain of arms to persuade the world leaders to provide debt relief for Third World countries. (ii) The Africa Summits held in various US cities between 1998 and 2000 around the theme,

‘Africa Matters’, focused on the investment potentials of African countries. (iii) Civil disobedience at Seattle’s WTO and Washington’s World Bank/IMF meetings in 1999 drew worldwide attention to the debt burden of Third World countries and the need for debt relief in the poorest countries. (iv) During the 2000 international AIDS conference in Cape Town, a global coalition linked the debt burden and its impacts on health delivery systems to the rapid rise of AIDS amongst the poor. The call for debt relief was reissued here, as well as at the G8 summit held in Japan in 2000.

Despite notable successes at community mobilization and international political activism, there are still serious questions surrounding the ability of civil society to represent the interests of the poor effectively. Civil society covers a wide array of groups and agendas. Like the state and the market, elements of civil society tend to be self-serving and engage in a lot of turf protection to secure donor funding. Civil society organizations, either by design or by accident, tend also to promote neo-liberalism, democracy and sustainable development as unproblematic projects in the Third World. To that extent, elements of civil society, especially international NGOs and their local allies, may be viewed as mere extensions of the same global forces from whose excesses they are supposed to be shielding the poor. In addition, local civil society organizations tend to be led by individuals with strong ties to the state and global market forces; they have agendas that are sometimes the antithesis of the needs of the poor; and they often lack the managerial and organizational skills as well as political commitment required to tackle the grand project of poverty alleviation.

Can civil society replace the state (or complement state policies) in countries under siege? This is a highly debatable question. In Sierra Leone, elements of civil society, for example, the Kamajors, have been integrally involved as combatants to fill the vacuum created by the inability of the state to field a well trained and equipped army against the rebels. Given mass army defections to the RUF-Koroma coalition, there is no doubt that the state and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) relied heavily on the local knowledge and determination of these civilian hunter societies to counteract rebel activities. Yet the Kamajors cannot replace the state.

What role can local and international civil society play in the transition to peace and in conditions of actual peace? International NGO activities in both Angola and Sierra Leone are currently directed primarily at rehabilitating millions of displaced (both internal and external) populations (in Sierra Leone, a focus on maimed persons and in Angola, a focus on victims of land mines). Civil society must also be credited for the political activities that have led to the initiatives to ban 'blood diamonds'. However, both the international and local civil society have been slow in initiating specific activities to complement state action in other areas of development. In part, this may be due to the fate that has befallen large numbers of UN peacekeepers and other civil society volunteers in both countries. Does this mean that civil society has a role to play only under conditions of political and economic security? The answer seems to be yes. Civil society must be expected to have a limited role in a state under siege. Unfortunately, this limitation only contributes to further weakening of the state and to delaying the participation of civil society in the rehabilitation of the economy and society.

Globalization and Environmental Security

It is unlikely that sustainable development (SD), however defined, can be realized by a state under siege. There are many reasons for this, but the contest over resources is clearly a fundamental barrier towards SD in Sierra Leone and Angola, or in any other country that finds itself in similar straits. Unfortunately the globalization discourse does not make it possible to address the immediate resource and poverty alleviation difficulties of the African state under siege. Since different aspects of globalization have besieged many African countries, this conceptual vacuum calls for urgent redress. One possibility that has received recent attention towards this end is environmental security (ES), which merges political ecology with the broader meta-theory surrounding globalization. ES attempts to address resource issues at several geographic and social scales, giving pride of place to local autonomy over resources. This bottom-up perspective is hinged on an effective network of political institutions that will allow the central government to gradually shift power over resources to local authorities. The central government should also be strong enough to adjudicate effectively between rival claims over

resources at the local level. In turn, the central government should be able to rely on an international network of political and legal institutions to adjudicate in any conflict over resources it might have with neighboring countries. Clearly, ES ascribes great importance to political institutions as agents for obtaining environmental security (Moyo and Tevera, 1999).

ES is built on a number of contextual yardsticks, including both resource availability at several geographic scales and avoidance of resource conflicts or potential conflicts at several levels of political organization (Lonergan et al., 1999). Increasingly, the definition of environmental security is being broadened to include political freedom, grass roots development, community advocacy and gender rights (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 1995; Lonergan, 1993; Suhrke, 1991). In particular, the ES approach to resource management ascribes great importance to political institutions as agents for obtaining improved community standards of living.

Like the current reliance on civil society to fill any institutional vacuum created by government withdrawal from resource allocation in Africa, interest in ES is born out of the belief that government withdrawal from social welfare functions exposes the poor too forcefully to the more malevolent aspects of globalization. The interest of some African scholars in ES issues may also have been inspired by the 'recolonization' of the continent's resources by global forces, as shown in the case of De Beers and diamonds.

What is the potential for engaging ES as a framework for addressing resource conflicts in Africa, especially with regard to the two case study countries? Of course, the prominence given to political institutions in ES is not unproblematic. The public sector in Africa, perhaps more so than elsewhere, is known to cater primarily to the interests of political constituents by promoting the agenda of the elite and vocal interests groups above those of the majority. This skewed pattern of distribution may be more acute in a state under siege. In the cases of both Angola and Sierra Leone, the state is too weak either to protect national resources at the macro or global scale or to ensure the equitable distribution of resources at the micro scale where this is absent.

As has been shown in previous sections, neither the Angolan nor the Sierra Leonean state can protect its diamonds from the power of global capital. The supply, demand, and hence the price of diamonds are all determined by forces completely outside the domain of the African state. De Beers, as has been shown, is more powerful than either state in determining the contours of the international diamond trade. There are no existing international political organizations to which either state can turn to protect its national resources from the power of global capital. In fact, most of the international trade structures have been put in place to protect global capital against state demands, especially from Third World Countries. The international diamond cartel is very powerful, deriving its influence from political affiliations at the highest levels of the global hierarchy. The Belgian state, for example, considers the diamond monopoly of De Beers to be a matter of state security and, for that reason, will employ all its power, authority and leverage to ensure that actions are not implemented at any level of political organization to undermine the stability and profitability of the industry.

Within the framework of ES, at the micro level, the state needs to decentralize authority to give local communities autonomy over their own resources. However, it is clear that only a strong state can engage in such policy. A weak state, as in the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola, cannot afford to decentralize authority. Quite to the contrary, a weak state needs to consolidate power so that rebel factions cannot exploit any perceived or real inadequacy. Given these conditions, it seems that even if ES has the potential to provide a framework for equitable resource distribution, it can be an effective framework only under conditions of political and economic stability. The paradigm is much more limited where the state is under siege from the entrenched interests of global capital and the political and economic pressures of rebellious local interests. The combination of such local and global forces undermines the integrity of the state as a tenable institution for redressing resource inequities.

Conclusion

The contesting of resources has often been identified as the cause of political unrest in Africa. In this chapter, I have sought to place the problem within the broader globalization discourse. I have explored this conceptual relationship by looking at the influence of globalization on state stability, civil society activism and environmental protection. Using the case of diamond exploitation in Sierra Leone and Angola, I have made the case that a state under siege in Africa is weakened to the extent that, (i) it cannot protect either itself or its people from the ravaging power of global capital and local rebellion; (ii) it cannot fully utilize civil society to alleviate welfare shortcomings; and (iii) it does not possess the necessary political infrastructure to ensure environmental security. These weaknesses have been exploited by global capital, in this case, De Beers – the diamond cartel – employing its colossal arsenal of financial and political power to determine public policy and political dialogue to further its own interest at the expense of the people of Sierra Leon and Angola.

Notes

- ¹ For example, Ohmae, 1990; Sassen, 1996; Baylis and Smith, 1997; Bryan and Farrell, 1996.
- ² See, for example, Brecher and Costello, 1994; Germaine, 1999; Hoogvelt, 1997; Kennedy, 1999.
- ³ See Kandeh, 1999, for an excellent analysis of the evolution of the political crisis in Sierra Leone.
- ⁴ Even though Liberia does not produce diamonds its diamond revenues have been substantial throughout the 1990s.
- ⁵ Interestingly, both Burkina Faso and Togo are also implicated in Angola on the side of Savimbi.
- ⁶ All diamond exports are exempt from taxes and most diamond imports are exempt from import duties. [See Professional Jewelers Magazine, 1999].
- ⁷ For these two countries, the oil interest supercedes the diamond interest from which they derive little direct economic benefit.
- ⁸ See, for example, Ayoade, 1988; Bienefeld, 1994.

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Chapter 6

Globalization and Regionalism Who Gains; Who Loses? A SADC Perspective

Trudi Hartzenberg

Introduction

Regional integration and globalization are perhaps the two defining trends of current international economic relations. Dani Rodrik (2001) has warned against developing countries' 'hazardous obsession' with globalization. It is perhaps equally important to note concerns about regional integration as we assess who wins and who loses in these two processes. This chapter considers in particular trade liberalization as it facilitates both regional integration and globalization, as well as who wins and who loses in a Southern African development Community (SADC) context.

Trade liberalization is an integral component of the regional integration agenda for countries in Southern and Eastern Africa. It is also an important step to global integration. The impact of trade liberalization on markets in developing countries, and consequently in SADC, can be significant, especially in view of the fact that domestic policy which embeds markets in the economic system is in many cases inadequate to the support of domestic market participants that must effectively deal with the new competition they encounter through regional integration or globalization. It is therefore important that policy makers in SADC countries focus on – in addition to the rather significant preoccupation with macroeconomic policy – monetary, fiscal and trade policy, the other microeconomic policies that affect the functioning of markets and the competitive capacity of market participants.

The Social and Political Embeddedness of Markets

Political and social embeddedness is a feature of national markets rather

than regional or global markets. In SADC social and political embeddedness of markets varies considerably among countries. Who wins and who loses from trade liberalization in the context of either regional integration or globalization, will depend on the extent of the social and political embeddedness of domestic markets.

A market may be defined as an area within which price is determined (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). The boundaries of a market are usually expressed in terms of two dimensions: product and geographic. The product boundary is defined from the buyer's perspective. Products that are regarded by the consumer (buyer) as good substitutes are located within a specific market. As soon as a low cross-price elasticity of demand is reached, the market boundary is reached. From a geographic perspective, the market boundary surrounds, on the supply side, the competing suppliers/producers (usually firms) of the product. On the supply side, the definition of the market is important when identifying competitors, producers or suppliers. This is particularly relevant to our consideration of who wins and who loses with trade liberalization, in the context of either globalization or regionalism, as new competitors enter domestic markets of SADC countries. It is also useful to consider the market from an institutional perspective. This means that we note the set of rules that governs interaction among buyers and sellers as they negotiate the conditions of exchange, in particular the price of a specific product or set of products.

Again both demand-side and supply-side issues are of importance, and will be affected by trade liberalization, globalization and regionalism. These processes will change the rules of market interaction from a developing country perspective, especially the supply side of the market, in terms of the number and size distribution of competitors in the market and, most likely too, the nature of interaction among buyers and sellers, perhaps especially among sellers. For markets to work effectively, they should be embedded in a set of social and political institutions (Rodrik, 2001).¹. The social and political embeddedness² ensures that markets work well, by regulating, stabilizing and legitimizing them. Regulation by competition or anti-trust

authority and other regulatory agencies ensures that domestic markets work efficiently and allocate resources efficiently. They also ensure a certain degree of fairness and legitimacy.

Markets need institutions for stability. There is no built-in mechanism to guarantee full employment or full capacity utilization. This is where national monetary (central banks) and fiscal authorities and their monetary and fiscal policies play a role to stabilize domestic demand, and the operation of national markets. In addition to this macroeconomic policy focus, it is important to note the role of the collection of microeconomic policies in generating market stability. Industrial policy, competition policy and labor market policy, in addition to trade policy, play a very important role in stabilizing markets.³

Social and political institutions are essential to the legitimization of markets by providing safety nets or social insurance. The specific forms of social safety nets may differ among countries, however, in all cases they mediate the risks and uncertainties that unfettered markets may create. The institutions that ensure the social and political embeddedness of markets are national rather than regional or global: they do not exist at the regional or international levels. Furthermore, it is important to note that in developing countries generally, and (for our present purpose) SADC countries specifically, even national markets may not be effectively embedded, socially and politically. This highlights the imperative of national policy priorities in the discussion of trade liberalization, regionalism and globalization, in the broader context of a coherent national development strategy.

Pursuit of regional and global integration by SADC Countries

The theory of contestable markets, developed by William Baumol and his colleagues in the early 1980s, provides a useful framework for analyzing the process of trade liberalization and assessing its impact. Briefly, contestable market theory focuses on market access conditions or barriers to entry.⁴ When no barriers to entry exist and exit from the market is costless, the market is contestable. The threat of potential entry performs the role of disciplining the incumbent firms. Given the possibility of hit-and-run entry behavior, firms

in the market will produce efficiently and sell their products without making excess profits. Obviously, this textbook sketch of the market will not be found in the real world. The policy lesson from this model is that increasing the contestability of markets will promote competition and hence efficiency. This is also construed to be in the interest of consumers, in terms of price.

The theory abstracts the market from its social and political embeddedness, which excludes a discussion of the problem of vulnerability to failures that plague markets everywhere, but perhaps most severely in developing countries where institutions, both social and political, may be weak and undeveloped⁵. Without explicit acknowledgement of the social and political institutional framework that supports markets in the national economy, a discussion of trade liberalization, globalization and regionalism loses credibility, especially for developing countries.

Trade liberalization reduces barriers to entry into domestic markets. Such liberalization takes the form of tariff reduction, tariffication of quotas, and the elimination of non-tariff barriers. Essentially, as these measures change market access conditions, contestability of these markets increases, making entry easier for foreign firms. The theoretical expectation is that greater contestability will bring efficiency gains (both static and dynamic). This is a naïve expectation, given the concerns raised above about market embeddedness.

The markets in SADC countries that are being liberalized have been protected, in some cases for many years, by high tariffs and other barriers. This adds another dimension to the lack of embeddedness of these markets, because a sheltered existence does not necessarily encourage or enhance performance. With the entry of new market participants, either entry of firms through investment or their products as imports, the market environment changes. Both the nature and the intensity of competition will change. The new firms may bring with them experience and may be supported by the social and political embeddedness in their home countries.

Without the checks and balances provided by social and political embeddedness in the SADC countries, in the form of competition policy, for example, competition may have negative effects on domestic markets and their participants. This is of particular concern in Southern and Eastern Africa, where most of the economies are populated by large numbers of small and medium-sized (SMEs) indigenous firms.

In some markets, size definitely matters when it comes to competition. The domestic SMEs may not be able to compete with large firms (multinationals for example) or firms which adopt competitive strategies that have been honed in totally different markets, and social and political environments. Some of these strategies may amount to anti-competitive practices, but if no anti-trust or competition authority exists, they may go unchecked.⁶ Indeed, the new entrants may influence and change the rules of market interaction in the domestic markets. There are numerous examples from the clothing and textile industries in SADC countries where competition from South East Asian countries has led to the demise of local firms.⁷ This should not be interpreted to mean that competition has only negative effects. Competition can certainly act as a spur to greater efficiency and bring benefits to the consumer too, in the form of lower prices. However, it is important that the discussion be sensitive to the context of competition within a particular market environment and the embeddedness of markets in their social and political framework.

Trade liberalization is an integral part of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s, which were sponsored by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Alongside the macro focus of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), especially monetary and fiscal policy reform, deregulation was of particular importance. Deregulation of domestic markets (including the deregulation of agricultural markets), and trade liberalization were required of these countries. Very little attention was, by contrast, paid to the development or reform of industrial and competition policies, for example. In SADC only three countries have implemented competition policies and have functioning competition authorities. These are South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Since the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations that culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the process of trade liberalization has gathered momentum. The establishment of the WTO has in fact institutionalized trade liberalization programs for all member countries. All SADC countries, except Seychelles,⁸ are WTO members. This binds them to the multilateral liberalization agenda and specifically to the commitments that they have made to the WTO. Liberalization facilitates the process of globalization.

The implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol, which was signed in 1996, began in September 2000. This process of trade liberalization and integration will culminate in a free trade area in 2008. Substantially all trade will take place among SADC member states without tariff or non-tariff barriers. The process of regional trade liberalization will change market definitions as firms from any one country will be able to sell their products, without impediment, in any other SADC country. Effectively both product and geographic market definitions will be changed.

The membership overlap between SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)⁹ means that the SADC countries that are also members of COMESA, are engaged in a further trade liberalization process. Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe deserve particular focus in this regard.¹⁰ These countries became part of the COMESA free trade area on 31 October 2000.¹¹ Seychelles joined the free trade area at the beginning of June 2001, and the Democratic Republic of Congo has agreed to an 80% rate of tariff reduction. For these countries these tariff reductions imply substantial changes in market access conditions.¹²

The different trade liberalization processes taking place concurrently in the SADC region, mean that the market for any specific product, from the perspective of any one SADC country, will have different entry conditions for different suppliers of the product, depending on the origin of the goods entering the domestic market. Contestability of the market will be firm-specific, depending on market access conditions – in particular, trade barriers

that apply to the product of a particular firm that is imported into a particular SADC country. If foreign firms, either from the region or outside, enter the market by investing in productive capacity and thus produce for the local market, then these firms may in a more immediate and perhaps fundamental way influence the nature and extent of competitive interaction in the market. As a result, the rules of the game may in fact change.

Trade liberalization by SADC member countries under the WTO, and in some cases unilaterally too,¹³ highlight a further concern related to the social and political embeddedness of markets. With the different liberalization processes taking place concurrently, market definitions are being complicated with high (opportunity) cost implications associated with the application of institutional capacity to trade-related activities. The rules that govern trade between any SADC country and another will depend on the trade regime binding the trading partners. For those countries that are members of both SADC and COMESA, a set of rules (either SADC or COMESA) has to be selected. COMESA advocates that these countries follow the COMESA rules, in accordance with “WTO procedures [which] require that trade be conducted on the basis of the more advanced trade regime” (www.comesa.int). Monitoring of trade flows has never been so complex! Customs and excise and border control authorities as well as Ministries of Trade/Commerce and Industry are likely to be especially burdened.

Globalization and regionalism

Globalization and regionalism are two defining trends of current international economic relations. Globalization (which is very difficult to define in unequivocal terms) takes place as firms seek new markets for their products or services, and as they access resources from international markets – for example, new technologies and capital. For SADC countries, this process most often means encountering markets or market participants, both from the demand and supply side, of the North. This encounter encompasses a new social and political institutional environment, one for which they are very often not well prepared. Examples abound of producers exporting agricultural products to EU markets, having been denied access on account

of environmental or technical standards. The capacity of developed countries to substitute a new generation of barriers to entry to their markets or change market access conditions is much greater than that of the developing countries. Globalization therefore effectively means that market boundaries are being redefined.

Asymmetric access to markets is a key issue in international trade bargaining. This is an area where capacity in developing countries in general and specifically in Southern and Eastern Africa, is either scarce or weak. It is also an area of particular concern, for instance, given the predominance of agricultural products (and other primary products) in their export profiles, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the protection, and support that the agricultural sector enjoys in the European Union, a major export market for SADC countries. Asymmetric market access is also a regional concern. Discussions within SADC concerning access to the South African market is a cogent example. Asymmetry in market access conditions and the differential levels of development within SADC in some ways mirror the global situation between developed and developing countries.

When firms from the north enter SADC markets, either as investors and hence producers, or as exporters, they enter a new social and political institutional milieu. The firms from the north have the experience of a developed milieu, a support infrastructure and access to information about their new markets that enables them to compete and often out-compete local firms. As the transaction costs of doing business are reduced by changes in technology, especially transport and information and communication technology, the firms from northern countries enjoy the benefit of assimilation, which a first-mover advantage bestows on them. The firms in SADC markets may not be able to counter these advantages, and thus may be the losers in competitive interaction with the new entrants.

Regionalism enlarges markets, within geographic bounds. In Southern and East African markets, boundaries are being redefined to extend to the periphery of the regional bloc of SADC or COMESA, as the case may be. These are not

just attempts to enlarge regional markets but also draw a boundary between the enlarged regional market and the global market. The rationale for this is that large markets offer opportunities to achieve the benefits of economies of scale and scope, recognizing, however, that international markets may prove to be hostile to newcomers, especially to firms from developing countries that cannot compete with the sophisticated competitive strategies based on intimate market knowledge, experience and a supportive social and political milieu.¹⁴ Even from these regional integration processes there will be winners and losers, as the benefits of the larger markets are unevenly distributed among market participants and member countries.

Globalization: Who Wins; Who Loses?

By changing market access conditions, trade liberalization leads to market redefinition; globalization and regionalism do so by expanding market boundaries. The impact of these developments may be assessed within an industrial organization framework. With changing market access conditions, the distinction between actual competition and potential competition is critical, as suggested by contestable market theory. As barriers to entry are lowered, potential competitors may enter the market. With entry, the nature and the intensity of competition may alter. Competitive strategies, based on both price and non-price factors, may change. New firms, from developed or global markets, may have an edge on incumbent firms. From a consumer's perspective the 'new entrants' may prove very attractive.¹⁵ As pointed out above, newcomers may exploit their size to gain an edge over domestic firms, which may lose out in this competition unless they are supported to compete effectively with new entrants – unless there is an oversight of competitive interaction to guard against monopolistic practices. As noted earlier, only three SADC countries have competition policy as well as regulatory authorities. Two policy areas in which both SADC and COMESA countries could do with capacity development are industrial and competition policy. Industrial policy includes support policies (which now have to be WTO-compatible, given the WTO membership of all but one SADC country) that can enhance firm competitiveness on both domestic and export markets.¹⁶ Competition policy refers to the policies and the legislation that govern

competitive interaction to prevent abuses of market power and other anti-competitive behavior.

From a regional perspective, the assessment of winners and losers has to take into account the country of origin of the new entrant. If the new competitor comes from a country in the same regional bloc, then our assessment is as follows: the country which is being entered by a new firm (from another country as opposed to the start-up of a new firm resulting from domestic investment), may find that its local firms face tough competition and could be adversely affected by this new competition.

However, our assessment of winners and losers takes on another dimension in a regional context. If migration of firms takes place within a regional bloc, this impacts on the regional distribution of economic (perhaps industrial) activity, which may be viewed as a positive development from the region's perspective, if we focus on longer-term sustainability issues. A more even distribution of industrial (economic) activity is necessary for robust and sustainable regional economic development.¹⁷ It is extremely important, however, that the migration of firms within a regional bloc not follow a one-way route. If it should, it would mean that economic activity would be polarized or concentrated spatially, which might be undesirable from a regional perspective. It is therefore imperative that when we focus on the implementation of the SADC trade protocol (trade liberalization) for example, that we also examine the set of related policies, in particular industrial and competition policy, that impact on the firms' ability to compete in the new markets, as well as influence the nature of competition in those markets.

Conclusion

For SADC countries trade liberalization, whether undertaken to comply with the implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol, the COMESA free trade area, or in terms of WTO commitments or unilaterally, raises a number of key issues. Market access conditions are changed by trade liberalization and, as a corollary, by globalization and regional integration. These changes will impact on a particular aspect of market structure, namely, seller concentration

– the number and size distribution of firms within a market. It follows that the nature and intensity of competition within a market is likely to change. It may very well be that the firms from developed countries that enter these markets are the winners, and firms in SADC countries, the losers. There will also be winners and losers, even if we consider only the migration of firms (or their products) within a particular regional bloc such as SADC. As firms move from one member country to another, those from the more developed countries that move to less developed countries could be the winners and the firms in the countries so entered, the losers.

However, the country from which firms migrate also loses in terms of jobs, for example. It is important to extend the assessment of regional winners and losers to take account of longer-term sustainable development issues. If relocation of firms leads to polarization of industrial or more generally economic activity, then all member countries (and their firms) will be losers in the longer-term, irrespective of who wins and who loses in the short-term.

Notes

¹ This section draws on the work on Dani Rodrik.

² Our discussion of social and political embeddedness focuses specifically on economic policy, and refers to examples of micro-economic policy – especially industrial and competition policy. Broader discussion of embeddedness is not undertaken in this paper.

³ Our discussion refers only briefly to a selection of these policies – the aim of the paper is not to discuss specific policy initiatives, rather to note the importance of focusing on domestic policy priorities, given commitments to trade liberalization with reference to regional integration and globalization.

⁴ A market is contestable if there are no barriers to entry and there is costless exit from the market.

⁵ Trade liberalization is not the only policy that attempts to promote the contestability of markets. Industrial policies or small business support policies may also enhance contestability.

⁶ It may be argued that the WTO offers checks and balances in the form of e.g. anti-dumping measures. Precedents within the WTO caution that developing

countries may not easily be able to take on developed country perpetrators. Although the WTO is a democratic institution, developing countries, because of capacity may not be able to use the system as effectively as developed countries.

⁷ It is important to recognise that new entrants may also display higher productivity levels and competition based on such grounds can be efficiency enhancing in the domestic markets.

⁸ Seychelles is awaiting approval of its membership application, and currently has observer status.

⁹ The SADC countries that are also COMESA members, are: Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁰ All except Mauritius are classified as least developed countries by the WTO.

¹¹ Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe were the founding members of the FTA (October 2000).

¹² In May 2001, the Organization of African Unity was replaced by the African Union – discussions on a free trade area for Africa are emerging.

¹³ Angola and Mozambique are two examples of SADC countries, which have also liberalised unilaterally. South Africa's trade liberalization process, which in fact goes beyond WTO requirements, may also be viewed as unilateral, at least to some degree.

¹⁴ We do not discuss here other rationales for regional integration, such as the improvement of international bargaining positions, which is possible when regional trading or economic blocs enter trade or other negotiations.

¹⁵ In many of our economies consumers display a marked preference for imported goods and services over local produce – the perception that imported is better, is a difficult one to change!

¹⁶ Industrial policy usually includes the collection of investment and export promotion initiatives.

¹⁷ This would counter the polarization of economic activity, which is being raised as a potential concern in SADC.

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Chapter 7

The ACP/Africa - EU (Cotonou) Trade Agreements: Critique, Options, Challenges

Moses Tekere

Introduction

African governments have a keen interest in the emerging trading arrangement between their countries and the European Union because of the strong colonial economic and trade links they have with the EU, which over the past two decades have been strengthened by the special relationship forged in the context of the Lomé Convention. More recently, a new cooperation agreement (the Cotonou Agreements) that will serve as a transitional mechanism from the Lomé model of cooperation to economic partnership agreements (free trade area agreements) was concluded. Both the transitional arrangement and the proposed economic partnership agreements, based on the free trade area concept, pose serious challenges and opportunities for African states.

These challenges include the nature of political dialogue (equal or asymmetrical), private sector development strategies, the nature of trade cooperation and the availability and effectiveness of development finance as well as conditions attached to the new partnership. There are also problems with the institutional capacity to negotiate free trade agreements separately with the EU since many regions in Africa have not yet developed into customs unions, which can negotiate on behalf of their members. Regional integration processes are at different and critical stages. The West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are customs unions, while the East African Community (EAC), **Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)**, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and others are still moving towards

complete free trade areas. Also, the EU has singled out SADC, EAC, ECOWAS and UEMOA (leaving out SACU, COMESA and others) as potential partners for such regional free trade agreements. In addition, the EU and South Africa have concluded separate free trade arrangements, which have implications for many SADC and virtually all SACU countries, thus posing further complications to regional economic integration in Africa. COMESA is taking serious steps towards regional trade liberalization, making it a more suitable candidate for a region-based free trade arrangement with the EU because it will have a common external tariff in place earlier than SADC and therefore be in a position to negotiate with the EU as one entity.

Furthermore, the African continent has a large number of least developed countries (LDCs) which, according to the Cotonou agreements, can benefit from unilateral market preferences in the EU and therefore need not necessarily enter into free trade agreements with the EU. These LDCs face very difficult decisions in terms of foregoing their non-reciprocal preferences enshrined in the World Trade Organization (WTO) by going into free trade arrangements with the EU. Finally, independent trade liberalization undertaken in the framework of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) by countries in the region has produced mixed results leading to trade policy reversals, such as those experienced in Zimbabwe, and resistance to wholesale trade liberalization, typified by Tanzania's withdrawal from COMESA.

ACP Country Performance under the Lomé Convention: An Evaluation

The performance of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in the EU market has been rather disappointing. Despite the preferences granted to the ACP countries in the EU market, the ACP countries could not improve on their poor trade performance. The share of ACP imports from the EU declined steadily from around seven percent in 1975 to 3.5 percent in 1997. Also, the share of ACP in total EU imports from developing countries has steadily decreased, from 34 percent in 1975 to 10.3 percent in 1997, when the number of ACP and EU countries increased. For example, the share of

EU imports from sub-Saharan Africa in total EU imports fell over the same period from 6.8 percent to 2.5 percent; those from the Caribbean from 0.7 percent to 0.3 percent; and those from the Pacific from 0.2 percent to 0.1 percent. ACP exports to the EU increased during the last ten years by a meager four percent, whereas exports from other developing countries to the EU increased by 76 percent over the same period.

While export performance varies from one region to another, in none of the ACP regions does export growth come close to that of other developing countries. For the period between 1988 and 1997, total exports from ACP countries to the EU grew by less than four percent in volume, whereas those of other developing countries grew by some 75 percent. Thus, despite the fact that the ACP countries are the EU's most preferred trading partners, their overall performance in the EU market has been far worse than that of other developing countries. In 1996, the proportion of ACP exports enjoying a preferential margin of over three percent was 29 percent. These products grew in volume by some 62 percent in the period 1988 to 1997. Exports of the same products from other developing countries, which have only modest preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) compared to most-favored-nation (MFN) status, grew by nearly 80 percent. Nevertheless, a few ACP countries have been able to take better advantage of the Lomé trade arrangements. Five ACP countries had export growth equal to or greater than the other developing countries: Mauritius, Jamaica and, to a lesser extent, Madagascar (in the textiles sector); and Kenya and Zimbabwe for cut flowers, fruits and vegetables. It is clear therefore that trade preferences are not a sufficient instrument for enhancing growth or improving trade performance.

Trade preferences under appropriate conditions can nevertheless have some impact on ACP trade flows. This is particularly so in cases where the preferential margin is of a certain significance, for example, over 30 percent. In volume terms, growth in ACP exports to the EU over the last ten years was considerably higher in those sectors where the ACP countries benefited from a significant margin of preference. A high level of preferences can therefore stimulate high export growth. However, at the ACP level, export growth in

these sectors (62 percent) still remains below the growth rates realized in the same sectors by other developing countries (78 percent). In fact, certain ACP regions, like the Caribbean, the Pacific and UEMOA, recorded even lower growth rates (18 percent, 46 percent and 22 percent, respectively). In other words, growth rates were well below those of other developing countries. Some ACP regions performed better in these sectors compared to other developing countries (in particular the EAC, with a growth rate of 135 percent and SADC with a growth rate of 84 percent). This confirms the belief that trade preferences beyond a certain threshold can have an impact on trade flows if the preferred country is in a position to utilize them. In short, a preferential trade regime can confer a competitive edge on the market – if the margin is significant and if the preferred countries have the capacity to utilize the facility.

Manufactured Products

As far as manufactured products are concerned, the preferential margin in favor of the ACP over the GSP beneficiaries by the year 2000 will be only 1.6 percent. Sectors where the margin will remain relatively significant are chemicals, footwear, textiles and clothing. Overall, growth recorded in the volume of ACP manufactured exports was 1.5 percent between 1988 and 1997, whereas other developing countries taken together doubled their export volume. Textiles are the only manufactured products accounting for a significant share of ACP exports, as they increased by nearly 70 percent in volume between 1988 and 1997. The dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) during the Uruguay Round and the added possibility of further multilateral liberalization of industrial products during the next WTO round of negotiations will mean increased competition for ACP countries and ultimately the total erosion of their preferential margins.

Agricultural Products

The preferential margin for agricultural products remains significant, although from 2000 50 percent of agricultural exports will no longer enjoy preferential treatment, the most affected commodities being coffee and cocoa. The other half will still have a margin of preference of about ten percent. Agricultural

exports (outside the protocol products) grew by 26 percent in the period 1988 to 1997, and by 60 percent in those sectors where the preferential margin is more than three percent. Sectors with a large preferential margin as well as high growth rates are flowers (+ 230 percent), vegetables (+ 132 percent), processed fish products (+ 110 percent), tobacco (+ 83 percent) and processed fruit and vegetables (+ 70 percent).

Commodity Protocols

- **Beef and Veal**

Less than half of the quantity allocated under the beef and veal protocol was exported in 1997, against nearly 80 percent in 1995. In 1996, European prices were 50 percent higher than world prices, generating additional earnings of 30 million Euros for ACP exporters. However, in the framework of Agenda 2000, the EU has decided on a 20 percent cut in the intervention price of beef, which will lead to a corresponding reduction in the earnings of ACP exporters. Since traditional ACP exporters are not substantial beef suppliers in the EU market, this protocol could be contested within the World Trade Organization (WTO).

- **Bananas**

In 1997, the banana protocol generated €400 million in export earnings for the twelve ACP beneficiaries; 75 percent of the allocation was used. The retention of the protocol depends on the successful negotiation of a waiver from the WTO. The recent WTO decision in the case involving the EU and the US, along with the reform of the common market organization, have added more pressure on the EU to open up its market to Latin American producers. This could seriously jeopardize the position of the ACP countries in the EU market.

- **Sugar**

The sugar protocol generated nearly €850 million in export earnings in 1996 to 1997 for the traditional sugar supplying countries. It will remain in force after the expiry of the Cotonou agreements and is compatible with WTO rules since the EU secured a concession for the ACP quota during the Uruguay Round. It could, however, be contested within the WTO by other producers such as Brazil, which might succeed in getting it liberalized or securing

improved access under the agreement with Mercosur.

- **Rum**

Duty-free quotas for rum were totally dismantled by January 2000. From this date, all imports of ACP rum into the EU were to be completely liberalized. In addition, trade in high-quality light rum worldwide will be fully liberalized by 2003 at MFN level, meaning that other suppliers will be able to compete on a level playing field with equivalent ACP rum. Total ACP export earnings for this product equaled €225 million in 1997, which was about 1 percent of total rum exports to the EU. The main region of origin is the Caribbean for which rum accounts for 13 percent of all exports.

Treating Unequals as Equals: Shifting from Aid to Trade

Post-Lomé IV negotiations were the most difficult in the history of ACP-EU cooperation. Negotiating parties were faced with very difficult choices and questions. One thing that was certain, however, was that a new arrangement reflecting various changes that had taken place globally was needed. The parties had to decide on the transitional arrangements and the nature of the post-transitional cooperation model. Another difficulty was how such a transitional mechanism and post-transitional model could capture and address the concerns of such a diverse group of countries, encompassing developed, developing and least developed members. Furthermore, they had to ensure that obligations were commensurate with rights and benefits. For example, unlike the current agreement where the EU is a benefactor, the new agreement must ensure that the EU also benefits through the rule of reciprocity from the ACP. On the other hand, several changes, negotiations and processes whose outcome will have fundamental significance for EU-ACP cooperation are expected; or they might be in the process of making it very difficult for the parties to determine the nature of both the transitional and post-transitional cooperation arrangements. The negotiations include the WTO Seattle Round that was aborted and later revived, the review of the EU's GSP scheme, UNCTAD X, expansion of the EU eastwards, US special initiatives for Africa (under the African Growth and Opportunity Act), regional integration efforts in the ACP (particularly in Southern Africa), and the CAP reform (Agenda 2000). Thus, unlike the 1974–75 period when Lomé I negotiations were

concluded, the ACP countries are confronted with several imponderables which require educated decisions as to the best form of economic cooperation among them. It is in this light that the current agreement is a transitional instrument during which events will become clearer, enabling them to conclude a new cooperation agreement with the EU.

Trade Commitments in the Cotonou Agreement

The essence of trade commitments under the Cotonou agreements is that current non-reciprocal trade preferences be maintained temporarily up to 2008. This will allow renegotiations of WTO-compatible trading arrangements (REPAs) starting from September 2002 that will enter into force in January 2008. However, the parties still do not agree on the content and substance of the trade arrangement following the transitional arrangement. In this context, the ACP countries and the EU merely agreed to objectives, principles, modalities and procedures. The main objective of the economic and trade cooperation agreements is to foster smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy and promote sustainable development as well as enabling them to effectively manage their transition to the liberalized global economy. Precisely whether WTO-compatible economic partnership agreements (EPAs) in the form currently proposed by the EU are the best instrument to achieve the objective is not clear. How do the equal partners ensure smooth integration and the equitable distribution of the benefits from integration into the world economy in favor of poor ACP countries?

The partners agreed to use the preparatory period for capacity-building in the public and private sectors of ACP countries, including measures to enhance competitiveness, strengthen regional organizations and support regional trade integration initiatives – and also, where appropriate, with assistance in budgetary adjustment and fiscal reforms, for infrastructure upgrading and development, and for investment promotion. Again, how this will be done, and progress assessed, is not clear. Are there measurable capacity thresholds or it is just rhetoric? What will happen if capacity remains low after the transitional period? Will an ACP country with such weak capacity be expected to accord reciprocal treatment to the EU?

It was also agreed that negotiations of the EPAs will be undertaken with ACP countries that are in a position to do so, at the level they consider appropriate, and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP group, taking into account regional integration processes among the ACP countries. Here the real issue is the circumstances under which countries decide whether they should individually, or as part of a regional bloc, go into EPAs with the EU. What would be the effect of this action on regional solidarity and integration if one member state should opt to sign a free trade agreement with the EU while the rest do not (as is the case of South Africa and SADC)?

Two reviews are envisaged, one regarding the position of LDCs in 2004 and the other on the progress in negotiations by 2006. First, there is an agreement to closely cooperate and collaborate with the WTO with a view to defending the arrangements reached. In this connection, a joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade Committee was to be established to examine the impact of the wider global liberalization initiatives on ACP-EU trade and the development of ACP economies. Secondly, the EU markets are the region's biggest export destination. EU aid, both multilateral and bilateral, accounts for more than half the aid disbursements to the region. Therefore, the type of North-South relationship that the Cotonou agreements shapes will be critical to the future of the region, requiring involvement of all stakeholders – not simply governments.

Main Lessons

There are several important lessons for COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC, and others to be derived from the post-Lomé IV negotiations in the area of trade. First, trade instead of aid to the ACP countries lies at the heart of EU's future strategy and engagement with the ACP states. This means that a failure to reach agreement on trade could pose a real threat to the continuation of the ACP-EU special relationship. Surely, the EU position is based on the economic interests of its members. The ACP countries should be reminded once again that the EU was not created to assist them to develop but rather to advance the trade interests of its members by securing and expanding market access in the ACP countries.

Secondly, because of the inherent inequality of the 'donor-recipient' relationship, the negotiating field was grossly uneven. The ACP made many concessions with the hope of securing more aid, while tactically the EU made aid availability and its size conditional to the reaching of agreement in all areas, so that the size of the bundle of Euros to ACP will be known only at the end of the negotiations. The EU employed the strategy of cross conditionality by tying aid provisions, size and conditions to an agreement to a reciprocal trade agreement. Being dependent on EU aid, the ACP countries had no effective bargaining power, enabling the demands of the EU to succeed. What is more disturbing is that expectations of more aid resources even after giving so many concessions have not been met, as the EU has not committed itself to increasing aid. Instead, the EU is shifting aid from the ACP countries to Eastern Europe.

Thirdly, the EU exploited negotiations on trade to advance issues that developing countries have been questioning at WTO negotiations. The real threat is posed by issues such as those on the environment, new ethical trading terms and conditions of labor, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, border controls and those dealing with rules of origin. Fourth, decisions on trade were not always based on the results of studies. For example, the impact studies of REPAs were only commissioned after the decision to adopt REPAs, but the studies revealed a number of problems, particularly regarding the lack of political will on the part of the ACP countries and the EU to reverse earlier decisions. Furthermore, the studies revealed that backstopping of ACP positions through broad-based consultations and the use of ACP expertise minimized losses to the ACP countries.

In addition, and more fundamentally, the outcome of the negotiations again indicates the failure of ACP countries to determine their own trade and development priorities, as well as the loss of initiative and sovereignty in national economic policy formulation and implementation. By agreeing to free trade arrangements with the EU, the ACP countries further endorsed the neo-liberal approach to development, despite its serious shortcomings, as are evident from experiences with the SAPs. Finally, the consequences of wrong

decisions can be severe; therefore before taking positions and engaging in trade negotiations, serious research into the complex issues at stake is required; also because there can be very different interpretations of the same issues, employing rather subjectively a number of strategic arguments to bolster one's advantage.

EU-Africa Trade: The Hub and Spokes Model

The long-term strategy of the EU is to create four separate free trade agreements with countries of the SADC, EAC, ECOWAS and UEMOA regions, respectively, and others with selected ACP countries. The choice of such regions has been made without consideration of regional and continental efforts towards economic integration. In its long-term view, the EU will be the hub while other regions will be the spokes. Through such a strategy, the EU will not only control patterns of trade cooperation but also ensure that no meaningful economic cooperation takes place among the different ACP regions. In political economy terms, the EU's objective is to perpetuate the balkanization of Africa and strengthen its domination of the ACP countries as a whole. For example, in Southern Africa the EU initially concluded a free trade agreement with the regional power – South Africa. By this, it brought the rest of the region into a *de facto* free trade agreement with itself. Undoubtedly, the conclusion of a free trade agreement between South Africa and EU has a direct bearing on the positions of the EU regarding its future trade relations with other African regions or countries. We contend that the outcome of the South Africa-EU free trade agreement may have influenced the EU to change goals in its negotiations with the ACP countries. Though the EU argued that its proposed free trade agreement with South Africa was based on that country's own merits, what unfolded within the EU-South Africa negotiations certainly gave ideas to the EU as to the desirability of the model. Further, it has now emerged that the South Africa-EU agreement was viewed as not only a building block but also a model on which to establish broader arrangements with African regions and states. Thus, a model that was meant for South Africa, a relatively developed country, is now being used as the basis for trade negotiations with other ACP states – developing countries.

What is the Problem?

Several changes and processes whose outcomes have fundamental significance for EU-ACP cooperation are either expected, or currently in the process of making it very difficult for African countries and regions to determine the nature of free trade agreements whose negotiations were due to start in September 2000.¹ So far a number of issues have caused some disquiet as far as free and fair trade with the EU is concerned. The following are worth consideration.

- **EPAs and the pace of unilateral or regional liberalization**

The real problem is that EPAs will push African countries to liberalize at a pace that is not in accordance with their development needs. Already African countries have experience with trade liberalization, and all of them are committed to it according to their own pace. The EPAs with the EU will impose a pace less optimal than could be achieved within national and regional frameworks.

- **Negotiation resources**

African countries lack the necessary negotiating capacity. They lack the resources, human and financial, to negotiate with the EU if they are to extract meaningful concessions from the Union. They are already engaged in regional and multilateral trade liberalization negotiations that require tremendous resources. Post-Lomé IV and South Africa-EU negotiation experiences show that the EU sometimes focuses on trivial issues that can exhaust scarce resources.

- **Revenue implications**

EPAs have serious tariff revenue implications, because without tariff revenue some governments will be plunged into such a severe fiscal crisis that they cannot govern their people.

- **Asymmetry in liberalization and longer time frames**

During negotiations for the Cotonou ACP-EU agreements the ACP countries were concerned with the length of preparatory periods rather than what is to be done during such periods – which is more important than mere time frame. Judging by the South Africa-EU time frames, a much longer transitional period could be sought by African countries. According to the WTO, the normal transitional period is understood to be ten years. Because African countries

cannot expect much assistance from the EU to address their structural rigidities within this period, securing a much longer transitional period could be regarded as important, for what is primarily a waiting period.

- **Sector coverage**

The problem regarding a free trade agreement with the EU is the *a priori* exclusion of agriculture and the distortive impact of CAP. South Africa managed to wrest some concessions from the EU in the agricultural sector, which is usually the most protected sector in the EU and has generally been a ‘no-go’ area in other free trade agreements of this kind. However, as the EU excluded about 46 percent of agriculture from the FTA with South Africa, could other African countries successfully demand that no sector be left out of free trade agreements, and the reduction and ultimate removal of CAP subsidies be a subject and precondition for free trade negotiations between the EU and African countries? This position is consistent with WTO provisions regarding regional trade arrangements that no sector should be excluded from liberalization.

- **Product coverage**

According to WTO, a free trade area should cover substantially all trade, and no sector should be excluded. The EU, on the other hand, interprets this rule – “substantially all trade” – to mean 90 percent of all trade, with the remaining ten percent being subject to special protocols. The problem is whether the ACP countries could reciprocate this by protecting their own sensitive or vulnerable sectors. Since much of Africa’s trade is with the EU, allowing 90 percent imports of the 40 percent duty free would certainly have serious implications for sensitive sectors and adversely affect customs revenue, which accounts in some cases for a substantial percentage of total government revenue.

- **Reduction of export subsidies**

One of the biggest threats posed by a free trade agreement with the EU is the high level of subsidies through the CAP. In the EU-SA FTA, the EU has committed itself not to pay refunds on cheese exported to South Africa under a tariff quota of 5,000; upon commencement of liberalization, refunds will be eliminated. Furthermore, the EU has indicated its willingness to remove export subsidies on products that South Africa might want for front loading. This is a concession on which African countries can build to further demand

the removal of all export subsidies on products that are of interest to them.

- **Essential elements and non-execution clauses**

The inclusion of essential elements and non-execution clauses has become a common feature of most co-operation agreements with the EU. These essential elements include respect of democratic principles, rule of law, good governance and human rights. Violation or breach of any one of them leads to non-execution, i.e. withdrawal of concessions, or other sanctions. Thus African countries would have to come up with their own definition of these essential elements to ensure objectivity in the test for breach of the essential elements. For the wrong or right reasons, already there are calls in the EU to invoke sanctions against Zimbabwe following the widespread use of political violence in that country's agrarian reform policy.

What are the Interests of Africa in the EU Market?

As African countries prepare for new trade negotiations with the EU, they should clearly define their interests in the EU and secure them in new engagements with the EU. The issues may include the following.

- Increased and improved market access to the EU, i.e. markets for Africa's commodities;
- Marketing and managerial skills, i.e. experience and exposure to new marketing and production techniques;
- Exporting to take advantage of export incentive schemes where these are provided;
- Exporting to the EU because of excess capacity, which resulted from heavy investments made earlier to benefit from export incentives;
- Lomé trade preferences were superior to the GSP preferences in terms of level of preferential treatment and product coverage;
- Aid that comes with trade and to support trade.

The EU market is Africa's biggest export destination, as well as a source of imported merchandise. Furthermore, EU aid – both multilateral and bilateral – accounts for over half the aid disbursements to the region. Therefore, the type of North-South relations that the Cotonou agreements shape will be critical to the continent's future.

New Enhanced Regional Agreements: A Viable Option for Africa?

Individual African countries are already undertaking trade liberalization programs within the context of SAPs and also within the regional and multilateral context. Liberalization of trade with the EU should therefore be welcomed and viewed as reinforcing rather than undermining efforts at the national, regional and multilateral levels. Given the differences in the levels of development between the EU and African countries there is a great need to craft a visionary, unique and innovative free trade agreement that addresses the trade liberalization and development concerns in a direct and comprehensive manner. Traditional free trade models based on time-bound removal of tariffs, irrespective of a country's level of development, are inappropriate where the partners are at very different levels of development.

In view of the emerging free trade agreements with the EU and the need for regions and individual countries to take decisions regarding the specific nature of such arrangements during the preparatory period (2000–02 rollover of current Lomé IV and 2003–07 negotiations of free trade agreements with the EU), African countries and regions must critically consider all their options. One such option is the 'new enhanced regional economic agreements' (EREAs). The fundamental objective of the new EREAs is to introduce free trade arrangements that target the achievement of some basic thresholds in African countries as determined by regional integration groups. They depart from trade agreements that are structured by reciprocity and based on mere time frames. The new EREAs with the EU may be designed to complement the trade liberalization programs of SAPs, within existing regional groupings, and to accord with WTO rules. To ensure that free trade arrangements with the EU address the fundamental development issues of poverty reduction and sustainable growth, some measures have to be put in place. First, the reciprocity rule should not rest on time frames alone; it should be tied to development aid to enable ACP countries to achieve development thresholds that will enable them eventually to compete with EU firms under conditions of free trade. African countries are facing various capacity constraints – human development deficit, debt burden, deficiency in economic infrastructure, weak private sector, commodity dependence, etc. – that reduce their ability to

compete with the EU. To address some of these, the EU should commit itself to providing financial and technical support to the continent. This can be done by tying EU access to ACP markets to the provision of such support.

In this regard, reciprocity should be related to the achievement of development thresholds in ACP countries. Aid from the EU towards achieving those thresholds is the price to be paid by the EU for accessing ACP markets. The advantage of tying the reciprocity rule to the attainment of development thresholds lies in the possibility of an ‘early harvest’ in terms of fuller reciprocity in favor of the EU if they provide more aid. In other words, the application of the reciprocity rule in accordance with the achievement of certain developmental thresholds will mean that if these or some of the thresholds are achieved sooner than the deadline, then there is the possibility of an ‘early harvest’ in terms of reciprocating in favor of the EU. There is also the possibility of combining the thresholds and time frames in a manner that will address the concerns of both parties. This might mean that African countries would not seek long transitional periods since the landmark for reciprocity would be thresholds. Secondly, the EU has to pay a price for the market access they are seeking in the ACP and African countries, because by accepting the reciprocity rule the ACP countries will at the same time be paying for maintaining current market access conditions in the EU. The outcome will be a win-win situation in which the EU will secure market access and ACP countries gain support to address their development constraints. Implementing this proposal will require appropriate amendments to the WTO provisions on RTAs, in particular Article XXIV of GATT 1994 (on regional trade) and the 1979 Enabling Clause to allow development-based thresholds instead of time-based thresholds.

Essential elements of the new EREA include the following:

- Agreed measures of development and overall vulnerability of each regional integration bloc, e.g. the SADC and COMESA states, to determine the pace and extent of trade liberalization in favor of EU. For example, opening up of SADC markets to the EU must be tied to substantial debt relief by the EU to Africa.
- LDC members to retain their special access to EU markets without

reciprocity for an extended period.

- Opening of Africa's markets is related to agreed benchmarks in reform of the CAP.
- Avoidance of EU trade diversion by liberalizing at own pace within the WTO frameworks, thus giving improved access to non-EU markets.
- Aid component to be used to enhance trade capabilities and increase export diversification.
- Aid to be used to cushion the transition to more liberal trading conditions (especially changes in protocols).
- A contract enforcement mechanism (including dispute procedures).
- Rules of origin are simple and facilitate cumulation.
- A review of WTO provisions on RTAs.
- In addition to these, the new EREA provisions should include detailed elaboration of the following areas:
- A careful definition of the "necessary conditions" that will have to be created to enable ACP enterprises to compete effectively with EU enterprises under conditions of free trade;
- A clear identification of the regional constraints and the establishment of a realistic timetable for addressing them;
- A clear identification of the CAP constraints and the measures which will have to be taken to address them;
- A clear identification of the fiscal constraints and the measures which will have to be taken to address them;
- The centrality of addressing the needs of least developed and vulnerable countries before moves toward free trade are initiated.

This option, though untested, appears to hold a number of advantages. It concedes the basic point of reciprocity as a valid long-term objective and links the concept of reciprocity to the need to create a genuinely level playing field. It focuses on the need to create the necessary preconditions for producers in smaller, less developed countries to be able to compete effectively with EU producers under conditions of free trade. It concedes the basic contention that ACP countries need to undergo processes of structural reform, designed to improve their competitiveness. However, it also links the role of trade

arrangements in promoting these reforms to the achievement of wider EU development cooperation policy objectives, such as poverty alleviation and the promotion of sustainable forms of economic and social development. Furthermore, it does not allow trade policy changes to be pursued in a vacuum. It poses the question: what else needs to be done so that trade policy changes will bring about the desired policy outcomes, namely, the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of sustainable forms of development? It is premised on the acknowledgment that regional cooperation and regional integration offer the best platform for the creation of internationally competitive patterns of production in developing countries. However, it makes a clear distinction between the pursuit of intra-regional cooperation and integration and the pursuit of inter-regional market integration. Also, this approach addresses the important question of the appropriate sequencing of moves toward intra-regional market integration between fellow developing countries and moves towards inter-regional market integration between developed and developing countries.

This model builds on the existing criticisms within Europe of the unrealistic nature of the EU's current timetable for the introduction of reciprocity and shifts the focus from debate over arbitrary time frames to a discussion of what actually needs to be achieved within developing countries and regions before moves toward free trade between developed and developing economies can generate poverty-focused growth. It sets out a concrete range of issues, which the ACP countries would like to see addressed within the framework of moves toward free trade. The issues include those related to the removal of CAP distortions from markets that are important to developing countries and the need to address the fiscal implications of moves toward free trade. Given the current position in which ACP negotiators find themselves and the lack of political will on the part of the EU to enhance GSP preferences to the equivalent of Lomé levels for all ACP countries, this option may well be the only viable one which ACP and especially African governments can pursue in their effort to ensure that future trade relations with the EU support wider efforts to promote sustainable forms of poverty-focused development.

Challenges

In the meantime, outside the Cotonou Agreements, the European Commission has made a proposal to grant all least developed countries (LDCs) duty free and quota free access to EU markets for all products except arms – under the ‘Everything But Arms (EBA)’ initiative – as of 2001 (39 of the 48 LDCs are in the ACP). Sugar, rice and bananas will only receive such treatment after a derogation of three to five years. While most observers are of the view that this proposal is beneficial to the LDCs, it is generally accepted that the proposal may have negative consequences on non-LDC ACP countries. Under the Cotonou Agreements, the EU was supposed to consult the ACP in its development of such a proposal. Thus far, the EU has failed to do this. There has been a lot of opposition to the proposal from European agricultural producers who claim that if it is implemented it could flood EU markets with products from LDCs.

We may summarize the main challenges facing African countries in the area of trade cooperation with the EU to include the following:

- Getting WTO members to accept a waiver to allow the ACP to continue to receive non-reciprocal trade preferences from the EU;
- The need for the ACP to define geographical configurations for future trade arrangements with regional institutions representing these configurations;
- The absence, in most ACP regions, of not only the institutional capacity for the negotiation of reciprocal preferential trade arrangements at the regional level, but also the necessary economic convergence to allow the negotiation of region-to-region agreements that accommodate the trade realities and needs of each participating country;
- The weak capacity of ACP is compounded by the fact that ACP negotiators are likely to be involved in two other sets of trade negotiations at the same time as new trade arrangements will be negotiated, namely, negotiations within ACP regions to establish free trade areas and negotiations for a new WTO round;
- Regional integration in the ACP LDCs will be made more difficult with two sets of trade systems operating within a single region. While

LDCs maintain trade preferences, non-LDCs will engage in EPAs or other alternatives;

- As enforcing borders to prevent goods entering LDCs is going to be difficult, recognizing the rights of least developed ACP countries to non-reciprocal trade preferences is going to be a problem;
- There is a need for concrete and targeted programs of assistance to overcome supply-side constraints facing ACP countries in attaining global competitiveness;
- There is also a need to comprehensively address the issue of the agricultural trade distortions arising from the changing pattern of EU support to EU agricultural enterprises under the Common Agricultural Policy;
- There is a need to comprehensively address the fiscal implications of the introduction of duty-free access for EU exports, where the EU is the major trading partner and customs duties make a significant contribution to total government revenue;
- The identification and implementation of improved market access arrangement for all ACP countries in those areas where individual ACP economies can gain immediate benefits, without posing any real and substantive threat to domestic EU industries. While the EBA may improve market access for some LDCs in the ACP, others may be adversely affected. There is a need to address the concerns raised by non-LDC ACP countries;
- There is a need for the ACP countries to develop and propose credible, feasible WTO-compatible trade arrangements.

Conclusion

EU trade policy is not being driven by the development needs of African economies, but by the need for the EU to position itself within an increasingly competitive global economy. While there has, in recent years, been progress towards multilateral trade liberalization, world trade is simultaneously being restructured into regional trading blocs. It is against this background of contradictory movements in global trade regimes and structures that the EU's policy on free trade needs to be assessed. Many developing countries still

maintain high protective tariff barriers around their markets in these changing environments. It is clearly in the EU's economic interests to persuade these developing countries to eliminate tariffs on trade with the EU, while maintaining tariffs on imports from the EU's competitors (US, Japan and others). The EU's proposals for economic partnership agreements in a Lomé context and the type of free trade area agreement the EU has recently concluded with South Africa neatly dovetails into the commercial interests of EU exporters. This is an issue that the EU needs to address in favor of the ACP and African countries if its relations with Africa are to benefit the continent's development goals.

Notes

¹ The aborted WTO New Round was then being revived.

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Chapter 8

Interrogating Power, Sexuality, Patriarchy and Globalization in Africa

Patricia McFadden

Introduction

This moment – which encompasses the multitude of complex and diverse relationships and realities, images, visions and possibilities across the vast land and sea mass known as Africa – is of special significance. The specialness of this moment lies in its being the culmination of many long and difficult struggles for dignity and peace, especially within Southern Africa. Each and every African person is the custodian of a sacred memory, drawn from the long battle to free the continent from colonization, racism, bigotry, backward feudal practices and conventions as well as the so-called civilizing agendas of capitalist modernity as they have unfolded, often with great pain and heartrending loss, these past five hundred years. This moment brings together all the energies and desires that we have whispered quietly or shouted out in great anger across the landscapes of this place we call home. Many a times have we found ourselves at the place of great mourning – as did those enslaved fore-parents who threw themselves off the great heights of Le Morne mountain in present day Mauritius, rather than return to the indignities and denigrations of enslavement – a choice they had to make given their knowledge of the monster that pursued them to that end. It is at such times of great challenge that we have to step back, take a deep breath and pause in order to be able to review the past so that we might understand the present and through that craft a new and different future.

Most significantly and in a very intimate way, this is a moment that is finally of our own making; a time that has come out of the imperative to become Africans in our own ways; an opportunity which we have crafted and nurtured through an unfailing belief and conviction in our ability to change our worlds,

lives and futures as women; as workers; as citizens of our national and continental spaces and increasingly as citizens of the world. I want to reflect upon what it means for those of us who believe in the freedom to accept the challenges posed by patriarchal privilege and exclusion; I would like to use the notions of the political as personal, of integrity, personhood and rights; and most significantly, the idea of citizenship as a wedge with which to open up the terrain of discourse in the hope that we will come closer to a resolution of the century-old problems of injustice and oppression in all our societies.

The consequences of globalization in economic and political terms are too clear and intimate to ignore – the threat to and erosion of basic services like health, education, affordable and accessible transportation and shelter are real in the lived realities of most Africans. Most people living on the continent are faced with declining access to the most basic human services; they do not have dignified or secure employment, and too often their rights as citizens are violated with impunity. In a very significant way globalization is an ongoing context of engagement constituted by historically recognizable forces that are once again attempting to restructure the world in order to maintain hegemonic systems of exploitation and privilege.¹ This is only one side of globalization. We need to explore another, often less recognized side of how our world is changing or has changed – that of the emergence of international coalitions and movements of resistance around the lives of women and poor people; movements that defend the eco-systems and environments that have sustained our livelihoods and very ability to co-exist with other species; movements for the right to mobility which has been systematically displaced by the coercive trafficking of human beings mainly from the societies of the South; the rights to safety of those who are fleeing religious fundamentalist persecution, or are simply exploring the immenseness of this planet. There are also movements that are almost a century old that resist the militarization of the world and the ever-present threat of nuclear destruction, which knows no boundaries. These are movements that have made the issue of peace central to our understanding of what globalization means for all of us in a much more diverse and less defeatist way.²

This is my ideological and conceptual objective – to locate some of what I think are the most pressing issues facing us as Africans within a context of modernity that requires that we envision a new and different future even as we remember the lessons and mistakes of the past. I could not agree more with Toni Morrison when she states definitively that, ‘Those who claim the superiority of Western culture are entitled to that claim only when Western civilization is measured thoroughly against other civilizations and is not found wanting, and when Western civilization owns up to its own sources in the cultures that preceded it’.³

Power and Democracy as Historically Exclusionary Practices

Throughout the human narrative, in all but the very exceptional cases, which are rare and often romanticized, power and notions of freedom and justice have remained deeply class-based and androcentric, reflective of the opinions and interests of ruling class men, regardless of their color and or location in spatial terms. Even when such aspirations sought to be inclusive and socially expansive, they remained essentially exclusionary and patronizing towards those who had been labeled as ‘Other’ in relation to power as the most critical resource in that society.⁴ Across our world we struggled for what appeared to be collective visions of freedom and justice; and while it is critical to acknowledge the opportunities that national liberation struggles and anti-colonial resistance movements provided to those groups that had been, up until then, excluded from the public – and here I refer explicitly to women – we must also critically evaluate the implications of Nationalism as an ideology which is fundamentally sexist and exclusionary of women, particularly during the current neo-colonial period. However, women were able to enter the public and to become political in new and critically important ways, while the public itself remained deeply embedded, as a notion, in a historical process that had given rise to the development and existence of surplus value. This was pegged largely on the unpaid labor of women in the home and the unremunerated labor of enslaved communities in the wider society.

It is within this milieu of exchange that new relationships of property and power arose and became institutionalized in new structures that, over time,

became known as the public – a space and a concept which reflects the new relationships of production and civic interaction: where the State and the key institutions of the society are located and dominated by men as a gender and as the owners of wealth – in both material and social terms. Juxtaposed to the public space where men are ‘free to roam’, always in relation to their status of course, the notion of the Private arises out of the definition of women as the private property of males, located in male-headed households. To date, in all African societies, women cannot form a family on their own, as a legal entity. They have to marry men in order to create a legally and socially recognized unit called the family. Through rituals and practices that have become euphemistically ‘cultural’ and ‘traditional’, women’s capacities and abilities to labor and to reproduce are institutionalized in the patriarchal family as the private property of their fathers and husbands. It is at this interface between human creativity and the existence of surplus that the most crucial relationships of power and control become embedded, especially in relation to women.⁵

Over time, most women, like poor men and the young, became excluded from the resources that were located in the public and a dualistic system of rules and regulations was formulated that has kept women largely in the private – working long hours without remuneration for their labor – which is one of the main reasons why women remain the poorest people in the world; and, like the enslaved, women were excluded from the rights and civic entitlements that emerged out of the various struggles enacted in the public. Therefore, while it is important to show the linkages between gender and poverty across the female/male divide, it is as important to recognize that poor men have always had some access to the public sphere, where they are able to engage in struggles for economic and social justice, while women have remained largely tied to the private sphere where they continue to be treated as the slaves of men in the heterosexual family, even in the families of men who struggle against economic enslavement of themselves as persons.⁶

In societies across the African continent, men have colluded to keep women out of the public sphere where rights and entitlements are located (there are

no rights in 'the family', only privileges and benevolent gestures as well as much violation, exclusion and death) and, even as Africans laud the struggles against colonization, they often shy away from the acknowledgement that most black men colluded with the colonial state in the exclusion of black women from the cities and those sites where the possibility of becoming free were located.⁷ After almost fifty years of independence, all African governments have retained, in some form, elements of the vicious socio-legal and coercive practices that characterized feudal African societies, which were further refined by the colonial state with the assistance of privileged African men in order to exclude and suppress women and female children. The re-institutionalization of traditional courts and traditional statuses in the political and legal systems of a country like South Africa in the present day speaks loudly and most tragically to this ongoing collusion between men of different classes and colors to exclude women from the democratic institutions and practices Africans have fought so courageously to build.

The maintenance of the public/private divide through claims of cultural authenticity and the need to hold on to so-called traditions – which are basically practices and value systems that privilege men in the home and in the key institutions of African societies – has inhibited the greater participation of women in the transformation of Africa up to the present day. Notions of what is political and public are still fundamentally tied to the claim that what women know and do is best suited to the production of use values for household consumption and the continuing reproduction of the species. Even in societies where women have excelled in public as professionals and knowledge producers, they are faced with a continuous backlash, often premised on the fundamentalist beliefs that so easily mobilize communities to participate in the undemocratic exclusion of women from their rights. One has only to look at the issue of taboos around the sexuality of women and how these taboos are perpetuated through fundamentalist claims that are centuries old and viciously misogynist – allowing women to be raped and violated by claiming that they bring such violation upon themselves, through the ways in which they dress and by the very nature of their female bodies as 'unclean' and 'sexually dangerous'.⁸

Continentially, we find the blatant justification of the victimization of women by men in key positions within the judiciary, organized religion, families and social and cultural organizations – all of which deploy ancient patriarchal myths of exclusion and privatization to defend impunity. By impunity here I mean the deliberate, socially sanctioned violation of rules and systems of human conduct that are the collective possession of a society, and which have been designated as the markers of human dignity. The notions of integrity and personhood lie at the core of human dignity and decency, and we all inherit these at the moment that we enter a human space. Every human being is born with the inalienable right to physical, emotional and sexual integrity and the nurturing process in all our societies recognizes the importance of not only protecting the integrity of another human being, particularly while they are young and vulnerable, but it is anchored on the transmission of these notions to the individual as untouchable and inalienable rights. For these reasons, slavery is abhorrent and people fight to the death to remain free and to overthrow systems of enslavement and persecution as publicly institutionalized systems of exploitation.

Yet the very people who understand the centrality of human integrity as a civic right often engage in and support practices and so-called ‘customary laws’ that violate and undermine the physical, emotional and sexual integrity of women and girls – in the name of culture and male supremacy. In my opinion, this impunity, which lies at the heart of violation and social injustice, is embedded in the privatization of women within the key social, political, religious and cultural institutions across this continent and the world at large. Therefore it is important to understand that inasmuch as the private/public divide, which has facilitated the construction of power in essentially class-based and masculinist terms continues to be challenged and resisted by women’s and other social movements, the major difficulty in making the political inclusive of everyone lies in the persistent exclusion of women as citizens. Unless the interconnectedness of impunity as it is culturally, politically, economically, religiously and legally framed and sanctioned is made visible, Africans cannot begin to respond effectively to the imperative of restructuring society in sustainable and democratic ways.

Africans have to reject the culturalized expressions of impunity (through female genital mutilation, male child preferences, unfair eating practices, incest, witch-hunting women – especially older women and widows – so-called child marriages, coerced marriages and feminized altruism) in order to debunk them and declare them criminal offenses against citizens in each and every instance. Only in this way can such practices be replaced with new, democratic, life-enhancing cultural notions and practices.

Legal systems that are partial and often blatantly patriarchal must be rejected outright. For example, the persistence of the notions of male conjugal rights; refusal to recognize marital rape as a crime; allowance of polygamy and rampant sexual mobility; notions of paternity which define children as the property of the man rather than emphasizing the responsibilities and obligations of parenting in democratic family relationships; inheritance practices that allow men to inherit women as a form of property or as slaves of male controlled families; and a myriad of injustices that are allowed to circulate and reproduce themselves through the often deliberate misrepresentation and/or insistence by judicial officers that women cannot be considered persons in the ways that men are. We must critique the exclusionary economic practices which globalization is reinforcing and extending to every aspect of human life that are deepening the poverty of women and young people through a rhetoric of dog-eats-dog; dangerous claims which have become normative and naturalized as the only reality possible (how unthinkable, that we could be living in a world where the narrow, sectarian claims of a voraciously greedy class could assume such public hegemony and go so largely unchallenged even by those who know that it is a blatant lie).

Making the personal political requires a transformation of the meaning of politics, from its current definition as men contesting power by any means – including and especially through the making of war and the use of Africa's resources at the expense of millions of lives across the continent, while African citizens become refugees; non-persons in flight, without any rights or securities. Politics must change so that it becomes a notion and practice that

guarantees the rights and security of all citizens, all the time. The life situations of increasing numbers of Africans have worsened in most African countries as the African petty bourgeoisie finds itself less and less able to accumulate competitively with the ruling classes of the North. Africa has remained economically marginalized in the capitalist global system, even as African resources and knowledge systems have fueled the development of Northern societies and continue to be crucial to the maintenance of dominant Western notions of democracy and development.

However, for the African petty bourgeoisie, the crisis of reproduction has been intensified by the concentration of wealth globally in the hands of a few Trans-National Corporations that are poised to take over the State in the North as they have done to a large extent in Africa and in the rest of the South. The WTO agenda was precisely about that – making capitalist rules and privileges the ultimate priority in every sense of the word and deed. We also know that in the history of human existence, war has always been a means of class accumulation by those elements that occupy the State – a patriarchal state that ensures the privilege and supremacist ideologies and systems of a small group over the rights and entitlements of the vast majority of persons. In Africa today we can see the coincidence of globalized class interests with those of an African ruling class in the theaters of war in almost every country. The generals are consolidating their newly acquired class positions by looting national treasuries and extending the arena of war and destruction across national and regional boundaries. A restructuring of the relationships within and among the ruling factions that occupy and use the African patriarchal state is clearly visible when we look at the ongoing devastation of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the parties involved in that debacle. In Eritrea, Ethiopia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Algeria, Sudan, Liberia, Congo (B), Cote d'Ivoire, etc, war has become the everyday tragedy of this most beautiful and, unquestionably, most bountiful continent on Earth.

That is why the normalization of war through the militarization of our societies under the guise of so-called Pan-Africanist rhetoric is totally unacceptable and must be exposed for what it really is – the plunder and accumulative

rampaging of gangs of middle-class bandits who openly defy the demands of the people for accountability and democratic responsibility. At this point in time, when we have had to fight to retain the very language of anti-imperialist resistance and to keep the memory of enslavement and colonization alive, because it will belong to us until our realities are no longer determined by racism, class-ism, sexism, fundamentalisms and other pernicious forms of sectarianism and communalism, certain groups of Africans are deploying our collective memory in justifying an openly militaristic class project that is costing the lives of millions of Africans and has laid waste to great swaths of this continent. This nationalist opportunism must be exposed and the rights and security of the African citizen must become the most important priority of all. We can no longer allow selfish class interests to dominate and destroy a continent of over 700 million people.

We have to find the courage to go beyond the hypocritical rhetoric of regional integration that in actual fact only facilitates greater accumulation by both national and global capitalist forces, at the expense of the basic human and social rights that African working people have fought so courageously to attain. The interface between class, gender and racist/communist interests is the site where the most critical and most productive contestations are taking place. The phenomenon of globalization must be understood in its multifarious forms – as a re-structuring of the old, hegemonic relationships of economic and political power which are mobilizing technology, new notions of space and communication, and the lapse in radical politics, to make up for whatever was lost to them during de-colonization and liberation struggles across the continent.

Women's Politics as the Source of a Sustainable Alternative Political Vision

For centuries women have fought private and public battles to make the world safer for themselves and for those with whom they live. It is this fundamentally inclusive epistemology that informs women's politics across the ideological and political divide, within what we call women's Movement. This is where one of the most critical political resources to a different future lies. In the

remainder of this chapter, I indicate some of these political gems that are so often unseen or even misunderstood by so many progressive men in the workers' and youth movements in particular.⁹

First and most fundamentally, women's struggles against patriarchy have revealed the inter-sectionality of all known forms of exclusion and oppression – racism, class exploitation, sexism and chauvinism, paternalism, able-ism, and heterosexism. By rejecting all these expressions of injustice, women have brought together, in a social movement for rights, the totality of issues that underpin patriarchy as an ideology and a system of privilege for the few over the interests of the majority. Women's struggles have, for the first time in the human narrative, made visible the interconnectedness of all systems of injustice in ways which neither the struggles of workers or of poor people in general have done. Secondly, by raising the essential issues of integrity and personhood, women's politics has challenged the bifurcated notions of justice and equality at every level of their societies, rupturing the public/private divide which still keeps millions of women the world over outside those civic resources and spaces where rights are embedded and secured.

As is well known within the radical community, the notion of rights is intimately linked with the demand and struggle for the social, economic, political and legal recognition of human value by those whose labor and reproductive capacities were appropriated and exploited by the ruling class over time. Historically, men who labored without pay came together to collectively demand the right to paid work and the recognition of their labor as valuable. It is in the valorization of human labor that the right to a dignified life becomes possible; and it is through a publicly recognized engagement with the market and the demand that profit-making not be allowed to keep the worker enslaved to the owners of capital that workers have been able to win the rights that define them as a class universally.¹⁰

Through the demand that women's rights must become human rights, women are insisting that the notion of human rights itself is partial and unsustainable unless and until it encompasses fully (without a single cultural compromise) the total rights of women to physical, emotional, sexual and social integrity

as complete persons in all their societies. The demand for integrity and personhood lies at the core of women's sexual and reproductive rights, and this campaign has been most instrumental in taking women's unmet sexual and reproductive rights out of the private where they were considered 'domestic matters' and locating them in the public, making them a political and policy issue and requiring that the State and the major institutions of society not only recognize these rights as legitimate and inalienable, but also provide the material and other resources to sustain them.¹¹

The extension of these rights to all women remains a major challenge which globalization, being a regressive process, is making even more difficult. In response to the specific impacts of globalization in this regard, women have formed global coalitions around the issues of sexual and reproductive rights and health, meeting in various international conferences (Beijing, Nairobi, Mexico, and at the level of the UN and the Economic Commission for Africa) to insist that states not only ratify the conventions and international instruments that women have formulated to affirm their various rights, without reservation clauses, but also that states, as the internationally recognized custodians of citizens' rights and entitlements, must undertake to implement such policies in order to safeguard the sexual and reproductive rights of women in totality.¹²

This has met with a tremendous backlash, the use of so-called cultural appropriateness and slogans of authentication that seek to fragment women's rights through the claim that sexual and reproductive rights are 'Western' and 'un-African'. Of course, we know that when women demand their rights they become inauthentic and un-African and that is exactly what we aim to do. We must subvert the archaic notions of what is African as we insist on becoming modern and free and re-define and restructure relationships of power and control, surveillance and exclusion as we claim our democratic rights to be citizens in the fullest way. Therefore, while African men remain locked in backward notions of what is African and practice western modernity in every other way but towards women, African women have embarked on an unstoppable path towards a practice and exercise of universal rights and entitlements as befit modern citizens.¹³

In reality, however, these claims and threats often become translated into life-taking expressions of the backlash, and the vilification of women's rights activists and women who claim their rights is real and requires the urgent response of all progressive men in our societies. This is not a matter only for women to resolve, because fundamentally it is about old systems of male privilege which all men benefit from in one way or another. Therefore no man is exempt from the political responsibility of fighting for the sexual and reproductive freedoms of women, for women's integrity and personhood, and for everyone to become a complete citizen in both the public and private spheres. But, in addition to recognizing and defending all women's rights, men have to begin the process of moving themselves to a new-gendered and different male identity, by interrogating their locations within patriarchal society as men. How could it be that male comrades spend their lives critiquing and resisting capitalism and fundamentalisms of every kind, except those that construct them as males in deeply essentialist ways? At the core of masculinity lies heterosexism and male systems of privilege that underpin impunity and supremacy – even if not used by individual males in their relationships with women.¹⁴ As a radical feminist I know and understand patriarchy in its most intimate and most pernicious forms, but feminist and women activists never assume that because they are able to defend themselves they do not need to restructure the societies they live in so that all women can access their freedoms and rights. Progressive men have to do the political work of transforming maleness and masculinity. It is not enough to be a good man – they have to be revolutionary men – so that women do not have to do the transformation work, particularly in this time of HIV and AIDS.¹⁵

Finally, the women's movement is without doubt one of the most vibrant and most sustainable movements globally and, through the creation of national, regional and global coalitions and networks, women have begun to change the world in very significant ways. In Africa, women's demands for justice, peace and equality have shaken the foundations of old patriarchal assumptions about what is normal and acceptable; women have begun to change the character of the public through educational and professional achievement and contestation; women are changing the meaning of science and knowledge

by challenging the old dogmas and paradigms that excluded their experiences and opinions. At the level of the law the changes have been astounding and absolutely marvelous: in most African societies impunity no longer rages as an absolute force, although it remains a key challenge in the transformation of those areas where women's lives are most undemocratically and most dangerously affected. Politically, women are challenging the state and its hegemony over the meaning of citizenship; women are questioning the assumption that the state is the best protector of common property - and in countries like Zimbabwe where a neo-colonial state simply took over from the colonial state in terms of being the 'middle-man' in relation to the land as a common resource, women are demanding that the state step aside and let the citizens relate directly to the land as a critical economic and socio-legal resource.¹⁶

Conclusion

By changing their relationships with the State and with males in the intimate and public spheres, women are becoming post-colonial in new and exciting ways. The challenge and disruption of old patriarchal relationships that constructed women as private or communal property, and men as the natural heirs of all power in our societies speaks to the emergence of a 'post-colonial' consciousness among women (and poor men who are challenging the neo-colonial state from where they are located as workers and peasants and homeless or landless persons) which will form the core of a sustainable anti-globalization strategy in the future. In addition to understanding how capitalism and neo-imperialism work at the levels of macro-economic strategies, cultural and technological hegemony, the military-industrial complex and the use of guns, human trafficking and drugs, we also need to focus on our own political traditions and the resources being generated by our social movements at the national, regional and global levels. While we have to understand how the WTO and GATT work to extend and intensify capitalist exploitation and human misery as well as remaining vigilant about the implementation of the pernicious MAI agenda, we also have to put more energy into the re-formulation of our capacities to think, mobilize and transform ourselves and our societies in ways which will finally rid us of the

scourge of human-invented systems of greed, inequality and violence. After all, globalization is just a fancy term to describe patriarchy in its most nefarious form.

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Notes

- ¹ This is a general understanding of the notion within the discipline of traditional political economy that does not integrate feminist analyses and the discourses that have emerged within environment and ecological movements globally.
- ² See SIGNS: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 26 No.4, Summer 2001 for an exceptional collection of feminist analyses on Globalization and Gender; Feminist Review – on Globalization - No. 70, 2002; AGENDA Journal – Globalization: Challenging Dominant Discourses, No.48. 2001; Sheila Rowbotham and Stephanie Linkogle (Eds.), Women Resist Globalization: Mobilizing for Livelihood and Rights, London, Zed Books, 2001; Vanessa Griffen, Globalization and Re-inventing the Politics of a Women's Movement, Association of Women in Development (AWID), Guadalajara, Mexico, 2002.
- ³ Toni Morrison, 'Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature', in The Black Feminist Reader, edited by Joy James and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
- ⁴ Here I am referring to a genre of social anthropological literature that draws from the works of noted Africanists such as Anta Diop and Leopold Senghor.
- ⁵ See Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, NY: Oxford Press, 1986; Linda Nicholson, Gender and History: The Limits of Social Theory in The Age of The Family, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- ⁶ Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour, London: Zed Books, 1986.
- ⁷ T. Barnes and EJ Win, To Live a Better Life, Harare: Baobab Books, 1992; Marc Epprecht, 'This matter of women is getting very bad': Gender, Development and Politics in Colonial Lesotho, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000; Patricia McFadden 'Cultural Practice as Gendered Exclusion: Experiences from

Southern Africa, in *Discussing Women's Empowerment: Theory and Practice*, Sida Studies No.3, Sweden, 2001.

⁸ Joanna Kerr (Ed), *Ours by Right: Women's Rights as Human Rights*, ZED Books/ North-South Institute, London and Canada, 1993.

⁹ See Ayesha Imam, Amina Mama, and Fatou Sow (Eds.), *Engendering African Social Sciences*, Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 1997; and the works of African feminist scholars like Sylvia Tamale (Uganda); Bisi Adeleye Fayemi (Nigeria); Joana Foster (Ghana); Shareen Hassim (South Africa) among many others who argue this position within the context of the African Women's Movement.

¹⁰ See the works of Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, Antonio Gramsci and other Marxist scholars in this regard.

¹¹ Charlotte Bunch, *Gender Violence: A Development and Human Rights Issue*, New Brunswick: Center for Women's Global Leadership, 1991; Florence Butegwa 'The Challenge of promoting women's rights in African countries' in Kerr (Ed), *Ours by Right ... op. cit.*

¹² Dorothy. Q. Thomas, 'Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure' in *Ours by Right*, op. cit; Sylvia Tamale 'Think globally, act locally: using international treaties for women's empowerment in East Africa', in *AGENDA*, No 50, 'African Feminisms' One, South Africa.

¹³ Patricia McFadden, "Becoming Post-colonial: women changing the meaning of citizenship", *DAWN*, (Queens University, November) 2002; Vivian Taylor, Anne Mager and Paula Cardoso, (eds.) *Cracks in the Edifice: critical African Feminist Perspectives on Women and Governance*, Cape Town: SADEP, 1999.

¹⁴ Robert Morell (ed.). *Changing Men in Southern Africa*, South Africa/London: University of Natal Press and Zed Books, 2001.

¹⁵ Helen Jackson, *Aids Africa: Continent in Crisis*, UNFPA, South Africa, 2002.

¹⁶ Mahnaz Afkhami, *Rights of Passage: Women Shaping the 21st Century*, Mexico: AWID, 2002.

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Chapter 9

Global-Local Discourses: Re-Negotiating Trans-Boundary Spaces of Identity, Rights and Power in the Niger Delta of Nigeria

Cyril I. Obi

Introduction

This chapter explores the ways in which globalization simultaneously undermines and empowers the forces of local resistance, using the Niger Delta as illustration (Obi, 2000a: 280-292; Obi, 2001; Gills, 2000: 3). It examines how the minorities' social movements in the Niger Delta appropriate global idioms, discourses, and infrastructures to advance their struggles for identity, rights and power in the Niger Delta. Within the logic of the 'global', I critique the tension between the trans-territorialization and localization of space, both in the physical sense, and as a conjuncture from which social forces and struggles can be analyzed (Benton and Redclift, 1994: 6). Space is conceptualized as the social terrain of power, expanding and contracting as one social force or a coalition of forces gains power at the expense of others, or resists the power of others.

This analysis captures the struggles for space between local social movements, their coalition allies – global non-governmental (rights) organizations on the one hand, and the Nigerian state and its allies – the global oil multinational corporations (OMCs), within the petroleum-rich locale of the Niger Delta on the other. It also reveals the anatomy of competing claims and protests, and the dialectics of expropriation and resistance as they express themselves within the local-global conjunctures.

The chapter expatiates on the ways in which the global is embedded in the local and exploits (and degrades) it for accumulation purposes; it examines

the manner in which the local co-opts a part of the global, and competes against (or resists) another faction of the global – the oil multinationals. The thrust of it is how, on the one hand, the oil multinationals penetrate and seek to domesticate themselves in the locale; on the other hand, how certain global NGO's provide support and access to local social movements resisting the extractive, pollutive and repressive activities of oil multinationals in the oil-rich Niger Delta. Running through these processes of global-local discourses that have assumed new forms and greater prominence in the Niger Delta since the end of the Cold War, is the continuous re-negotiation of spaces within the volatile context of a growing trans-territorialization of extraction and resistance. The forces of global oil capital – the oil multinationals – seek to expand the space for unfettered global extraction of oil (in collusion with its state and local factional partners), while the forces of local resistance, through the welding of local identity and rights onto global discourses and solidarities, seek to re-assert their blocking power to resist global expropriation and expansion.

Globalization and the Politics of Local Resistance: Some Conceptual Issues

Globalization is dialectically tied to the politics of local resistance. This is the outcome of the contradictions it spawns at the locale, and the fact that its structures and processes provide avenues through which the protests and claims of social forces at the locale ride piggyback to seek global attention (Klein, 2001). Yet, it is not possible to explain the nature of globalization outside the expansionist logic of capital. Gills (2000: 6), aptly summarizes this link in the following ways:

1. The protection of the interests of capital and expansion of the process of capital accumulation on a world scale.
2. The tendency towards homogenization of state policies and state forms to render them instrumental to the protection of capital and the process of capital accumulation on world scale, via a new 'market ideology'.
3. The formation and expansion of a new tier of transnational authority above the state's, which has the aim and purpose of re-articulating states to the purpose of facilitating global capital accumulation.

4. The political exclusion of dissident social forces from the arena of state policy making, in order to de-socialize the subject and insulate the neo-liberal state from the societies over which they preside, thus facilitating the socialization of risk on behalf of capital.

In the current phase of globalization, there is a clear trend in which private capital and the market are privileged over other considerations as the sole factors “restructuring ... economic, political and cultural life” (Gills, 2000: 4-5). As noted elsewhere, globalization is a multifaceted process operating with varying levels of differentiation and spatio-temporal impact. Driven by an integrationist and market logic, it seeks to remove political barriers to the entry and exit of capital by reconstructing the economic role of the state, as well as depoliticizing and deradicalizing state and society. In the process, it brings peoples and economies in different parts of the world into close proximity, while it simultaneously creates extremes of wealth and poverty in different parts of the world (Obi, 2000a).

Clearly, globalization has serious implications for local politics. In its drive to totalize the hegemony of global capital over society, globalization rejects the existence of any other viable social system, and drains democracy of politics, reducing it to the managerial enterprise for running the ‘new’ market society. Politics becomes the refuge for those who are alienated by capitalist social relations, and seek to oppose globalization’s homogenizing agenda. Thus, in poor locales, the impact of globalization is pervasive and crushing, as it seeks to control the state, the people, and environmental resources. Social movements bent on blocking global expropriation resort to a new form of politics of resistance. Depending on the specificities of each moment, the balance of social forces and the organizational capacity of local social movements, these movements seek forcefully to rectify the inequities embedded in the imperatives of global accumulation. Therein lies the kernel of the politics of resistance. However, it is important to note Gramsci’s argument on the “ambiguity of resistance” (Mittleman and Chin, 2005: 17-27) in seeking to fully understand the complexities and fluid dynamics of the politics on local resistance.

Globalized Oil and the Politics of Local Resistance

The modern history of the ‘hydrocarbon society’ is built on the globalization of oil production, distribution and accumulation by oil multinationals that control all aspects of the industry in a globally integrated regime. Oil multinationals are not only strategic to Western civilization, which ultimately rests on cheap energy supplies, they are important also to their shareholders who derive huge profits from their operations.

What is important is the strategic link between the oil giants and the energy needs of the Industrial powers, particularly the G-7 countries. Oil is strategic as the most viable source of energy for transforming nature into commodities, which are then exchanged to realize surplus. Thus, control of oil is directly linked to the reproduction and expansion of capital on a global scale (Obi, 2000a: 281).

For these reasons, oil multinationals have been prominent and powerful global players, and as Watts (1991: 1) notes, have adopted policies and methods that reek of “criminality, corruption, the crude exercise of power and the worst of frontier capitalism”. An integral part of British colonization of Nigeria was the capture of Nigeria’s oil reserves under the *1907 Mineral Oil Ordinance* and the *Mineral Oil Act of 1914* (Obi and Soremekun, 1995: 8-9). Following these acquisitions, in 1938 the colonial administration granted Shell-BP an oil concession covering the whole of mainland Nigeria. It was not until 1957 when Nigeria’s independence was imminent, and Shell-BP had struck oil in commercial quantity a year earlier, that this monopoly was broken. Shell-BP then gave up some of its oil concessions, retaining what it considered to be the richest. At this point, other global oil corporations entered. By these developments the Nigerian oil industry became ‘globalized’ at its infancy. At the same time, this development confined the Nigerian state to the role of a rentier state, collecting royalties and other taxes. To date, the structure of ownership in Nigeria’s oil industry is one of total domination by the oil multinationals: Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (which produces almost half of Nigeria’s oil), (Exxon) Mobil Producing Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria, Nigerian Agip Oil Corporation, Elf and Texaco Producing of Nigeria

Limited. They have remained dominant despite the indigenization policy of the late 1970s.

Nigeria is the fifth largest oil exporter to the United States (Fleshman, 2000: 17) and Shell sources 14 per cent of its global oil production from Nigeria. Since Nigeria is so critical to global oil capital and most of the oil is extracted from within the Niger Delta – an area of about 26,000 square kilometers with its adjoining offshore continental shelf – the contradictions associated with oil production have been most acute in this impoverished, but oil-rich region of Nigeria. The rich and powerful oil multinationals extract oil from the impoverished communities of the Niger Delta regardless of the adverse environmental effects. This also implies that decisions taken at the global level directly impact on the lives of poor villagers thousands of kilometers away. The central role of oil multinationals in the globalization of the Nigerian oil industry strongly make them central to the system of deepening inequities, tension, conflicts, and repression in the Niger Delta. On the one hand, the oil multinationals seek diligently to maximize accumulation in the oil industry in partnership with the Nigerian state; on the other hand, their operations dispossess communities of the Niger Delta of their farmlands, crops, homes and fishing grounds (Ashton-Jones, Arnott and Douglas, 1998). It is this conflict between global oil-based accumulation and the very survival and welfare of the people of the Niger Delta that is at the heart of the politics of local resistance in the area: it is the essence of the clash between globalization from above and globalization from below.

The politics of local resistance is a collective action drawing on local identities and strengths and, working with global solidarities, to prevent further alienation and expropriation, as well as environmental degradation by the state–oil multinationals alliance (Obi, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001). The dialectics of globalization and local resistance can be gleaned from the struggles of the social movements of the Niger Delta. In the same vein, these struggles transcend the site of oil production to connect global platforms, and the sites of global ownership and consumption.

The Nigerian state is central to these dialectics: although it theoretically ‘owns’ the country’s oil reserves, it depends on oil for over 85 per cent of federal revenues and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. It is thus heavily dependent on the oil multinationals that are engaged in, and dominate the production of oil. By the same logic, the oil sector plays a strategic role in integrating the Nigerian state and economy into the global economy. All this boils down to the fact that the Nigerian state is precariously dependent on the oil multinationals and this has facilitated its privatization by the hegemonic transnational forces of the global oil economy. The privatization of the state by these economic interests clearly undermines its traditional role as a mediator in class struggles. The state’s loss of autonomy is illustrated partly by the fact that it agreed to deregulate the economy when it implemented structural adjustment policies in the mid-1980s and thereby enhanced the hegemony of the private (foreign and local) capital over the Nigerian oil industry. The state elites are also heavily dependent on the state’s share of the oil surplus for self-enrichment and class consolidation and rule. This in turn gives their politics a rather violent, opportunistic and zero-sum colouring, with power over the “spoils of oil” as the ultimate prize.

Having accepted the market ideology with its emphasis on deregulation and privatization, the Nigerian state has been ineluctably sucked into the role of an agent for transnational private capital. Yet, because of the position of Nigeria at the periphery of the global market, and the historical, ethnic, class and economic contradictions that are embedded in the state, the expected market transition can only lead to the reinforcing of the current exploitative and iniquitous class relations and deepen the crises in which the country is immersed. The contradictions emanating from the processes of the ‘transition economy’ render state mediation of the class struggles extremely problematic. In order to force through the project of globalized accumulation, the state has resorted to repressive measures against opposition groups, even as it strives to blunt the sharp edge of the class struggle and as it de-politicizes and subverts democracy. Thus, within the dialectics of globalization and the politics of local resistance, globalized forces of oil extraction in alliance with the state confront the forces of local resistance, which act in concert with their own

global allies. Politics in this trans-territorialized arena therefore transcends the nation-state and is truly global, both in its reach, and in terms of the forces at play. Furthermore, the state has become even more critical both in seeking to deconstruct local resistance and promote conditions that will enhance the integration of Nigeria into globalized capitalist (oil) relations.

A Social Analysis of Space and Power

Benton and Redclift (1994: 6) have rightly argued that social analysis must be located in space and time. This is more so when we are dealing with “liberation ecologies in the developing world in the age of market triumphalism” (Peet and Watts, 1996: 1-3). Benton and Redclift further argued that, “the spatial distribution of environmentally relevant human social action, as well as its ecological effects, bears no necessary relationship to the boundaries within which legal and political decision-making or authority operate”. This explanation enables us to determine territoriality and further explain differences and complexities in social-ecological analysis. It also helps us to place social processes and struggles in a historical perspective and move analysis beyond the confines of the national boundary.

There is also a sense in which we cannot escape from the definition of the physical space as the terrain of struggle and a context for the exercise of power. In this regard, the Niger Delta can be conceptualized as the physical location of oil production, and the site of class struggles around oil. The very nature of the ecologically fragile, but ethnically diverse Niger Delta area has implications for the forms and intensity of political struggles. The swampy nature, the predominance of subsistence economies and the scarcity of lands in the Niger Delta imply that the degradation of the environment will impinge on the survival of the people, who will respond by organizing themselves for the defence of their space, defined both in terms of control and claim to ownership. Yet, it should be noted that within the Niger Delta itself, the class differentiation and horizontal cleavages along ethnic, communal and elite/fractional/personal lines are exceedingly deep and complex. While the Niger Delta fraction of the ‘national’ ruling elite—linked to the federal and regional state(s), the transnational-dominated oil industry, and local traditional

institutions of authority adopts an often ambiguous to the federal state, or an openly antagonistic relationship to the 'grassroots/popular forces' of local resistance that also contests its legitimacy, it is however possible to still discern expedient coalitions between the local fraction of the Niger Delta ruling elite and the forces of local resistance. While the former seeks to ride on the anger of the latter to extract more concessions, resources and power from the federal government-transnational oil alliance (of which it is a part), the latter is also keen to use the former to advance its own agenda. At the same time, the forces of local resistance 'globalize' their grievances against the hegemonic transnational oil-state alliance, by drawing international attention to the plight of the people of the oil-rich, but impoverished Niger Delta, and seeking the support of foreign governments, prominent personalities, pro-environment and minority groups within the 'global' civil society.

When an external force – a foreign oil multinational – penetrates and seeks to seize control of the same space for accumulation purposes, we are immediately confronted with contesting and contradictory politics and claims regarding control of the oil-rich physical space, and the distribution of oil revenues and benefits. It is this complex push and pull of social forces over the contested space that engages social forces from the broader global space on opposing sides.

It is important to emphasize that while the site of the struggle could be located within a physical space, it cannot be limited to it. The concept of space transcends the physical, and its ramifications are much wider, emphasizing connections between the global and the local, core and the periphery, the whole and the parts, and the meeting of spaces. In an abstract sense, space refers to the widest canvas of social action, yet there could be the diffusion of spaces as well.

Space as (de)territorialized Power

While space may be the arena of social action, and the very soil on which social movements thrive or seek to control, social action does not occur outside a given geography of power. Groups jostling for control of an arena of social

action are in reality seeking power, exercising power and expressing power. As globalization seeks the homogenization of spaces in the interest of private capital and of market forces, the marginalized, exploited and oppressed social groups oppose its hegemonic project by organizing and creating autonomous spaces of action. In constructing such spaces, they transcend their local territory drawing support for their cause, and building up their capacity to alter the power relations that are structured against them. At this level, such social coalitions require representational power beyond the boundaries of their local territory to win over global sympathy and support for their protests and claims. Social action and coalition building are therefore not bound by national territory: trans-boundary negotiations take place across the boundaries of global and local spaces, drawing on discourses and structures at both levels. The social movements of the Niger Delta formulate the agenda for engaging the global and re-negotiating the very nature of social relations and political ecology in these trans-boundary spaces, constructing and mobilizing local-global solidarities to interrogate and re-negotiate the prevailing oil-based hegemonic global-locale social relations in the Niger Delta.

Re-Negotiating Trans-Boundary Spaces of Identity, Rights and Power in the Niger Delta

The re-negotiation of trans-boundary spaces fundamentally rests on the possibilities for transforming the prevailing exploitative and hegemonic relations between the global and the local, in favor of the latter. It is trans-boundary in the sense that both spaces are as separate as they are inter-linked. The very fact that the local social forces in the Niger Delta could take advantage of the global (liberal) moment to interrogate and challenge the hegemony and corporate rule of the oil multinationals in an oil-rich ecology, need not preclude support from the global human rights community. In the same way, the fact of global expropriation and pollution of the Niger Delta, involves collaboration with the Nigerian state and their local accomplices, including the elites of the oil-rich communities. Re-negotiation therefore implies a deconstruction of global-local solidarities as are reflected in the relations of globalization and resistance.

The dependence of the Nigerian state on the hegemonic forces of the global oil industry means that oil multinationals are able to carve for themselves various ‘oil colonies’ in the Delta with little state interference or regulation. In the same vein, the social movements of the Niger Delta could successfully bypass the Nigerian state to connect global platforms and present their case at global forums such as the United Nations. This trans- territorialization of space and access was not only an arena of interrogation and struggle, but also one of re-negotiation. It implies dissatisfaction with the nature of existing relationships, as well as the presence of opposing forces – that is, oil multinationals versus the resistance movements in the Niger Delta. Still, the fundamental question arises as to the possibility of a negotiation between unequals such as Shell and the social movement of a tiny ethnic minority group, the Ogoni – for example, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). The explanation lies in the way local resistance movements are empowered both through local and global discourses and idioms, and the ways global solidarities support local protests and claims. The entry points of the forces of local resistance into the global arena are the ethnic (minority) identity/rights and power politics in the Niger Delta (CLO, 1996, Douglas and Ola, 1999, Eson, 2000, Obi, 2001, Carr, Douglas and Onyeagucha, 2001). Hence, appeals by local social forces such as the MOSOP and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) could win sympathy and support from the global rights and INGO community for their cause. More recently, local resistance has assumed militant and insurgent proportions with the deepening of the Niger Delta crises, and the coming on the scene in 2006 of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Global-Local Discourses: Identity Politics in the Niger Delta, A Critical Perspective

Ethnic identity politics in the Niger Delta has a rather long and turbulent history. Yet it is possible to discern an upsurge since the mid-1980s. Several reasons can be advanced for this transformation in the ethnic (oil minority) identity politics in the Niger Delta. First, the bulk of the oil produced (and exported) in Nigeria is mined from ancestral lands of local communities; yet since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970 these communities have been

denied access to the fantastic oil wealth accruing to the oil companies and the state. Second, the communities are suffering from the pollution of the eco-system on which their survival depends. Third, the deep sense of anger that the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta bear against the Nigerian state for complicity in the developments in the oil industry that are the cause of their deep sense of alienation, as well as their marginalization by the hegemonic politics of the dominant ethnic groups in the country. These factors have transformed identity politics in the Niger Delta into “the quest for change and liberation of the oil (producing) ethnic minorities from the hegemony of the dominant ethnic groups and the oil multinationals operating in the Niger Delta” (Obi, 2001: 5).

The identity of ‘oil minorities’ is itself embedded in the post-civil war era: that moment offered the platform for differentiating the ethnic minorities of the oil-rich Delta from other ethnic minorities in Nigeria. The oil minorities became identified as the ones who, in spite of being physically located in an oil-rich ecology, find themselves marginalized from state power and denied access to oil wealth. Their physical location in the oil rich Niger Delta was the critical factor defining the claims of the ethnic minorities to the oil resources, which had been appropriated by the state and its partners, the oil multinationals. In short, oil minority identity became the issue around which the people of the Niger Delta were mobilized to protest their exclusion from the nation’s power and wealth and against the degradation of their environment.

Ethnic identity politics was able to latch onto global discourses in three principal ways: the historical, economic and political. The Niger Delta has a history of over 300 years of involvement in global trade. By the latter part of the 17th century, European traders were calling at the coast of the Niger Delta and forging links with its peoples. The entire region was integrated into the global mercantile system via the trans-Atlantic trade in goods and later, slaves. In the nineteenth century, after the slave trade was abolished, the Niger Delta became a source of palm oil for the industries of Britain as well as other global markets. This latter trade was dominated by British trading monopolies

such as Lever Brothers, and the United Africa Company (UAC) who sought to maximize their profits, often at the expense of the people of the Niger Delta who acted as middlemen in the trade and collected excise duty on the trade that passed through their territory. It was partly in a bid to gain control of the trade in the hinterland that the European traders and the Royal Niger Company clashed with the people of the Delta who resisted European encroachment. This justified the colonial conquest of the region and annexation of what became Nigeria into the British colonial empire. The colonial government's appropriation of the whole of Nigeria's known oil reserves, which it later handed over to the oil multinationals – first to Shell D'Arcy (which later became Shell-BP), followed later by others such as Mobil (now Exxon-Mobil), Gulf Oil (now Chevron-Texaco), Agip (now Eni) Texaco, Elf (now Total) etc. finalized the integration of Nigeria (including the Niger Delta) into the global economy. This historical development immediately transformed the Niger Delta into an oil colony in the global economy. Identity politics as a method of struggle is embedded in and shaped by this history.

The global neo-liberal revolution which de-legitimized the one-party and military regimes and replaced them with the multi-party system as the preferred form of governance, the growth of the civil and human rights movement and market-based reforms became a catalyst to the minority rights movement. The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union fed this global resurgence of nationalism and self-determination by ethnic minorities; it gave impetus to the struggles of the marginalized and oppressed ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta. Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the MOSOP, attested to this fact that the global discourses on nationalism and minority rights became pertinent to the struggles of the minorities in the Niger Delta and felt encouraged to find out if the same standards that had been accorded minority rights in the successor states of the USSR would be extended to Africa's minorities (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 1995).

Indeed, Saro-Wiwa's testimony underscores the globalization of identity politics as a way of challenging economic injustice, environmental degradation

and political marginalization, based on the discourses of self-determination for minorities. Such post-Cold War identity politics was different: it was militant, made clearly defined demands on the state and oil multinationals and challenged the legitimacy of the latter's claim to produce and pipe out oil wealth without regard to environmental standards and the well-being of the local communities. This post-Cold War environment made it easier for the social movements in the Niger Delta to, for the first time, take their case to the global level using new strategies, alliances and politics. They also benefited from the experiences of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples in other parts of the world who had found a niche in the global arena and were successfully mobilizing support against the forces of global expropriation and state repression. Social movements in the Niger Delta adopted such global discourses to empower local appeals to the international community as a way of putting pressure on the Nigerian state and exposing the dark side of the operations of the oil multinationals in the Third World.

Global-Local Discourses: Struggles for Environmental and Human Rights in the Niger Delta

The struggles for rights by the social movements of the oil minorities in the Niger Delta revolve around self-determination, resource (oil) control, and ownership of land. It is believed that self-determination will provide them with the space and the access to power that would enable them to re-assert control over the highly prized oil resources of their communities, as well as force the oil multinationals to recognize and respect their rights (Robinson, 1996; Rowell, 1996; Naanen, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Esparza and Wilson, 1999).

The human rights struggles in the Niger Delta focused on exposing wanton rights violations by the state and the oil multinationals and on appeals to the international community for support in securing redress. The struggles took the form of popular protests, the making of demands or declarations, or the presentation of Bills of Rights to the Nigerian Government and the oil multinationals. Well known examples of these include the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990), Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1991), the Aklaka Declaration

of the Egi People, the Ogba Charter, the Isoko Youth Charter, the Oron Bill of Rights, the Warri Accord, and the Kaiama Declaration (1998) of the Ijaw ethnic minority group. More recently, the Niger Delta Congress – a coalition of oil minorities movements – sent the Niger Delta Bill of Rights to the United Nations (UN) (2000). In 2001, the Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ) and the Environmental Rights Action, Friends of the Earth Nigeria, brought to world attention threats to life posed to local communities by a massive oil spill from a ruptured Shell oil pipeline at Ogbodo oil community near Port Harcourt. These strategies empowered the struggles of the various grassroots movements. They could exploit the global human rights discourse and the international human rights movements in general to advance their course. What this means is that the expansion of the global rights space, particularly when the Niger Delta society had been militarized and the local democratic space had shrunk under the military dictatorship of 1983 to 1999, had provided a big impetus for the global empowerment of local struggles. As I have argued elsewhere (Obi, 1998):

The insertion of the Ogoni resistance into the global rights agenda, its success in waging one of the most sophisticated environmental rights struggles in the 1990s, was predicated not merely on the cooptation of the global rights discourse on the universalization of human rights and freedom, but also a solid project of local popular empowerment and mass mobilization, under a conscious leadership. This social force of the Ogoni empowered the case made through, and in, the global rights discourses and won the attention and support of significant sections of global civil society to the cause of local resistance.

The ways the MOSOP globalized local resistance by riding piggyback on global rights discourses have been extensively explored and need not delay us at this point (Obi, 1998: 20-21; Obi, 2001: 88-90, Carr, Douglas and Onyeagucha, 2001). The global minority and human rights movements had a positive effect on the Ogoni cause: they facilitated access by the Ogoni to the global media platforms and exposed their struggles to worldwide

acknowledgement, including awards from prominent human rights bodies. On the other hand, they provided the medium for exposing the rights violations perpetrated by the oil multinationals and thereby hurt the corporate reputation of the latter in Europe and North America. As Fleshman (2000: 181) noted:

In this era of globalization, the role of the International NGO Community in the Niger Delta crisis is emblematic of an ambitious effort by oppressed and exploited peoples at the “point of production” in less-developed countries to forge working alliances with progressive social forces active at the “point of consumption” in the West to advance a mutually beneficial agenda of economic and social justice, respect for human rights and environmental protection.

The activities of such trans-boundary allies, which centered on the global rights agenda, inflicted considerable damage on the image of oil multinationals in their home countries. Their activities included demonstrations, sit-ins, and consumer boycotts of Shell products, especially after the outrage caused by the hanging of nine Ogoni environmental rights activists in November 1995. In the same manner the picketing of Shell offices and stations as well as a steady stream of complaints in the form of emails, faxes and letters from all parts of the world placed Shell on the defensive, even if on some occasions it admitted its shortcomings. For example,

Shell’s initial response to the campaign was mainly defensive, although under continuing pressure from its European shareholders it eventually became more conciliatory. From the start, the company expressed some sympathy for the view that not enough of the revenue from oil was going back to the inhabitants of the oil-producing areas (Carr, Douglas and Onyeagucha, 2001: 159).

The same pressure from consumers and campaigners forced Shell to admit that its environmental policies were a sham (Carr, Douglas and Onyeagucha, 2001: 161). Among the INGO’s that supported the Ogoni cause, as identified

by Carr *et al.*, (ibid.) are included: Gaia Foundation, Bodyshop, Human Rights Watch, Green Peace, Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International, Pen International and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). There were many others, which cannot be listed here (Obi, 2001: 91). Apart from Shell, Mobil and Chevron also came under immense pressure, particularly after reports linked the latter to the flying of Nigerian security personnel in a helicopter from which local community youths protesting on a Chevron installation (the Parabe Platform) were shot at, resulting in some fatalities (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 12, Esparza and Wilson, 1999, Owugah, 1999).

In order to facilitate their campaigns, local resistance movements in the Niger Delta established branches in Europe, the United States of America, and Canada, from where they coordinated their struggle, provided refuge for activists from home and kept the campaign for environmental and human rights alive and deep in the hearts and minds of Western oil shareholders and consumers. More recently, these organizations in the diaspora have formed the Coalition of Niger Delta Organizations. The globalization of the local struggles in the Niger Delta has continued even after Nigeria's return to democratic rule in May 1999. They have continued to tap into global discourses to win international support and attention for local protests, claims and grievances. They have, to varying degrees of success, hurt corporate oil interests in their home countries, forcing them to respond to allegations that they are not meeting international health, safety and environmental standards and that they are guilty of collusion with Nigeria's authoritarian state to violate the rights of the oil minorities of the Niger Delta. The oil companies have usually framed their responses in the language of public relations and damage control. Nonetheless the social movements of the Niger Delta have been successful in putting their grievances before the world, thereby forcing the oil multinationals to give account of their activities in the Niger Delta. However more recently the militant face of local resistance, represented by the MEND has assumed greater prominence, prompting in the process the further raising of the stakes in the global access to the oil in the Niger Delta, and the securitization of oil commerce in the name of the 'global' energy security interests of the world's powers, led by the United States. In this way,

the local finds expression at the global level in ways that strengthen its cause, but not without contending with the awesome power of big business–state alliance.

Re-Negotiating Power in Trans-Boundary Spaces

Power is central to the struggle to renegotiate trans-boundary spaces. Although, power itself must be re-negotiated if the concerns of the social forces engaged in local resistance and their international supporters are to be addressed. Nonetheless, questions should be raised about the capacity of local social movements to negotiate with global forces and the willingness of the latter to demonstrate good faith and corporate social responsibility. Movements like MOSOP have been able to block Shell's entry into Ogoni land since 1994. Others have only periodically, and for brief periods, succeeded in compelling Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Agip and Texaco to suspend oil production. In the long term, they have not been able stop their operations. Their episodic successes have rather encouraged the oil multinationals and the state to launch a policy of dividing the ranks of the resistance movements and suppressing them. In the words of Frynas (2001: 53),

... [T]he evidence presented suggests that the nature of state and corporate response to the Delta conflicts was an important contributory factor to the current crisis. Two of the generic strategies identified – the PR response and the use of repressive security measures – did not address the question of the causes of the unrest in the Niger Delta... They demonstrated the unresponsiveness of the government and the oil companies to the demands of the local people in the oil-producing areas, which probably fuelled further conflicts in the Niger Delta.

It is clear that the pressure on oil multinationals has not moved them out of PR strategies; nor has the state abandoned its coercive approach to resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta, as shown in the repression of the protests that followed the Kaiama Declaration in December 1998 and the destruction of Odi. However, the concrete gains that local forces have made in calling both

the oil multinationals and the state to give their operations a human face cannot be ignored. For instance, the managing director of Shell (Nigeria) appeared before a Human Rights Investigation Panel in July 2001 to answer to charges made against it by MOSOP. Also, several fact-finding missions from Europe and North America have visited the Niger Delta and their reports have boosted the legitimacy of the demands of oil minorities worldwide (Boele, 1995, Robinson, 1996, Human Rights Watch, 1999, Esparza and Wilson, 1999). The upshot is that during the past decade and a half, the Niger Delta has witnessed the re-awakening of social movements seeking to reverse the unjust global social relations spawned by the oil industry. By successfully taking the oil giants to the court of global public opinion and mobilizing shareholders and consumers in the home countries of the oil multinationals, the oil minorities of the Niger Delta have been re-negotiating trans-boundary spaces and power.

The process of re-negotiating power has pitched the forces of local resistance against those of globalization and the Nigerian state. The outcome of this struggle has direct implications for the very survival of global accumulation in the Niger Delta, as well as the viability of the Nigerian state. Clearly, the outcome of the rights struggles is yet to become discernible as the forces of the state and global oil continue to defend their hegemony over the space for accumulation in the Niger Delta. Depending on the balance of forces, liberation ecologies as exemplified by the politics of social movements such as MOSOP, Chikoko, NDWJ, IYC, and now the resistance militia, MEND, would continue to push for the re-negotiation of spaces. They seek to create and defend autonomous spaces in the Delta area, while connecting with global spaces to empower and legitimize their claims. This involves a lot of networking, developing new agendas and campaign strategies; seeking points of entry and dialogue on both sides of the global fence. In sum, the re-negotiation of space and power hinges on the tensions between trans-boundary spaces and forging new alliances based on equity, social justice and responsible (global) corporate practices.

Conclusion, Lessons and Prospects

Undoubtedly, the processes of re-negotiating trans-boundary spaces of identity, rights and power in the Niger Delta are underway. Taking the fight to the arenas of ownership and consumption in Europe and North America has enabled local social movements to put the oil multinationals in the dock of world public opinion. In the same regard, the raising of social consciousness and mobilization of the people of the Niger Delta by the local resistance movements have boosted their blocking power *vis-à-vis* the forces of global oil. For the first time in the recent history of Africa, a coalition of ethnic minorities has taken on some of the world's most powerful and wealthy companies and sought the transformation of exploitative relations. Surely, global legitimation has strengthened these local struggles; but it is equally true that such local resistance runs counter to the homogenizing project of economic globalization.

Beneath the euphoria of the success of the “Ogoni revolution” as the most sophisticated of globalized social struggles, as well as the popularity of Ijaw resistance and pan-Delta movements around the world, lie important lessons. Perhaps the most important of these is that there is a limit to which global solidarities can defend local social forces, or radically alter the inherently exploitative character of capitalist social relations in the Niger Delta and elsewhere. While international NGO's visit the Delta and compile impressive reports and brilliant researchers, scholars and activists from the global North also visit and greatly enrich the state of knowledge on the political ecology of oil, the oil multinationals have managed to continue with business as usual, even if the costs (in the face of attacks and acts of sabotage by militants) and PR challenges have become more daunting.

In some ways, some of the movements of local resistance have fallen victim to their ‘success’, leading to factionalism and personality clashes among the leadership with adverse effects – demoralized rank and file, violent struggles, and confusion among global supporters. In other cases, leaders have expended too much energy on global campaigns, while local cadres and activists are left to carry on under difficult circumstances. What comes out of all this is

that the social movements need to do more work in carving a niche for themselves and defining their social agenda. In many cases it is difficult to say whether the groups are ethnic, environmental or rights movements, especially where some of the leaders straddle a number of these multiple divides. What this suggests is the need to pay more attention to the specificity of each case and its evolution and politics. When this is done, it becomes clear that these are movements in evolution, drawing upon specific social histories, political ecologies and identity politics.

With regard to the Niger Delta, it can be suggested that these are social movements in gestation, with strong minority ethnic identities that are welded into the quest for social justice, equal citizenship and local autonomy within the context of the politics of Nigeria's rather skewed federal experiment. Yet it must be pointed out that social movements hardly move in linear progression and those in the Niger Delta are no exception to the rule. They are influenced by both internal and external factors and the 'contradictions within them. In the final analysis, the prospects for the future lie in the quality of leadership and politics of these movements, and alliances that will emerge between them and other social forces at the local, national and global levels and the response of the Nigerian state and its hegemonic transnational partners. Clearly the focus locally is towards a pan-Delta movement, but this must come to terms with, and transcend a host of contradictions as well as the physical challenges posed by the terrain of the struggles. Fortunately, the international concern with environmental issues, democracy and human rights provides the social forces of local resistance with a global handle to deal with the deepening inequalities spawned by globalization. Thus, for the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state there is no hiding place in a globalized world. The challenge for the forces of local resistance is to move the struggle beyond exposure to censure, and eventual emancipation.

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Chapter 10

Caught Between NEPAD and Neo-Liberalism: Human Security in Africa's Renaissance Strategy

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Introduction

The poor state of Africa's economies, which has led to the appalling standard of living for the majority of the people, has engaged the minds of policy makers and other stakeholders for some time. Several attempts have been made by way of improved modes of governance and economic reforms to tackle Africa's development crisis; but to date there has been no appreciable improvement in the situation, for a number of reasons. These include corruption in high places, poor political leadership, fluctuating terms of trade, inadequate investments, and poor management methods. Some of the continent-wide measures that have been adopted over the years are the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980–2000) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980); Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986–1990), which was later converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD, 1986); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989); the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990); and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF, 1991).

Those among these that were Africa-initiated development strategies were either opposed or undermined by the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs), and finally abandoned. "Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future" (Adedeji 2002). The impact of this opposition to Africa-initiated economic reforms programs

was devastating; it deflated the commitment by African leaders to pursue their own development agenda, led to excessive dependence on external sources of financial support, and undermined the legitimacy of governments. Instead of such internally crafted reform programs, the BWIs imposed their own development strategies – the structural adjustment programs whose overall effects on Africa’s development have been less than salutary. In the midst of several policy failures and the continued pursuit of austerity measures prescribed through structural adjustment programs, the majority of Africans have been going through harsh social and economic experiences – their living conditions continue to deteriorate, with many of them living in abject poverty; conflict and other forms of internal strife have become rampant, compounding the severe material conditions they have to contend with; and their right to human security has been flagrantly violated.

The latest development paradigm, which is a strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21st century, is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was adopted by African leaders at the July 2001 Lusaka Summit. It provides an African-initiated and driven framework for interaction with the rest of the world with the long-term vision of eradicating poverty. Like earlier development paradigms, NEPAD is also acclaimed as an indigenous African-initiated development strategy. This time, however, the BWIs and the G8 have endorsed NEPAD as an appropriate development strategy and made a financial commitment to it. This endorsement notwithstanding, the pertinent question is whether NEPAD can succeed where earlier African initiated development paradigms failed. Does NEPAD fully address the issues embedded in human security, for instance? In what ways can NEPAD be strengthened to tackle the multiple developmental sclerosis of Africa? These and many allied concerns engage my attention in this chapter.

It is argued that though the vision of African leaders, as embodied in NEPAD, is well intentioned, the ideological underpinnings of the approach to resource mobilization and the economic governance initiative do not depart from the well-known neo-liberal approach to managing African economies that has

been in vogue since the 1980s. The neo-liberal approach, as implemented in Africa, has not conferred lasting developmental benefits. Rather, the human security concerns of the people have become a casualty. Unless African leaders mix the neo-liberal approach with a policy of state intervention in the development processes, the human security needs of their citizens will be jeopardized. In other words, to ensure the realization of human security a development paradigm, which is people-centered and driven by a careful mix of the market and state, is an imperative.

Brief Overview of NEPAD

The purpose of NEPAD is to set “an agenda for the renewal of the continent” (Par. 47 of NEPAD, 2001: 11) in order “to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development” (Par. 67 of NEPAD, 2001: 14). In sum, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development “is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic” (Par. 1 of NEPAD, 2001: 1). The program rests “on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world” as well as “a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over the centuries of unequal relations” (Par. 8 of NEPAD, 2001: 2).

NEPAD provides staggering statistics to underscore the abject poverty facing the majority of Africans. Almost half of the population lives on less than US \$1 per day and the majority of those in extreme poverty are women and children. Between 1987 and 2000, the number of people living below the absolute poverty line in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 80 million. Projected estimates show that if the trend continues, by 2015 the number of Africans living below the poverty line will rise by a further 219 million.¹ It is believed

that the continent's poor development indices underpin the vision for a new approach to development based on effective partnership between the industrialized countries and sub-Saharan Africa.

NEPAD traces the root causes of Africa's malaise largely to the structures laid by colonialism. It alludes to the partial success of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and the frustrating downturn in the economies of most states since then. The document fails to elaborate on other equally important contributory factors that have brought Africa to this pathetic conjuncture. For example, the continent has rarely been blessed with selfless and dedicated leaders; more often than not leaders have contributed to the destruction of the developmental base of the continent through deliberate policies of siphoning resources out of the continent and presiding over corrupt regimes. African leaders have also not been committed to the protection of the human rights of their people, which accounts for the rather low levels of human security. In other words, the failure of the ruling elite to ensure the fundamental and basic rights of their citizens has been a major factor in the economic underdevelopment of the continent.

One would have expected that NEPAD would spell out a detailed strategy for arresting the deteriorating human rights situation on the continent, especially regarding economic and social rights and other third generation rights which are embedded in the notion of human security. This is crucial because there cannot be any effective development in Africa if the social and economic rights as well as basic political rights are ignored. Human rights include political, social, economic, cultural and environmental rights. These rights are interrelated, and encompass human security; thus any program that has the potential of impacting negatively on any of these rights must be interrogated. Even though human security and human rights are not the same, they are interrelated; respect for the latter encompasses the former.

NEPAD sets out a number of initiatives to achieve its very ambitious goal of eradicating or, at least, mitigating poverty. These are:

- The peace, security, democracy and political governance initiatives;

- The economic and corporate governance initiative;
- Bridging the infrastructure gap;
- Human resource development initiative;
- Agriculture;
- Environmental initiative;
- Capital flow initiative;
- The market access initiative.

On paper the initiatives cover every segment of Africa's developmental concerns, including those aspects of society that must be transformed to ensure sustained development. What is needed is an action-oriented implementation strategy that would simultaneously address policy, institutional and technical constraints facing the continent's development. The issue, however, is whether NEPAD can assure human security, in the short and long-term, in the context of the broad areas of concern that have been mapped out.

The most daunting challenge facing Africa in its quest for sustainable development, which is also the focal point of NEPAD has, in my view, been correctly identified as the eradication of pervasive poverty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 states that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person". Pervasive poverty engulfing over half of the population of the continent is in no way a guarantee of security of person as enshrined in the UN declaration. This justifies and legitimizes NEPAD's focus upon poverty reduction as a broad development objective in the long run, and by so doing ensures the ordinary citizen the security of his or her person. In the context of everyday occurrences in Africa, one may ask what the components of human security are. How have nations protected human security and what does NEPAD intend doing to protect human security?

Understanding Human Security

The concept of human security is relatively new on the international scene but has gained much currency because of its potential to complement and enrich conventional approaches to security. It has emerged at a time of

heightened awareness that “collective efforts are needed to reduce human suffering and insecurity where it is most acute and prevalent”.² It must be noted, however, that security has been a catchword since the dawn of human civilization, and people have been striving to ensure that their physical security is always assured in the midst of the harshest environment. Similarly, from ancient times states have been concerned with their security and go to every extent to ensure a secure territory with the assumption that a secure territory ensures the personal security of citizens. As a result, states have always construed security as a top-down, state-centered imperative. This was because, traditionally, security threats were assumed to originate from other states with aggressive or adversarial designs. Security issues were therefore analyzed in the context of state power. The protection of the state with regard to its boundaries, people, institutions and values was deemed to be the sole responsibility and objective of the state. This explains the propensity of states to build strong military structures to assure themselves of maximum protection in case of attack from external aggressors. Thus, security meant national or international security and signified the “protection of the state (or group of like-minded states) from physical assault or ideological subversion. What matters has always been the larger entity, and only incidentally or secondarily those inhabiting it.”³

Human security, by contrast, is a bottom-up, people-centered concept; what matters are the people and their overall well-being. It is people-centered in the sense that it is based on the same foundation as the related concepts of human rights and human development; namely, that the individual human being is the principal object of goal of development regardless of race, religion, creed, color, ideology or nationality. Thus, human security ensures the peaceful enjoyment of the fruit of human development. Like its related concepts, “human security has the characteristic of universality; it is applicable to individuals everywhere”.⁴ Human security refers to the security that people should have in their daily lives, not only from the threat of war but also from the threat of “disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards”; including peoples’ “safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns

of daily life” (UNDP, 1994). For Sabina Alkire (2002), “the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment”. The United Nations Secretary-General’s Millennium Report also intimates that the world is progressing towards a new understanding of the concept of security: “Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence... the need for a more human-centred approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons pose to humanity; their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used.”⁵

Human security encompasses economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal (physical) security, community security, and political security. In essence, human security is about how secure members of a society feel about the conditions of their whole society, and their place in it. The human security approach also “urges institutions to offer protection which is institutionalized, not episodic; responsive, not rigid; preventive, not reactive.”⁶ It is only through this mode that the individual could be assured of the totality of his security needs in a globalized era. As pointed out by Walter Dorn (n.d.):

It is, in essence, an effort to construct a global Society where the safety of the individual is at the centre of international priorities and a motivating force for international action; where international human standards and the rule of law are advanced and woven into a coherent web protecting the individual; where those who violate these standards are held fully accountable; and where our global, regional, and bilateral institutions – present and future – are built and equipped to enhance these standards.

A number of strong similarities exist between human security and state security. Both proactively identify and prioritize critical and pervasive threats

to the security of people. This identification and prioritization is made on the basis of empirical evidence and strategic analyses. As at now, the exponents of both human and state security perceive key threats to be intra-state conflict, AIDS and other diseases, economic and financial instability, and terrorism. In both cases there are institutional responses, which are systematic, comprehensive, durable and coordinated to identify threats to security.

The differences between human security and state security are also significant. As noted above, state security largely concerns territorial units and the inhabitants of such units. In almost all cases, state actions are taken with national security in mind, but those that concern human security are instrumentally justified because they impact positively on national security. Secondly, state security is also concerned with power relations between states, and with territorial integrity. While this approach in the international system is legitimate, lively and complementary, it is not part of the human security agenda (Alkire, 2002: 6). There appears, however, to be a convergence of human security and state security in the 21st century as attempts by groups, individuals and states are strongly geared toward the need to solve the problems of millions of human beings who are adversely affected by enormous and growing political, economic, social, health, personal, and cultural threats. This concerted effort has been propelled by the enormity of human vulnerabilities occasioned in some instances by an unfair global economic order and by the increasing regional and global interdependence. A core concern in the 21st century “is to progress towards the construction of a new global order capable of placing human beings at its center and for states, which continue to be the actors with the greatest relative power, to be able to efficiently guarantee peoples’ security and contribute to overcoming the vulnerabilities and difficulties of hundreds of millions of human beings in acceding to progress and development” (Aravena, n.d.).

Human Security and Human Development

Any acceptable conceptualization of human security for African countries should “link human security with human development” (Naidoo, 2001) because human development is one important means to create human security.

“The two initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Without one, the other becomes difficult, if not impossible” (Dorn, n.d.: 3). Human development, like human security, is also people-centered and multidimensional, and is defined in the space of human choices and freedom. As such, both share a conceptual space. However, human development has wider ramifications, and is long term, with holistic objectives, and has the capability of capturing the aspirations of any society irrespective of its status in the international system – whether rich or chronically poor. Individuals need to expand their valuable choices, they need to flourish and fulfill their aspirations in their homes and communities in the broader sense and this is what human development is about. Even though both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security “has a systematic preventative aspect”. In a more explicit sense, “while human development aims at growth with equity, human security focuses on downturn with security” (Alkire, 2002: 7). The human security approach is equally proactive and identifies and prepares for unanticipated events or occurrences such as economic recession, conflicts, emergencies, etc. Activities impinging on human security may sometimes have a very short duration and include emergency relief work and peacekeeping. They may at times also have a long-term perspective such as human and institutional development.

Human Security and Human Rights

One can easily discern the interconnectedness also of human security and human rights. In the first instance, human security is a human right. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”. It is also recognized and generally accepted that human security is enhanced when the fundamental human and peoples’ rights are respected. Both attempt to deal with issues of universal concerns that encompass poverty and violence. As indicated earlier, the UNDP has identified seven key areas as constituting human security. There is also a corpus of agreements addressing various issues that are at the core of human security. The accompanying covenants define human rights very broadly. They encompass not only the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, torture, or “disappearance” but also economic, social

and cultural rights in general,⁷ as well as specialized thematic and group or collective areas including rights, freedoms and responsibilities pertaining to women,⁸ children,⁹ migrant workers,¹⁰ refugees,¹¹ indigenous peoples,¹² racism and racial discrimination,¹³ peace and security,¹⁴ the environment,¹⁵ development,¹⁶ and many other issues.

International human rights norms define the meaning of human security and national development, irrevocably establishing a link between human rights, human security and human development. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families are all meant to make human beings secure in freedom and dignity with equality, and to protect human rights and human security for all.

Given the vision that influenced the drafting of the NEPAD document, namely the eradication of poverty in Africa, one may ask whether NEPAD adequately caters for the security of the citizens of the continent. The assumption is that if the eradication of poverty is the vision, then poverty has related bedfellows that must be equally tackled.

The NEPAD-Human Security Nexus

That Africa is plagued by potential or actual conflicts, weak states, weak civil society, population displacement, economic deprivation, unemployment, and deterioration of basic services, human rights violations and above all endemic poverty is well known. These factors notwithstanding, states continue to play a significant political and economic role, which affirms in so many instances their importance as indispensable actors in the global system. To ensure progress along the path of human security, institutional and administrative shortcomings of governments in various sectors must be identified and tackled. More importantly, the overarching social problems that are attributable to endemic poverty must be addressed. This means eradicating poverty and its ramifications.

Overall, the economic situation since the 1980s, and especially the consequences of depressed economies over the years for most Africans, has been negative. It is true that the magnitude of the situation varies from country to country; but in general problems such as acute unemployment, a deteriorating standard of living, persistent economic decline, and internal conflict must be addressed to assure citizens across the continent of their basic human security needs.

At the root of Africa's development crisis is a continuous cycle of economic failures characterized by a long history of exploitative integration into the global economy. By the early 1980s, many African states were on the point of bankruptcy and were servicing their external debt only at the risk of jeopardizing the already fragile fiscal stability of the state and further deepening the development crisis. At the insistence of the international financial institutions (IFIs), loans were given on condition that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were implemented. These liberalized financial and trade regimes in addition to measures that required reduced public expenditure, and the privatization of public enterprises. The SAPs rigorously subjected Africa's fragile economies to the volatility of international markets and their adverse terms of trade, to the extent that sub-Saharan Africa's trade at the end of the 1990s had declined to 21% of what had been attained in the early 1970s.¹⁷ Many countries were compelled to spend their meager export earnings on debt servicing instead of providing basic social services. A recent IMF paper explains the situation in more graphic terms:

... for many countries in the [African] region the stock of external debt has built up over recent decades to a level that is widely viewed as unsustainable. For example, in 1975 the external debt of sub-Saharan Africa amounted to about \$18 billion. By 1995, however, the stock of debt had risen to over \$220 billion. The standard ratios reflect this huge buildup of debt. The region's aggregate debt-export ratio rose from 51 percent in 1975 to about 270 percent in 1995 (excluding South Africa, the ratio was above 300 percent). For all low-and middle-income

*developing countries, the average ratio of debt to exports was less than 150 percent. Similarly, the debt-GNP ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa was 14 percent in 1975, but by 1995 it had reached more than 74 percent.*¹⁸

The unsustainable levels of debts have compelled many African countries to join the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Yet the prospects still do not look bright in terms of accelerated development. With unsustainably high debt levels, the ability of most countries to adopt effective poverty reduction measures is in jeopardy. The HIPC initiative calls for further sacrifices, which include the implementation of enhanced adjustment policies, in order to reach a completion point that will qualify a country for debt relief. In the interim, the majority of the people continue to endure deprivation and extreme poverty takes its toll as the withdrawal of subsidies for various services and the introduction of user fees for other services impact negatively on the poor. Thus the African situation continues to worsen each passing day, and this in turn affects the security of the people.

Moreover, the numerous conflict situations on the continent – one could cite Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and others – have resulted in a sizable number of refugees and internally displaced persons on the continent. Over thirty wars have been fought in Africa since 1970 and, in 1996 alone, conflicts in Africa accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide, resulting in more than eight million refugees, returnees and displaced persons.¹⁹ Many of these refugees find themselves in foreign countries, thus stretching the meager resources of recipient countries. Apart from this, there have been several humanitarian crises, which have been occasioned by famine in some parts of southern and central Africa. There appears to be no end in sight to such occurrences. Military rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire, which hitherto seemed an island of peace in the turbulent West African sub-region, is a clear manifestation of the seemingly intractable propensity of Africans to self-destruct. In the midst of such conflicts, human rights are violated, human development constrained and human security is undermined. The spate of conflicts across Africa continues to induce fear in

the people and this does not augur well for the development of the continent. At the Millennium Summit, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stressed that people should enjoy “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”; he asserted that these were to be the priority objectives of the United Nations in the years ahead. It could be argued that the vision to eradicate poverty by African leaders through NEPAD is equally informed by the twin needs of freedom from fear and freedom from want. These have greater potential for strengthening national security, than mere economic development for the sake of it. Individual, national and international securities are intertwined; one leads to the other. As such, individual or human security must constitute the basis for national security, and national security grounded in individual security must be the basis for international security. By promoting African development through the eradication of poverty, all forms of security in the state – individual, national and international – are guaranteed.

The problem with NEPAD, however, is that its mechanisms for attaining such lofty objectives are fraught with several imponderables. Given Africa’s historical development since independence, the most serious problem, which unfortunately was not explicitly outlined in NEPAD but can, nonetheless, not escape careful scrutiny, is the neo-liberal underpinnings of this new development framework for the continent. Every economic development strategy must of necessity be grounded in some form of ideological postulates whether explicitly stated or not. In the case of NEPAD, the ideological underpinning is unambiguous. The dominant development ideology now is neo-liberalism. As a result of structural adjustment, African governments have embraced variants of the neo-liberal ideology in the management of their economies. Furthermore, Africa has been caught in the whirlpool of economic globalization that equally extols neo-liberalism. Thus, one cannot easily divorce neo-liberal thinking from NEPAD: the mechanisms subsumed under the political and economic governance initiatives as well as the capital flows and market access initiatives expose this without any ambiguities.

There have been dramatic policy reversals in Africa in the areas of economic policy and more importantly in development strategies as a result of liberal

triumphalism and the ensuing economic globalization. The most significant change, across the Third World and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has been “the virtual abandonment of support for socialist economics: central planning, extensive state ownership, and distribution based primarily on need rather than material incentives” (Stallings, 1995: 364). Apart from Cuba and North Korea where such policies are defended, the world seems to have been caught in the unrelenting jaws of neo-liberalism in an era of heightened economic globalization. Even China and Vietnam have repudiated socialist economic policies and leftist party leaders such as Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in Mexico and the popular president ‘Lula’ in Brazil “strive to assure business people that they would respect market mechanisms” (*Ibid.*). A casual reading of NEPAD reveals that statist policies have been jettisoned in preference for liberalism. This has been done without any in-built social safety mechanisms that could protect the ordinary citizen from the ravages of uncontrolled competition from the global economy. The type of international competition that has been unleashed by economic globalization has been of concern to many exponents of Keynesianism, even in the developed countries. For example, on the implications of international competition for welfarism in Canada, Gindin and Robertson state:

There are those who ... believe that we can take on the challenge of competitiveness and retain our social values; indeed they believe that competitiveness will create the very economic success essential to sustaining social programs. They are mistaken. In the first place they are wrong because, in the particular case of Canada, there is no capitalist class with the interest or capacity to develop a strong industrial base ... But they are more than just mistaken. The framework for competitiveness they invite us to accept is ultimately dangerous ... Once it is accepted, its hidden aspects ... such as attacks on social programs quickly reassert themselves. Once we decide to play on the terrain of competitiveness, we cannot then step back without paying a serious price. Having legitimated the importance of being competitive (when we should have

*been mobilizing to defend our social values), we would be extremely vulnerable to the determined attacks that will inevitably come in the name of “global realities.” ... The competitive model ultimately asks how the corporate sector can be strengthened. Our perspective asserts that it is the very strength of that sector that limits our freedom and belittles the meaning of “community”.*²⁰

The issue of community raised by Gindin and Robertson appears to be at one with Julius Nyerere’s view that “in African traditional society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us” (Nyerere, 1967: 166). Nyerere elucidates the fundamental pillar of African social capital – the idea of the person within a community – which, if effectively utilized, could restore the human dignity and self-respect to the peoples of Africa. Social capital in this sense consists of networks and norms of communal and civic engagement. These networks and norms of communal engagement are facilitated and enhanced through the principle of reciprocity, which is based on feelings of trust and the “willingness of people to help one another with the expectation that they in turn can call for help” (Deng, 2002). Without community, the basis for communal solidarity is irreparably undermined.

Features of Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism has been on the ascendancy since the 1970s and its gains have put the interventionist role of the state in the development process under severe attack. Consequently, “from being the cornerstone of development, the state [has now become] the millstone holding back a system of market-led development” (Olukoshi, 1998: 16). Without doubt, international lending and investment as well as aid from the IFIs are underpinned by a government’s willingness to implement neo-liberal policies. Under neo-liberalism, government budgets are slashed and greater reliance is placed on the private sector to provide basic services, ranging from refuse collection to education and social security. Public enterprises are auctioned off, usually to foreign investors, and stock markets are set up based on the newly privatized firms. Tariff structures are dismantled,

and new laws are promulgated to encourage foreign investment. In a nutshell, there is an emphasis on market forces as the state is forced to withdraw abruptly from many of its traditional activities (Stallings, 1995: 370).

Other distinctive features of neo-liberal relations in the global economy include the explicit and implicit conditions for obtaining international finance, the need to meet prescribed economic requirements as a condition for gaining access to markets and production networks, and the increased ideological support for liberalization and privatization (*Ibid.*). NEPAD is cast in the mould of these well-defined parameters of neo-liberalism. In the light of the nature of the global system, the ramifications and tentacles of economic globalization, the experiences gained from structural adjustment programs and the readiness of the IFIs and the G8 to offer valuable financial and ideological support to only servile governments, African leaders dare not initiate a development paradigm that contradicts this prevailing ethos. As pointed out by Thomas Biersteker (1995: 178), “at the general level, the economic ideas being pursued as policy throughout the developing world today include a *reduction* and *transformation* of state economic interventions, from production and distribution toward increased mediation and a redirection of regulation.” This contradicts the Brandt Commission Report’s (1980: 23) admonition, according to which “a refusal to accept alien models unquestioningly is in fact a second phase of decolonization. *We must not surrender to the idea that the whole world should copy the models of highly industrialized countries*” (emphasis added). The report continues:

Over recent years experts and international observers have become aware that development strategies which used to aim at increasing production as a whole will have to be modified and supplemented in order to achieve a fairer distribution of incomes taking into account the essential needs of the poorest strata and the urgency of providing employment for them (Ibid.: 24).

NEPAD and Neo-liberalism

NEPAD acknowledges that structural adjustment in Africa has had contested outcomes: “the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980 provided only a partial solution” to Africa’s developmental problems, it declares. Structural adjustments “promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services. Consequently, only a few countries managed to achieve sustainable higher growth under these programmes” (NEPAD, 2001, par. 24). By implication, the neo-liberal approach to development, which underpins structural adjustment policies, did not yield any durable developments; also some of the countries that implemented them became worse off. This was because “ideologies of growth in the North ... have had too little concern for the *quality* of growth” (Brandt Commission Report, 1980: 24). NEPAD further acknowledges that “the net effect of these processes has been the entrenchment of a vicious cycle, in which economic decline, reduced capacity and poor governance reinforce each other, thereby confirming Africa’s peripheral and diminishing role in the world economy” (NEPAD, 2001, par. 26). These admissions notwithstanding, NEPAD does not depart from the ideological canons that guide structural adjustment: it is embedded in it.

The overriding question, therefore, is whether NEPAD will succeed in guaranteeing a secure political, economic, social and cultural environment of Africans where structural adjustment has failed, especially where both are premised on the necessity of “a minimalist state whose role is to produce an enabling environment for the functioning of an essentially self-regulating market economy based on free competition” (Olukoshi, 1998: 17).

The political and economic governance initiatives, the capital flows and market access initiatives sufficiently expose the ideological underpinnings of NEPAD. For instance, the objective of the economic and corporate governance initiative is to “promote ... a set of concrete and timebound programmes aimed at enhancing the quality of economic and public financial management, as well as corporate governance”, (NEPAD, 2001, par. 88) which makes economic liberalization and deregulation the center-piece of NEPAD’s

economic governance initiative. The efficiency of the market must be determined by its ability to provide what it entails to move an economy into higher productivity. Surely, there are situations where the market may be preferred; in others the market may be detrimental to the aspirations of the people. In the African situation it is perhaps wise to strike a just balance between the market and the state – that is, open the economy up to free economic agents in competition with the state. This will ensure that the agents act as a countervailing force on each other to avoid both market and state failure. Alternatively, there is a need to move cautiously with deregulation; that is to adopt a policy of guided deregulation to ensure a gradual but steady shift from a state-directed to a market economy (Ekpo, 2002: 13). Under NEPAD, however, the open anti-statist bias reduces the state to the role of creating a congenial environment for property rights and generally for business. If the state should depart from this neo-liberal role it risks attracting derogatory adjectives such as “prebendal”, “parasitic”, “personalistic”, “clientelist”, “kleptocratic”, “unsteady”, “over-extended”, “predatory”, “crony”, “soft”, “weak”, “lame”, “rentier”, “sultanist”, or “neo-patrimonial” (Olukoshi, 1998: 14).

According to NEPAD, the bulk of the capital needed for achieving the proposed economic growth and poverty-reduction goals will be obtained from outside the African continent. To bridge the annual resource gap of “12 per cent of its GDP, or US \$64 billion, ... the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent” (NEPAD, 2001, par. 144). It is argued that this is required to achieve the estimated 7% annual growth rate needed to meet the internationally agreed development goals, especially poverty reduction, by the year 2015. Improved governance is also seen as a necessary prerequisite for increased capital flows, which is not radically different from an SAP. This is essentially an extroverted (and dependent) development path. And as if to remind Africa’s leaders of the futility of this strategy, the G8 accepted NEPAD in principle but stopped short of providing or even giving indications that it was prepared to provide \$64 billion for Africa’s development. It is inconceivable that the G8 will decide to offer Africa a ‘Marshall Plan’ type of aid to finance its development. But even if

they decided to do so, will such assistance be without strings? Already the G8 has promised to facilitate the financing of private investment through increased use of development finance institutions, export credit and risk-guarantee agencies, and by strengthening equivalent institutions in Africa (US State Department, G8 Africa Action Plan, 2002, Section 3.1). It is doubtful whether the development finance institutions will forego conditionalities on loans granted to Africa under NEPAD just because the G8 are the intermediary. Clearly, NEPAD promises to plunge the continent back into the economic conditionalities that have been the hallmark of policies espoused by the IFIs, the World Trade Organization, as well as most mainstream economists who work in African institutions such as the Economic Commission for Africa. The experience of Africa since the 1970s bears witness to the limitations of the neo-liberal approach to development: the pursuit of neo-liberal policies without sufficient measures to protect the poor has exacerbated the economic, social, cultural and political disabilities of the mass of the people, and further exacerbated social inequality. The capacity of the state to provide essential social, economic and cultural benefits or services has been seriously impaired, thus jeopardizing the human security of the majority of the population. NEPAD, with its avowed commitment to the neo-liberal approach to development, is most likely to exacerbate this deplorable situation.

One other mechanism for garnering resources is the pursuit of debt relief strategies.²¹ In spite of the elaborate mechanism put forward by NEPAD, the G8 in its response to the debt relief mechanism rather stressed the importance of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in the fight to reduce poverty (US Department of State, G8 Africa Action Plan, 2002, Section 4.1). Yet, the HIPC initiative enhances the economic conditionalities imposed on countries that accede to membership of this 'poor countries club', and therefore compounds the harsh social and economic existence of the majority of the people. If the adjustment programs were anti-people in conception and implementation, then the HIPC initiative cannot be different. This means, furthermore, that those states that have lagged behind in terms of the neo-liberal restructuring of their politics and economy must accelerate the liberalization process or be left behind in the disbursement of any assistance

for the continent's development. The implication is that under NEPAD many more Africans will experience extended deprivation and suffering.

Another mechanism for achieving accelerated development is the intensive exploitation of the continent's natural resources by foreign capital. This mechanism or strategy must be viewed with apprehension, especially against the background of the difficulties entailed in monitoring the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs). The enhanced global power of TNCs, especially following the coming into force of the WTO, cannot be over-emphasized. The WTO rules have further reduced the capacity of African countries to monitor TNCs, especially with regard to environmental issues that naturally crop up in their extractive activities. Due to the keen competition for foreign capital, African governments are faced with the dilemma of how to regulate the activities of TNCs without losing their investments to other countries or incurring the wrath of the WTO. For instance, they are unable to enforce anti-trust legislation or ensure compliance with laws on good environmental practice or socially responsible corporate governance generally. The irony of NEPAD is that it is "predicated on the assumption that its goals will be unattainable without tightening further the colonial umbilical cord" (Adedeji, 2002: 8).

The crux of the matter is that Africa's problems are hydra-headed and most states cannot deliver on their developmental goals if the private sector, where profit maximization is the primary motive, is made the driving force. Yet the success of NEPAD hinges on the private sector, which raises the question of the feasibility of this renaissance development strategy and the extent to which human security will be guaranteed. As the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan aptly stated with regard to the effect of structural adjustment in Africa,

...painful structural adjustment programmes have in many cases led to a significant reduction in social spending and in consequent reductions in the delivery of many of the most basic of social services. Especially when this is coupled with a perception that certain groups are not

*receiving a fair share of diminishing resources, the potential for conflict is evident.*²²

Unless effective counter policies are put in place to protect the people against the effects of neo-liberalism, NEPAD will surely bring much greater suffering upon the people, thereby contradicting the stated objective of poverty reduction articulated in the Millennium Development Goals strategy. The danger posed by the anti-poor conditionalities inherent in the finance mobilization instruments of NEPAD is that the economic and social rights of the people will be in serious jeopardy. This is far more disturbing, particularly with regard to the privatization of sectors that are responsible for the provision of essential services such as water, education, and healthcare. The fact is that the propensity of the private sector to charge “cost-recovery” prices is bound to sacrifice the rights of the majority of the people, who are the less privileged and the most vulnerable, and will become the ultimate losers under NEPAD. In short, the nature of poverty in Africa implies that the majority of the citizens, and more specifically disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, will not be able to access “user-pay” services. Where this happens the security of the people is undermined, and development may prove elusive.

Africa has been trying to overcome its many developmental constraints but to no avail. According to the UN Development Programme Report,

*Although a number of poverty-reducing programmes are being implemented in almost all [African] countries, little positive impact has been recorded ... the continent's worsening degree of vulnerability to life and welfare-threatening calamities is unmatched.*²³

The poor results of those efforts are due to the fact that they were underpinned by the neo-liberal ideology, which is not charitable to the poor. The withdrawal of subsidies from a wide range of goods and services, while claiming to implement poverty reduction policies, is an untenable contradiction. The scope of poverty in Africa makes it obligatory for the state to provide social assistance in the form of subsidized goods and services. If such social assistance has to

be cancelled simply because it is inconsistent with the free market, then the struggle to alleviate poverty among the majority of the African population will be long and arduous. Poverty and conflict will persist as core elements of the development crisis. This is the greatest challenge facing Africa.

Conclusion

Human security puts a premium on human life and its power is most clearly manifested when it is contrasted with the traditional concept of national security. The welfare of human beings around the world is the object of concern rather than the military and strategic interests of states. In the national security approach, everything revolves around the prowess of the military, the police and other organs of the state security apparatus and the sort of defense hardware the armed forces possess. On the other hand, in the human security approach, a lot depends on the development community, civil society, and non-governmental organizations engaged in catalyzing local development or providing humanitarian aid (Dorn, n.d.: 4). Human security is powered by its focus on the individual; the more civilized society becomes, the more attention is diverted from national security to human security. We might as well forget about helping the poor until mechanisms that recognize the centrality of human security in contemporary development are enshrined in development thinking. The structures and ideological underpinnings that have proved to be detrimental to the development of ordinary people must be re-examined. Alternatively, other mechanisms capable of counteracting the decidedly negative ones must be developed, strengthened and employed to assure a human-centered development that recognizes the centrality of human development in the contemporary world. It is only when these have been done that Africa can confidently join the league of civilized nations. Albert Einstein once noted:

*Not until the creation and maintenance of decent conditions of life for all people are recognized and accepted as a common obligation of all people and all countries – not until then shall we, with a certain degree of justification, be able to speak of humankind as civilized.*²⁴

NEPAD, as the blueprint for Africa's renaissance, is locked into the profit matrix of foreign capital. Wherever profit is the driving force, basic rights become the casualty. NEPAD is bound to have negative effects for the citizens of Africa. Development will undermine the security of the silent majority. It is therefore imperative that NEPAD should be guided by the principle that trade and economic growth is not an end in itself; that trade and economic growth become meaningful only if human security is guaranteed. The late Prime Minister of Japan, Keizo Obuchi, in reference to human security, noted that people should be able to lead their lives "without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired".²⁵ The development paradigm imposed on African countries by donors, and now freely extolled by NEPAD, is likely to undermine human security and the ability of majority of the people to survive in a global environment made more competitive by globalization.

Notes

¹ See Anneke van Woudenberg, 2002.

² See Kathleen Collins, 2002.

³ See Gareth Evans, 1999.

⁴ See Walter Dorn, n.d.

⁵ The Millennium Report of the Secretary General of the UN is available online at <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report>.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ UNGA Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 on *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)*. It came into force on 3 January 1976..

⁸ *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)*, 1979, UNTS, Vol.1249, p.13. It came into force on 3 September 1981.

⁹ *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, 1989, A/RES/44/25, entered into force on 2 September 1990; *African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child*, adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 1990 at the Twenty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

¹⁰ *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families*, 1990, A/RES/45/158.

- ¹¹ UN, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, entry into force on 22 April 1954; UN, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 16 December 1966, entry into force on 4 October 1967; and OAU *Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*, 10 September 1969, entry into force on 20 June 1974.
- ¹² *ILO Revised Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries*, 1989, ILO Official Bulletin, Vol. LXXII (1989). Entered into force on 5 September 1991.
- ¹³ *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, 1965, UNTS Vol. 660. Entered into force on 4 January 1969.
- ¹⁴ *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, 1981. Entered into force on 21 October 1986. Article 23.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 24.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 22; *Declaration on the Right to Development*, UNGA Res. 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
- ¹⁷ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Economic Development in Africa: Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues*, 2001.
- ¹⁸ See Ajayi and Khan, 2000. Cited in International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD), *Human Rights and Democratic Development in Africa: Policy Considerations for Africa's Development in the New Millennium*, 21 May 2002.
- ¹⁹ ICHRDD, 2002.
- ²⁰ Cited in Leo Panitch, 1996: 103.
- ²¹ See paragraphs 146 and 147 of NEPAD.
- ²² United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the United Nations Security Council, *The causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, 1998. Cited in ICHDD, 2002.
- ²³ UNDP *Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa*, AGF-V Concept Paper, 2002.
- ²⁴ Cited in Walter Dorn, n.d.
- ²⁵ Cited by Ogata, 2002.

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Chapter 11

Africa's Search for Renewal in the Era of Globalization

Horace Campbell

Introduction

When the African Union was launched in Durban in July 2002 there was an explicit call for renewal and for a new mode of politics. This renewal was premised on the principles of Ubuntu as the Constitutive Act of the African Union committed itself to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Ubuntu is based on a simple proposition of the shared humanity of all and the basic principles of love, willingness to share, forgiveness and reconciliation. This principle had emerged as one component of the anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa where the articulators of white supremacy had presented a vision of the hierarchy of human beings. This hierarchy of humans beings had been embedded in the dominant ideas of statecraft and justified the wanton destruction of human lives. This destruction took numerous forms ranging from the violation and dehumanization of women to the military use of force to achieve political goals. Genocidal politics, genocidal economics and genocidal economics were the consequences of this nested loop of militarism and repression. Making a break with this recursive process is the challenge addressed in this chapter as we seek to grasp the essential components of African renewal in the era of globalization.

The genocide that took place in Rwanda between April and July 1994 was the fastest genocidal act in recorded human history. In less than four months an estimated 800 000 Rwandan were slaughtered while the international community in the form of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations dithered and debated whether an act of genocide was taking place.

Genocidal violence of even greater proportions had taken place in Burundi over a period of thirty years and the train of genocidal violence engulfed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) claiming more than 4 million lives. It was in the DRC where the forms of genocidal violence were accompanied by brutal forms of sexual coercion and terrorism to the point where rape as a weapon of war gained international notoriety. These episodes of genocide did not abate in the aftermath of the coming together of the African Union but found even greater depth in the conditions of political authoritarianism in the Sudan, especially in the region of Darfur.

These experiences of Burundi, Darfur, the DRC, Rwanda, Northern Uganda and elsewhere in Africa experience brought to the fore of international politics questions of militarism, dictatorship, and arbitrariness, and the general devaluation of the lives of Africans by both elements of the so-called international community and one section of the political leadership of Africa. Equivocation over the content and meaning of genocide in Africa generated controversy as some leaders embarked on repressive acts against opposition elements in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. This repressive reflex became most evident in countries where those who had embarked on armed struggles for liberation mobilized militarism, thuggery and forced removals against innocent citizens. Ethiopian, Eritrean, Ugandan and Zimbabwean leaders became role models of militarism and masculinity but the complicity and silence of a large section of the African Union revealed clearly to the producers of Africa that their lives were not considered important.

In 1948, the United Nations had adopted a convention against genocide and called on all citizens of the world to act to prevent its occurrence. However, the reality was that the very framers of this convention had been guilty of genocide in Africa. At that moment most of Africa was under colonial rule. Evidence of Belgian, British, German, French, Italian and Portuguese crimes against humanity abound in villages and towns all across Africa and in the memory of the people. Even after the signing of the Genocide Convention the British carried out crimes against humanity in Kenya. Caroline Elkins documented the extent of this brutality in the book, *Imperial Reckoning:*

The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag.¹ Adam Hochschild had documented the genocidal murder of ten million in the Congo during the period of King Leopold and Americo Boavida estimated that Portuguese genocide possibly took the lives of more than 30 million.²

Despite this evidence it is only the German state that has apologized for the genocide in Namibia. The experience of the Nazi Holocaust in the Second World War had elicited a level of caution on the part of the German intellectual and political establishment in the celebration of genocide. In the main, the intellectual centers of Europe continue to teach their students of the positive contributions of colonialism in Africa. These centers are integrated with the Universities and institutions of higher learning that continue to train a cadre of educated Africans who identified the militarism and expansion of Europe as 'unfortunate' by-products of 'progress'. This stratum of assimilated Africans have developed a culture of violence against their own people, and trampled on the spiritual strength of the masses who had opposed colonial rule.

Independence and decolonization for the masses had required the transformation of the colonial state, but for their assimilated compatriots it meant inheriting the mantle of coercion, violence and self-aggrandizement. This in practice meant the Africanization of the state and indigenization of the economy. In Southern Africa this creed of self aggrandizement coincided with a period of the celebration of individual accumulation under neo-liberal privatization and Black Economic Empowerment. There was no major effort to counteract the legacies of coercion and the devaluation of African labour power and African lives. Not only had the emergent political elite internalized the ideas of modernization being propagated by the oppressor, but ethnic supremacist ideas and rivalry had also become so entrenched that African leaders have developed a high tolerance for those who ruled on the basis of fear and the promotion of genocidal violence.

Violence and force in politics reinforce the exploitation and domination that is endemic to the present forms of economic organization. Entrepreneurs both of a civilian and military hue vie to maintain the relations of domination

and subordination by becoming the transmission belts for the importation of armaments into Africa. These entrepreneurs (called warlords by western academics) serve both the functions of maintaining the outmoded economic relations that prevailed under colonial rule and providing the weapons of mass terror and destruction so that different sections of the African ruling class could fight as to who should be the most legitimate mediators with the international system. When this competition is compounded by the politicization of ethnicity and rule on the basis of an ethnicized state, then political competition might turn into genocide – as was the case in Rwanda and in the avalanche of murders in Burundi. Episodes of war and genocidal violence have characterized social and political life to the point where hostile external commentators could prophesy “the coming anarchy.” On the basis of this self fulfilling prophesy and anarchy then came the call for the recolonization of Africa to end barbarism and tribalism. These episodes of misrule also gave rise to a veritable industry of writing on ‘failed states.’

The basic right of the African to live on the planet Earth is challenged daily by the social, economic, gender and military conditions under which the African people live. The life sciences are moving ahead with tremendous breakthroughs, yet the dominant thinking that informs and inspires millions of scientific and cultural workers in the world is the supremacy of the industrial order that considers Africans as sub-humans. In the colonial context citizenship became the basis for separating citizens and subjects. Women, especially African women were considered minors and incapable of rationality. The concept of Europeans as rational and superior to other human beings has been packaged as one component of the expansion of capitalism on a world scale, in short, modernity.

Modernity included the ability to produce mass consumption goods, the ability to build modern weapons and armaments and the destructions of forests and natural environments to build monuments of concrete and steel. This concept of superiority was linked to ideas of the scientific method, patriarchy, progress and the domination of humans over nature, while the ideas of the spiritual balance between the living, the ancestors, and the unborn, and between humans

and nature, that provided the harmony between the spiritual and material world for Africans were denigrated as primitivism.

It is at the intersection of this reality of genocide against Africa, and the challenges posed for the survival of humanity, that this chapter starts. It starts from a position that the basic question facing Africans is the unearthing of the continent's spiritual wealth that has so far acted as a force to resist the dehumanization project of globalization, and urges the spiritual renewal of African peoples at home and abroad as the keys to emancipation. The crude materialism and the obvious destruction emanating from the mastery over nature have sharpened this search. The international gene hunters are prospecting the very same rain forests that were preserved by 'primitivism.' In many respects the African continent is viewed as the last frontier where Western pharmaceutical industries have targeted its rich biodiversity. Ethnobotanists are traversing rural communities seeking open access to all plant resources. The plunder of humans and nature is one of the clearest manifestations of this period of globalization: it is the period of intensive exploitation of Africans.³

Africa: Yesterday and Today

To develop a positive perspective of this century we must examine how Africans have fulfilled the task of recovering their right to self-determination and the lessons that have been learnt. Are there lessons to be learnt from the forms of organization and consciousness of the decolonization period? What has been the response to the major actors and actresses in the international system? How can African producers rise above the despondency and mendacity that is inscribed in the ideas of Afro-pessimism and the incessant psychological warfare embedded in the commentaries on state failure? These issues are becoming even more significant in the context of the realignment in the international political economy and the new property rights regimes that are being contested as a component of the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the time when the ideas and policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) have been discredited by the massive suffering

inflicted on millions in exploited countries, the countries of Asia seek to establish new economic relations while the democracies in Latin America have established the Bank of the South to bypass the IMF. With the challenges from the BRIC economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China it is in Africa where the IMF seek to have complete independence in promoting the policies of unregulated markets, privatization and liberalization of economies. These are the policies of neo-liberal globalization. Samir Amin has linked these policies to *Permanent War and the Americanization of the World*.⁴

The anti-colonial struggles that inspired the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples are now being undermined by the doctrine of pre-emptive war that justified the US military occupation of Iraq. Under the guise of fighting terrorism the same US administration is organizing a new military command structure called Africom. All aspects of US engagement with Africa are to be subordinated to the military considerations of the Pentagon. US corporations, especially those involved in the extraction of petroleum resources will be protected by the military and support the activities of US corporate interests. The defence of one section of capital against other capitalists is defended under the banner of globalization. Even though the hegemony of US corporations has come under threat from the entry of Chinese capital into Africa, the orthodox ideas of neo-liberalism continue to be the mantra for ideological engagement with Africa.

Reference has already been made to Samir Amin and his conceptions of the links between neo-liberalism and militarism. This connection between neo-liberalism, globalization and militarization of the planet has been made by scholars on all sides of the intellectual spectrum. Susan George traced the growing inequalities in the world to the ideological onslaught from the time of Ronald Reagan and the conservative ideas associated with the individual accumulation of wealth. The Indian economist Amartya Sen made the same point with respect to the growing poverty on the planet earth and the impact of globalization on exploited societies. In his essay on “How to Judge Globalism “ he had written,

First came the Renaissance, then the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and these led to a massive increase in living standards in the West. And now the great achievements of the West are spreading to the world. In this view, globalization is not only good, it is also a gift from the West to the world. The champions of this reading of history tend to feel upset not just because this great benefaction is seen as a curse but also because it is undervalued and castigated by an ungrateful world.⁵

Samir Amin, Susan George, Amartya Sen, Yash Tandon and numerous scholars have written on the reality that the present globalization of capital is not new but has roots in the expansion of capitalism in what is termed imperialism. Conservative writers in both Europe and the USA embrace the responsibilities of imperial domination and are not shy of using the term imperialism. The varying writers who proclaim the need for US imperialism are documented in the book, *The New Imperialism* by David Harvey. This author wants to go beyond David Harvey and note that this is not only the period of the New Imperialists but also one of counter-revolution.

Robert Kaplan symbolized this counter revolutionary tenor in his book, *Imperial Grunts*. Kaplan called upon US politicians to embrace the role of international police to prevent anarchy. "The antidote to anarchy is empire, policed by American soldiers holding an assault rifle in one hand and offering candy bars with the other." ⁶ Not to be outdone the British author Robert Cooper added his own voice to the "why we still need empires,"

*In the Ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilization. Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder."*⁷

Globalization and counter revolution

The key elements of the counter revolutionary ideas of the era of globalization can be summarized as the idea that imperialism and militarism are the best guarantors of order, that the state should not play a role in the economy

(deregulation and privatization) with the following key attributes

1. Economic polarization and disparities globally. Concentration and centralization of capital taken to new heights.
2. Twenty-first century eugenics, such as AIDS, Sterilization, Biometrics. This is what is termed *Medical Apartheid*
3. International Drug and Military interconnections: wars on drugs and crack cocaine epidemics (global drugs, finance infrastructure).
4. Religious Fundamentalism (especially Christian, Islamic, Jewish and Hindu fundamentalism).
5. Armaments Culture, Militarism and military humanitarianism - war and influence of intelligence, security apparatus, information warfare (multi billion expenditure on war and the development of nuclear weapons).
6. Media disinformation, psychological warfare and mind control.
7. Environmental decay: pollution and global warming.
8. Big Pharmaceutical conglomerates, genetically modified food and seeds.
9. Racism at a new level.
10. Sexism, deformed patriarchy, and homophobia.

Because of the degree of concentration of capital that has been reached, the counter- revolutionary politics of the one per cent of billionaires on Earth impose these consequences not only for citizens of the USA but for most of humanity. In the process there is an array of institutions that are organized to demobilize and disorganize the citizens of the world. Africa is at the bottom of the polarization of wealth, with nearly half of the continent living on less than one US dollar per day. These are the entities that Cooper refers to as living outside of 'order, culture and civilization.'

One of the most chilling aspects of this counter-revolutionary period is the way in which the spiritual values of poor and oppressed peoples are being manipulated to the point where poor people of one religious faith can be mobilized to kill peoples of another faith. The propensity towards genocidal politics is one manifestation of this trend as is evident in Darfur, Sudan.

Normalized violence is the other manifestation where poor persons are caught in a loop of structural, direct and sexual violence.

These elements of counter-revolutionary politics force thoughtful analysts to be clearer on the tasks of renewal and it is within this period of counter-revolution that the discussion on African liberation in the 21st century is taking place. From the outset, it should be noted that the identified elements of counter-revolution: militarism, war, eugenics, institutionalized racism, culture, environmental decay and toxic racism, propaganda and psychological warfare, economic disparities, the politicization of ethnicity and religion, re-segregation, sexism and homophobia—cannot be understood in isolation. Within this counter-revolutionary period militarists and anti-democratic forces thrive as constitutional dictators and this provides cover for some leaders who repress their people while castigating imperialism (Sudan and Zimbabwe).

Despite the material wretchedness of the African peoples, the spiritual depth of the people prevents them from total collapse under the weight of militarism, war, the debt crisis and the AIDS pandemic. Africans are called on to pay debts incurred by militarists and genocidaires rather than provide clean running water or systematic health care to the people. African men, women and children are urged to believe in the market as the new religion and spiritual reference point for the 21st century. African intellectuals are also urged to believe in the fundamental truth of the market and to exclude the possibility of alternative truth – for example, that of state intervention to guarantee the social and economic rights of citizens.

The present mode of politics and economic organization is based on the reductionist ideas of the self-interest of the individual and individual rights that inspire the economic theory of markets. Milton Friedman had argued in his book, *Capitalism and Democracy* that “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom.” Taking this theory from the abstract text to practical politics Friedman had trained a generation of scholars at the University of Chicago and embraced the view that, “the free market is the only mechanism that has ever been discovered for achieving participatory democracy.”

The devastation of the free market policies on the peoples of Latin America has set in motion a revolt that has brought in populist leaders who have renounced this neo-liberal conception of democracy. It was in Chile under General Pinochet where the ideas of Friedman and neo-liberal globalization had its greatest damage. In Latin America neo-liberal globalization of unlimited markets and deregulation is now seen as fundamentally flawed and there are devastating critiques coming from the day-to-day resistance of those who are caught at the bottom of the system struggling to prevent social and community breakdown. The dead-end of the structural adjustment policies is being critiqued even from the right by those who were once its exponents. Venerable ‘ideologues’ and ‘economists’ such as Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffery Sachs and Robert Reich now compete to provide explanations for the crisis of globalization that will absolve them from responsibility for the destruction of the lives of millions. At the very center of the world system there is an acknowledgement that the crisis is systemic (Toussaint, 1999).

Nobel Prize recipients for economics who wrote on the “science of financial risks” took the world economy to the brink of total collapse in 1998. These Nobel Prize recipients were involved in one of the many hedge-fund schemes that proliferate, with devastating effects on the world economy. The brains behind the Long Term Capital Management Fund have exposed the underlying relations of power, indicating instances where speculators are bailed out of economic distress while poor people all over the world are left to die because of the absence of resources for healthcare and food.

From speculators who have made billions from the casino system that is called global financial system, we now have books such as that of George Soros heralding the *Crisis of Global Capitalism*. By the end of 2007 the financial crisis associated with the ideas of free markets led Soros to bring out another book that started with the sentence, “We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s.”⁸ Within the USA there are frantic efforts to socialize the losses as the government bailed out banks and mortgage companies. In Britain the nationalization of the bank, Northern Rock came as the governments justify these actions on the grounds that the banks were too big to fail.

Within the meetings of the G* and conferences at Davos, Switzerland there is a search for a new financial architecture that can restore the political compromise of Breton Woods in the form of some understanding, to mute the competition between the dollar and the euro, the challenges from the Bank of the South and the independence of countries who have established Sovereign Wealth Funds. The ideas that dominated the international financial institutions are now being called into question even by the very forces that profited from the system. There are now four centers of global finance and economic power. These are the European Union, the Countries of the Shanghai Cooperation organization, the Union of South American States and the United States of America. All of these centers of power seek to project their influence in Africa with renewed three way competition between China, the old colonial powers of the EU and the USA.

Even within the period of very fast and dynamic changes in the international system old ideas die hard as the US expends state resources to prop up failed banks, subsidize farmers and protect US industries while preaching the gospel of free market to African governments. Among the theoreticians of globalization, there is an implicit acceptance by many in the mainstream that Africa is marginal to the global economic system. Market fundamentalism serves an important function in so far as unregulated economic activities and privatization ensure the transfer of wealth from Africa for the benefit of capitalists in Europe, North America and Asia. The use of the term marginalization is another way of bringing up to date the idea that Africa is black, tropical and outside of history. However, the leaders of Europe who understand the realities of the survival of Europe are most active in seeking to recolonize Africa. Hence Giscard D'Estang could say in 1978: "He who controls Europe controls Africa", which exposed the masculine concept of conquest and control that is implicit in imperial thinking.

Looting Africa

In the present era of the globalization of capital, the convergence of the information revolution, biotech revolution, nanotechnology revolution and cognitive revolution has placed additional importance on both the knowledge

of Africans and the vast genetic resources that had been preserved because of the African world view of the intimate relationship between humans, plants and animals. Africa is the home of the richest biodiversity on the planet. While some leaders are struggling for land, the biotech and pharmaceutical companies are patenting African medicinal plants. Calestous Juma who has written extensively on the relationship between biodiversity and the conservation of the environment also drew attention to the relationship between ***the Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seed.***⁹ Juma's language and formulation of hunting was more neutral than the cryptic description of this practice by Vandana Shiva who has termed this form of looting, *Biopiracy: the Plunder of Humans and Nature*.

This plunder of the genetic resources is supported by the ideas of freedom of the market and the right of biotech companies to own life. Under the new ideation life is an invention and can be bought and sold by the highest bidder. The threat of the major biotech companies to patent life forms along with the contentious rules of the World Trade Organization relating to intellectual property rights contain the seeds of undermining most if not all of the gains that were made in the context of the struggle for United Nations Convention on biological diversity. Because Africa is the home of the greatest diversity, it is the peoples of Africa who have the most to lose from the view that genetic materials can be patented for private profit.

Under neo-liberalism biological diversity should not be the common concern for human kind but should be turned into commodities. By presenting life as an "invention" the biotechnical companies and the food corporations seek to eliminate the idea that "there should be access to and transfer of technology, including biotechnology, to the governments and/or local communities that provided traditional knowledge and/or biodiversity resources."¹⁰ Traditional farmers and traditional knowledge are threatened but as of now there is still no comprehensive study of the displacement of the African farmer. In societies such as India it is now well documented how under corporate led globalization the combination of crop failure, drought, pests, and spurious pesticides has eliminated hundreds of thousands of farmers. The well documented suicides

of tens of thousands of Indian farmers is only one of the by-products of the kind of neo-liberalism that threatens the elimination of the African farmer altogether. It is against this background that Africa is providing the lead in the World Trade Organization against the patenting of life forms and looting of resources.

In his most recent book on the ***Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World***, Samir Amin critiqued the capitalist intensive mode of agriculture and the threats posed to peasants throughout the world. Amin argued that under the new mantra of modernization and property rights the neo liberal policies of capitalists in North America and Western Europe promise extermination for peasant agriculture. Peasant agriculture, accounting for 3 billion humans, faces economic extermination by 20 million modern farms. Continuing he asserted,

*“We are thus led to the point where in order to open up a new field for the expansion of capital, it would be necessary to destroy- in human terms- entire societies. Twenty million efficient producers on one side and five billion excluded on the other.....If capitalism has “resolved” (in its own way), the agrarian question in the centres of the system, in the peripheries, because it is indissociable from imperialism, it has created a new agrarian problem of immense proportions that it is incapable of resolving, except by destroying half of humanity through genocide.”*¹¹

It is this slow genocide in the rural areas of Africa that is providing the basis for looting and genocidal economic relations throughout most of the African continents. Patricia Daley defined genocidal economics as the forms of economic management that require the physical elimination of competition.

*“This type of economics comes from a form of competition for resources which is militarized, racialized and linked to the characterization of economic opponents as vermins. This form of economics is heightened by conditions of capitalist crisis.”*¹²

This agrarian problem that is fed by mindless competition in the rural areas of Africa is compounded by the belief that African lives are worthless and that petroleum companies can destroy the natural environment. Such thinking had already been articulated by Lawrence Summers when he was a chief economist for the World Bank. Summers reasoned that,

*"I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that."*¹³

Africans in countries such as the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroons and South Africa understand that this logic of toxic imperialism is not simply an abstract problem in so far as the dumping of toxic waste has intensified in Africa since Summers wrote this memo in 1992. Additionally, the wanton destruction of the environment by petroleum companies exacerbates the economic features of plunder and toxic racism. Throughout the first years of the 21st century petroleum extraction increased all across Africa to the point that today the US imports more of its petroleum from Africa than from the Middle East. From North Africa in Algeria/Libya down the West African coast to Angola/Namibia and from the Cameroon coast in West Africa across the Chad pipeline to the new oil fields in the Sudan petroleum companies are looting the resources without regard for the health and safety of the peoples. Oil theft and the non remittance of revenues cement links between corrupt oil magnates and equally African bureaucrats, politicians and military personnel. This form of looting as been graphically outlined in the book appropriately entitled, *Where Vultures Feast*.¹⁴

Nigeria represents the extreme example of both looting and toxic racism. It is in this the most populous state of Africa where a small clique of capitalists is enriched while the majority of the people are exploited.

As much as 76 per cent of all the natural gas from Petroleum production in Nigeria is flared compared to 0.6 per cent in USA, 4.3 per cent in the UK, 21.0 per cent in Libya. The flaring is one of the most severe of the numerous hazards to which the peoples of the Delta and the Rivers

States are exposed. At temperatures of 1,300 to 1,400 degrees centigrade, the multitude of flares in the Delta heat up everything, causing noise pollution, and producing CO₂, VOC, CO, NO_x and particulates around the clock. The emission of CO₂ from gas flaring in Nigeria releases 35 million tons of CO₂ a year and 12 million tons of methane, which means that Nigerian oil fields contribute more in global warming than the rest of the world together. (Claude Ake, 1996)

Throughout Africa the petroleum companies are simultaneously looting and executing crimes against humans and crimes against nature. In Nigeria where the companies flare gas at a rate that would not be allowed in societies such as Norway or Britain, many of the gas flares are situated very close to villages within a hundred metres of homes of ordinary citizens. Petroleum companies have been flaring at some sites for 24 hours a day for more than 30 years. Despite this record, the standard view of environmental management, is that the basic rights of private property and of profit maximization, come before the health and welfare of the peoples of Nigeria in general, and in particular, the peoples of the Niger Delta.

Successive governments in Nigeria since independence in 1960 have been willing accomplices to this degradation. Oil companies are protected by the power of the state and military regimes while the health and welfare of Nigerian society suffers irreparable. The cuts in the social wage of the population make it impossible for local communities to support health clinics and there is an absence of drugs in most rural hospitals. The oil revenue is recycled to prop up the political class. Since 1958, Royal Dutch Shell has extracted billions from the lands of the Niger Delta.

Looting and capital transfers from Africa in the period of globalization. Many of the crimes committed in this era of counter revolution are hidden behind lofty goals of eliminating poverty in Africa. So clear is the gap between the rhetoric of “development” and the reality of exploitation that from time

to time here are initiatives to “eliminate” poverty” as manifest in the declarations of the G 8 summits or the ideals of the Millennium Development Goals. There is of course some background history to the previous era of development decades that had been initiated by the United Nations at the time of independence. In the postscript to *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, A. M. Babu had penetrated the rhetoric of “development” to expose the absence of real change in the quality of the lives of the people. Forty years after independence the statistics from the Human Development Index on the deterioration of the quality of the lives of the poor is even grimmer.

Development decades of yesterday have been overtaken by the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. Yet, the more these campaigns are activated the more money is looted from Africa. Both Patrick Bond and Yash Tandon have been tracking this drain of resources out of Africa with Tandon identifying fifteen different forms of the drain of capital as a result of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In seeking to cut through the orthodoxy of neo-liberal economics Tandon argued that Foreign Direct Investment is neither good nor bad in Africa, it depends on how it is used. Tandon argued that foreign aid created debt and that this debt is then the basis form a further drain of capital from Africa.¹⁵

Elementary figures compiled by international institutions in the business of measuring human development have documented the tremendous outflow of capital from Africa in debt servicing. Figures from UNICEF and UNESCO estimate that in 1997, developing countries paid \$270 billion in debt servicing, which was approximately \$60 per head. A more recent study by two economists on the estimates of capital flight from African countries gives the figure of US \$607b over a 35 year period. Léonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce computed this drain of capital from Africa by noting,

Real capital flight over the 35-year period amounted to about \$420 billion (in 2004 dollars) for the 40 countries as a whole. Including imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock of capital flight was about \$607 billion as of end-2004. Together, this group of SSA countries is a

“net creditor” to the rest of the world in the sense that their private assets held abroad, as measured by capital flight including interest earnings, exceed their total liabilities as measured by the stock of external debt. Their net external assets (accumulated flight capital minus accumulated external debt) amounted to approximately \$398 billion over the 35-year period.¹⁶

While both Patrick Bond and Yash Tandon may be considered critical of neo-liberal globalization these main stream economists consider the outflow of capital as a paradox. For the mainstream economists the paradox lay in the fact that on the one side African countries are heavily indebted and are forced by external debt burdens to devote scarce foreign exchange to debt servicing while on the other hand African countries are exporting massive outflows of private capital towards western financial centers. Yet behind this seeming paradox is the consistency of the logic behind structural adjustment which was to ensure that Africa remained exploited and underdeveloped.

(Boyce and Ndikumana) observed correctly that,

African countries have experienced massive outflows of private capital towards Western financial centers. Indeed, these private assets surpass the continent's foreign liabilities, ironically making sub-Saharan Africa a “net creditor” to the rest of the world. Compared to other developing regions, Africans tend to exhibit a significantly higher preference for foreign assets relative to domestic assets; hence Africa has the highest proportion of private assets held abroad relative magnitude of the region's net external position, the region's external assets are 2.9 times the stock of debts owed to the world.

They continued this observation with the analysis that sub-Saharan Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the world, in the sense that private assets held abroad exceed the continent's liabilities to the rest of the world.

Then the question is, if Africa is a net creditor, why are so many of its people so poor? The answer, of course, is that the subcontinent's private external assets belong to a narrow, relatively wealthy stratum of its population, while public external debts are borne by the people through their governments. To the extent that these private assets were accumulated using the external borrowings that were intended to develop the countries, this raises the question of the legitimacy of much of the debts owed by African countries. In other words, there is legal basis for claiming that a substantial fraction of Africa's debts are "odious."

The authors then went on to clarify the context of what is considered an "odious debt" under international law. Most African scholars use the experience of Mobutu in the DRC to clarify this form of debt which is "an unjust debt accumulated under circumstances in which it would be iniquitous for the debt to be repaid."

One of the positive aspects of the anti-globalization and the debt campaign in Africa has been to link up with activists in Latina America and the Middle East to learn lessons of the nature of successive campaigns against the "odious debt." This campaign to cancel the African debt has been given even greater prominence after the citizens of Iraq were able to renegotiate their debt to international banks on the grounds that the debts Iraq now bears were contracted to sustain a corrupt, oppressive regime. Because Iraq is not the only country burdened by such debts, it is now possible for anti-globalization activists in Africa to move the debate from debt cancellation and repudiation to the issue of reparations.

Healing, repair and renewal are now concepts that are emerging from the anti-globalization movement with the legal challenges for reparations by South African activists. After the World Conference against Racism in Durban in September 2001 the issue of reparations for the crimes of colonialism, the slave trade and slavery became a central feature of the anti-globalization

movement. Up to the time of writing African universities have not been central to the debates and conferences on reparations because the member countries of the European Union are firmly opposed to the new thinking of reparations for crimes against humanity. The task of renewal requires a new economic thinking and planning that will raise the standard of living of the people by developing the production base of agriculture for the provision of food, clothing, shelter and healthcare. These requirements necessitate dedicated, incorruptible and honest leadership and gender sensitivity. But most importantly, renewal requires the unleashing of the creativity of the people.

We must now briefly revisit the leading ideas that emerged from the independence movement; because for the majority of the people the dismantling of the elementary gains in education, health, and water supplies has exposed the limitations of the anti-colonial leadership and the need for new reference points for emancipation.

The Spiritual Dimensions of the Decolonization Process

The task of recovering the humanity of the African in the 21st century can be located at many levels: the cultural, the political and the economic, and at the level of the transformation of gender relations. But at all these levels the question that is being forcefully asked is: "What are the ideas and forms of political organization that will guide the ambitious project of confronting globalization?" This question emanates from the lessons of the decolonization period, the summit of which was reached recently in the transition to majority rule in South Africa. This victory highlighted the limitations of the ideas that had guided the whole process of African independence. In so far as the leadership had internalized the ideas of progress from Europe, these very ideas contained the materialistic and reductionist views of humans that placed Africans at the bottom of the process of surviving on this planet, in modern civilization.

The emergence of Nelson Mandela in South Africa personified the best of the traditions of the decolonization process. Mandela had epitomized what was common to the whole of Africa, which is a willingness to make sacrifices

for the sake of freedom. In the literature on the transfer of political power in South Africa there is undue emphasis on the skills of politicians and negotiators but little on the conscious efforts or the sacrifices of millions who gave their lives and their energy for the removal of white rule. Another major area that has been missing in the books and monographs is the continuities and linkages between the South African process and the various lessons of black revolt from the revolution in Haiti in 1804 for the wars of national liberation across Africa. African scholars are now searching the anti-colonial struggles to learn from the history of pan-African revolts and to grasp how Africans have responded to the barbarism of capitalism. For instance, in a discussion of black Marxism, Cedric Robinson underlined the willingness on the part of the African to die for freedom.¹⁷ In a chapter on the 'Nature of the Black Radical Tradition', he argued that the violence of the colonized against the colonizer should not be understood as simply an attack on a system, or an engagement with an abstraction of oppressive structures and relations. Rather,

it was the renunciation of actual being for historical being, the preservation of the ontological reality granted by a metaphysical system which never allowed for property in either the physical, philosophical, temporal, legal, social or psychic senses. For them defeat or victory was an internal affair. Like those in the 1950s who took to the mountains and forests to become the Land and Freedom Army (in Kenya), the material objective power of the enemy was irrelevant to their destinies. His machines which flung metal missiles, his vessels of smoke and gas all were allowed less relevance than the integral totality of the people themselves.

This was the essence of the anti-colonial struggle: how to reclaim the integral totality of the people themselves. Kwame Nkrumah brought to our attention this spiritual depth of the search for renewal as manifested in the anti-colonial struggles. In a book appropriately entitled, *I Speak of Freedom*, Nkrumah (1973) linked the liberation of the continent to the recovery of the spirit of the people:

When the spirit of the oppressed people revolts against its oppressors, that revolt continues until freedom is achieved. We have not the arms with which to fight as the Americans did against the British, but we have the moral and spiritual forces at our disposal which outnumber all the physical weapons and forces which no arms can conquer and no gold can buy.

This was a profound restatement of the position of those who led the cultural resistance at the height of colonial domination. Every liberation movement consciously sought to unearth this spiritual strength, whether in the form of the oath taking of the Land and Freedom Army or the mobilization of the spirit mediums in the struggle against the Rhodesian settler class. In both cases the leaders turned their backs on the people once they assumed control over the colonial state machinery.

There were two different conceptions of spirituality. There was the conception by the educated that this spirituality was a source of weakness and therefore resorted to ideas of African fundamentalism as a method of seeking state legitimation (such as Mobutu's authenticity movement). For the masses, this spirituality linked them to the ancestors, to their inner being and to a cosmology that was outside of the control of those who exploited their labor. For the educated, (assimilated, evolve etc) who were conditioned by the intellectual training of the modernizers, spirituality inspired ideas of magic, mystery, witchcraft, and anything ranging from supernatural powers to utter devilry. In this enterprise the state institutions of religious reflection were most hostile to ideas of African spiritual renewal. Malidoma Some expounded in great detail in the book, the *Healing Wisdom of Africa* how the missionaries denigrated the spiritual values of the community and the traditional knowledge that renewed human cooperation and survival.¹⁸ It devolved on the same educated strata to inherit the mantle of the colonial state that was opposed by the spiritual energy and sacrifices of the masses. This was the educated African who understood decolonization as a means of learning how to accumulate property, and how to master the European colonizers' systems of social domination.

On the other side was the mass of the producers searching for new institutional forms in registering their quest to reclaim the essence of their humanity, which was locked up in the exploitative system of colonialism. The leadership of the decolonization movement, who embarked on programs of nation-building, had internalized concepts of progress. Mission schools education and the education that alienated the educated from the knowledge around them rendered many incapable of undertaking the historical tasks of change and renewal. This was especially the case for those who considered themselves civilized. Yet, there were limitations even among those who were committed to fundamental changes as in the case of Tanzania under Nyerere where an attempt was made to find an alternative to capitalist forms of organization in the form of Ujamaa.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Ujamaa

The Ujamaa experiment was a profound attempt to search deep into the African past to find forms of social organization that could break the property relations in private land ownership and the grip of social squalor. The idea of Ujamaa villages had set Tanzania apart in a continent where private property and primitive accumulation were the leading principles of state management. Julius Nyerere emerged not only in Tanzania but also in the whole of Africa and in the rest of the underdeveloped world as a champion of the producers who wanted a new international economic system. This demand was valid throughout the last years of the 20th century and is still valid for this century. This demand is now being articulated by the reparations movement. It was significant that this leadership was also the most hostile to the ideas of militarism and masculinity, and maintained that state sovereignty entitled African leaders to kill their own people with impunity. The war against Idi Amin in Uganda demonstrated that the Tanzanian society was prepared to place the sovereignty of the African (the people) over territorial sovereignty. It was not accidental that it was from this secure social base that Tanzania became the home for the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

The elements of the Ujamaa experiment are too well known and documented both from the supporters and detractors to bear repetition. The elements of

the socialist form, the development of education for self-reliance, a leadership code, collective villages based on collective ownership of land, and political accountability and transparency are now part of the history of Tanzania and Africa. These were the strengths of the most advanced sections of the decolonization politics; the positive lessons from this experiment will continue to exercise a powerful inspiration to find new forms of political organization. In critiquing the Tanzania Ujamaa experiment, we will also benefit from the experiences of this period of African politics. It is this political culture of self-reliance and anti-militarism that preserved Tanzania as a haven of peace in a region that had been overtaken by genocidal politics and genocidal violence.

The principal weaknesses of Ujamaa include the fact that the mode of economic organization was based on the production of cash crops for export, as inherited from colonialism. The school system was to be the service sector for this economy and was still masculinist in form and content. The entire educational system was gendered in the sense that it favoured the patriarchal structures of the missionary form of imparting knowledge and the question of who would become the intellectuals of society. The language of higher education continued to be the European language (in this instance, English) and the society did not seek to harness the knowledge of African women to transform the colonial intellectual structures. In essence, Ujamaa was another form of the Africanization of the colonial state. The positive aspect of this Africanization was that it was premised on egalitarian principles that were supposed to be socialist.

But, by the end of the 1980s the political leadership of Tanzania had surrendered to World Bank management after a spirited fight. This episode exposed the fact that no one country in Africa can develop a national project in the era of globalization. The requirement of regional cooperation between democratic states became obvious from this lesson. The experiences of Ujamaa reinforce the present case for the unification of Africa and a strengthened African Union.

In Tanzania itself there was a spirited debate on the differences between scientific socialism and utopian socialism. African intellectuals who had declared

themselves disciples of Hegelian philosophy and dialectical materialism argued with each other as to who was more scientific in their approach to understanding the social realities of the society. Having internalized the ideas of the scientific method and the crude determinism of this system, the intellectuals of the Dar es Salaam school appropriated the stages of European development from communalism, slavery and feudalism to capitalism and applied them to African societies that had been forcefully integrated into the global economy. Most of these intellectuals did not seek to enrich universal science with an African ethos. This debate on socialism exposed one of the fundamental problems of African politics, which is the dependence on ideas that developed in the context of the social history of Europe. In so far as Marxism emerged from the corpus of ideas that emanated from the reductionism, materialism and determinism of European philosophy, the final decolonization of Africa necessitates a thorough critique of the principal ideas emanating from this brand of Marxism. The ideas of Marx in relation class struggles, history and revolutionary change were ignored by a cadre of intellectuals and activists who assigned themselves as the vanguard of the African revolution.

What did South Africa learn From the Tanzanian Debates?

There is an ongoing struggle by external exploiters to generalize the idea of individual land tenure to overthrow the last vestiges of Ujamaa. This struggle is supported by a propaganda war to denigrate the Tanzanian experiment and to suggest that other countries have nothing to learn from Tanzania. The destruction of Angola and Mozambique served to underline the intolerance of attempts to break with imperial domination, because it is clear that the end of white minority rule and the beginning of the process of renewal are momentous affairs and can be termed a turning point in African history.

South African scholarship had not prepared the people to understand the meaning of the change that was in the offing. This is because at the apex of the educational system is the view that there was nothing that could be learnt from the rich history of decolonization in Africa, and that the South African experience was exceptional. The coming to power of the freedom fighters in South Africa therefore brought to a close the chapter that the armed struggles

would lead to substantial changes in the quality of life for the majority of the people. The struggle for renewal therefore draws from the richness of the lessons of the decolonization process, and from the reality that liberation movements founded on armed struggles did not address or resolve a number of questions about democracy.

The most fundamental question about democracy that has not been addressed is the despotism of economic relations. In less than thirty years the limitations of both the market-driven concept of democracy and the vanguardism of the former liberation forces have been exposed. In the specific case of South Africa, the theoreticians who had internalized the European stages of history proffered ideas on the development of the productive forces to the point where this legitimized their partnership with the white capitalist class in South Africa. The elevation of these comrades to the boards of the economic structures of apartheid pointed out the dead-end of a scheme of Black Economic Empowerment that did not seek to empower the producers. It was in this context that the new leaders of South Africa have sought new legitimation by advancing the idea of African Renaissance.

African Renaissance and the Spiritual Renewal of Africa

One of the more profound aspects of the call for the African Renaissance is the attempt to put to rest the debate on “who is an African”. The racialized and binary concept of the African that was given credence by the enlightenment philosophy is now being challenged as present intellectuals seek to distance themselves from the European categories of race. This quest to rise above racial hierarchies was expressed at the time of the Seventh Pan-African Conference when it was accepted that historical and political consciousness count more than biology or skin pigment. African women have also sought to transcend the racial categories when the very same purveyors of racial authenticity carry out physical and sexual abuse and the divisions are supposed to be inscribed within the bodies of African women.

The debate on who is an African was also most forcefully joined in the South African context where the idea of national reconciliation included the concept

of a 'rainbow nation'. Yet commentators have reminded us that the color black is not a color of the rainbow. The fact is that the black experience is a particular experience that derives from the experience of colonialism and racism. Therefore, the idea of renewal will not make sense if it does not deal with these histories.

In an effort to develop a philosophy for legitimating the rise of the African middle class, President Thabo Mbeki and the present leadership of South Africa joined the debate on who is an African. Their vision of the African and African Renaissance straddles both the pan-African traditions of autonomous intellectual reflection and the heritage of the ideas of the old established intelligentsia in South Africa. It was in walking this tightrope that one heard the call for an 'African Renaissance'. However, while cementing the break with the racialized concept of Africa and who could be considered an African (by making an inclusive concept reiterating the views of the Freedom Charter that South Africa belonged to all those who live there), there was still reverence to the ideation system of the enlightenment by adding the concept of 'Renaissance' to the 'African'. In doing so they have created a truly hybrid theory.

What is Renaissance?

In European history the Renaissance marked the stage when philosophy, art and culture broke their bearings and moorings in the religious mysticism of the Church, and the ideas of thinkers such as Isaac Newton, René Descartes and Francis Bacon took hold. At that historical moment, the idea of the Renaissance was revolutionary in another sense; it broke with the despotism and arbitrariness of the feudal era. After the rise of rapacious capitalism, advances in scientific research became associated with the particular genius of Europeans. The application of science and technology to production reflected the instrumental and mechanical values that had been set in motion. The industrial revolution accelerated the application of science to industry; the transition from industrial capitalism to the present forms of monopoly and global capital are some of the consequences. It was in this period that the scientific method and rationality were refined to overshadow the scientific

contributions to humanity by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The idea of progress took root, and Europe became the continent of progress and Africa the continent of backwardness. The idea of progress was also used to justify international plunder and genocide. Now that we have the destruction of human beings and nature, the physicists are recoiling from the mechanistic conceptions embedded in the intellectual assumptions of the Renaissance. Those who deal with quantum society, fractal thinking, and emancipatory politics are re-examining the cosmology of the Africans, who never developed a strict distinction between spirit and matter.¹⁹

It is in this context where the importance of African knowledge systems such as Fractal thinking is enhancing the convergence of new revolution in thinking about life that one should interrogate the intellectual roots of the African Renaissance project that has been developed by intellectual centers in South Africa. Are the roots of this renaissance in the ideas of the scientific method of Newton and the artistic world of the Dutch masters? Or are they in the tradition of Cheikh Anta Diop and those who seek to rehabilitate the ideas and spiritual values of Africa? One indication of the hybrid nature of the South African search for renewal is the simultaneous use of the African concept of *ubuntu* (respect for African humanity) and the idea of the Renaissance.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been at the forefront of propagating the philosophical and political elements of Ubuntu. In his writings Tutu has underlined the fact that the philosophy of Ubuntu can be described as the capacity, in African culture, to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, humanity and mutuality in the interest of building and maintaining communities of justice and mutual caring. Simply stated ubuntu incorporated principles of forgiveness, willingness to share and reconciliation. Tutu attempted to translate the abstract concept of Ubuntu from the philosophical level to the practical relations between humans in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At the end of the sitting of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu pressed the government to go to the next step to unleash a new culture of reparative justice.

In the immediate period after the transfer of power in 1994 the strength of the popular organizing at the grassroots had inspired the political leadership in South Africa to embark on a program of economic transformation that was based on the redistribution of wealth. Imperialism did not remain quiet or silent. Through the financing of think tanks, non governmental elites and aspiring African business persons the major centers of neo-liberal thinking intervened vigorously to recommend to the leadership a policy of neo-liberalism. Patrick Bond has written on the apparent attempt to serve both the constituency of the organized workers and the entrenched capitalists by *Talking Left Walking Right*.²⁰ Out of the dual policy of Talking Left while walking right the South African political leadership under Thabo Mbeki sought to project a new leadership for Africa under the banner of the New partnership for African Development (NEPAD). International capital and local exploiters welcome this view of development that retreated from the inclusive concepts of ubuntu and reparations.

Thabo Mbeki was projected as a ‘moderate’ and as a “Renaissance man.” As the economic depression and the financial crisis deepened South African workers and poor farmers started to distance themselves from the neo-liberal views and policies of the ANC government. While sections of the new black bourgeoisie wallowed in conspicuous consumption, the workers of COSATU organized solidarity for Zimbabwean workers who were being oppressed by former liberation fighters who had turned their backs on the poor. Even as the politics and economics of retrogression were becoming entrenched in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe South African workers blocked the transfer of Chinese weapons and protested the “quiet diplomacy” of Thabo Mbeki that supported the regime of Robert Mugabe.

African women from the grassroots who are opposing the multiple forms of structural and sexual violence added to our knowledge in linking the renaissance to the period of the victory of patriarchy in Europe. The African males across the continent who inherited the colonial state have been quite willing and able to entrench pre-colonial and colonial forms of patriarchy while they create their own spaces for gender violence, homophobia and

other forms of oppression. African women are forcefully challenging patriarchy, and the violation and subordination that are inscribed in male centered liberation projects. It is from Zimbabwe where organized women from the grassroots seek to distinguish themselves from those women who are allied to the ruling party. One formation called Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) developed new techniques of non-violent struggle to fight against oppression when the official opposition retreated. Similarly in the Sudan it is the organized women from the grassroots who are challenging genocidal violence and registering the reality that religious fundamentalism whether Christian or Islamic is based on the super exploitation of women.

In every society from the Cape to Cairo there are new formations of organized women who are changing the character of African politics. They are raising the questions of citizenship, human rights and democracy to a level that will require a complete transformation of gender relations in Africa. They have extended the critique of capitalist democracy to questions about health, sexuality, sexual orientation and the whole question of production and reproduction. It is this critique that has sharpened the exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation in Africa.²¹ In seeking to emancipate African males from their complexes, progressive African women (to be distinguished from the first wives club) are registering one of the fundamental issues of emancipatory politics in the post-apartheid period. These women are raising new theoretical and political issues that place new questions under new conditions.

More than thirty years ago, Frantz Fanon called on Africans to make a clean break with Europe. Fanon, who was grappling with both the mental and physical health of the colonized person, asserted that colonialism had created a mental pathology and that for healing to take place Africans had to develop a new model of politics. Africa had to leave Europe behind. Fanon (1961) had urged in the conclusion to his classic, *The Wretched of the Earth*, as follows:

We must leave our dreams and abandon our old beliefs and friendships from the time before life began. Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Let us

leave behind this Europe where they are never done talking of man yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their streets, in all corners of the globe. For centuries they have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience. Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual disintegration.... That same Europe where they are never done talking of men, and where they have never stopped proclaiming that they were only anxious for the welfare of Man, today we know with what sufferings humanity has paid for everyone of the triumphs of the mind.

It is this triumph of the mind that is the basis of the current divide, and Fanon in 1961 had the foresight to grasp that it is at the level of the struggles over the mind that the transformation of African societies will have to take place if Africans could reclaim their humanity. Fanon urged that

The human condition, plans for mankind, and the collaboration between men (sic) and those which increase the sum total of humanity are new problems, which demand new inventions. Let us not imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth. Two centuries ago a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster in which the taints, the sickness and inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions. Humanity is waiting for something from us rather than just imitation, which would be an obscene caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades we must turn over a new leaf, and try to set afoot a new man.

African Women and the Search for Renewal

This admonition by Fanon is still a fundamental condition of African politics in this 21st century. How can Africans be validated as human beings and be able to lay the foundations for a new sense of personhood? This question is at the core of the search for renewal. African women who bear the brunt of the exploitation by global capital are taking the arguments of Fanon even further. They have underscored the fact that not even Fanon's call for a new person can obliterate the andocentric thought that dominates African politics. Women who face the day-to-day issues of social reproduction under daily threat of physical and structural violence are the main forces preventing social and economic collapse in the face of the cuts in state spending on healthcare, social services and education. They qualify Fanon's call by asserting that women must learn from each other in the fight against patriarchy and sexual violation. Accordingly, African women have found common cause with women in Asia and Latin America and are forging linkages with them in this period of globalization to register alternatives to the present forms of economic organization.

The most important new development in the debate on the way forward is the centrality of grassroots African women in the struggle for emancipation and social transformation. This posture emanates from a long tradition of struggle by African women and the determination that they would not be marginalized again as they have been since independence. The ongoing debate on gender, sexuality and social reproduction hold the seeds of the most profound understanding of the limits of Africanization that was the hallmark of the post-colonial state and society. The question of how the oppression of women is linked to the household as a site of politics underscores the point that African scholars who oppose globalization cannot move forward while supporting andocentric ideas on the rights of women in society, politics and the economy. By framing and ending the separation of the gender question from other sites of struggles and making gender transformation a central question of politics in Africa, African women are taking the lead in the struggle for Africa's renewal.

The very nature of the discourse on the necessity of ending the exploitation of women and the humanization of males has forced us to rethink conceptions of work, production, household and housing, family forms, citizenship, traditions, culture and the relationship between humans and the natural environment. These debates by African feminists have exposed our collective ignorance and pointed out how our previous prescriptions for radical and 'progressive' politics on the basis of historical or dialectical materialism were informed by a limited understanding of human history. Rudo Gaidzwana (1993), the Zimbabwean feminist, captured the leadership offered by African women in the following statement:

In the quest for defining the theorizing the societies of the future, working and peasant women in Southern Africa are positioned to take and make a lasting and valuable contribution in redefining political struggles and society since they are the ones with the least to lose in the present social and economic conditions. The discrediting of the vanguard notions of both the right and left wing bourgeoisie in the different countries has occurred because of their inability to prevent these countries from going into crisis in the first place, and their failure to resolve the crisis evidenced by the need to resort to IMF/World Bank definitions of the way out of the crisis.

African states are being forced through the IMF and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programs to reduce the social wage of the bulk of the poor, which will surely undermine their livelihood and their capacity for self-production. The increasing proportion of female-headed and female-managed households marks the emergence of a situation where the conditions that underpin the bourgeois family and society cannot be reproduced in Africa. New gender relations are emerging and they cannot be adequately theorized and understood in the context of the bourgeois perspectives of society. Bourgeois theories and perspectives rooted in the enlightenment philosophies hold great appeal for the African elites in so far as they do not want to be identified with "barbarism, chaos and disorder." These elites cooperate with

Western Europe to silence the projects of reparations, reconstruction and peace in Africa.

These elites are walking symbols of the dead-end of nationalist politics today. They demonstrate in all corners of Africa the limitations of the institutional and legal forms inherited from colonialism. In the search for a new mode of existence questions of new modes of economics, new modes of politics, new gender relations and new concepts of citizenship. At the level of the community there is the search for democratic social relations and the end to the dictatorship in family relations. The male-headed household and the patriarchal family are central institutions of the state and politics at present; the search for renewal is recognition of the limitations inherent in these institutions, and should position us to break the ideas of male domination that rule our society.

Globalization and Democracy

In all fora and in day-to-day politics, African women are redefining politics and the terrain of democratic struggles. The issues of environmental racism, the AIDS pandemic, sexual violence and violation against women, the dumping of toxic waste, the looting of natural resources and the breakdown of social services elevate politics to a new level that is beyond parties, elections and the liberalization of the economy. It is in this context that the theory and practice of emancipatory politics are being developed out of the mess created through global plunder.

Wamba dia Wamba (1990) reaffirmed the humanity of Africans when he noted:

Without a revitalization of African traditions of solidarity community to deal with the urban-based process of expropriation threatening that community, even the call for democracy will [produce] capitalist despotism. Beyond democracy, what? The answer may not be easy to conceptualize without the revitalization of oral traditions, immediate reaffirmation (at the level of the individual and the community) i.e. cult of life process. The African masses

think, they are also people and not living machines, they can/do/must self programme and cannot be fed programmes by servants of capital, etc. Capitalist despotism is not against African unity; only mass movement beyond political capacities will give a different content to it. The call for democracy, outside of the revitalization of the community, cannot go beyond multipartyism.

This quotation has many cogent features; but the one that needs emphasis in this discourse on renewal and emancipatory politics is the question of Africans as thinking beings, who belong to a community. This restores to the debate the militant struggles of the African masses, especially women. The militancy of African women in their day-to-day fight for survival is creating new sites of politics and rendering irrelevant the ideas of nationalist legitimation and multipartyism. This militancy is reflected in the new intellectual and political insights inspired by autonomous organizations of women. These insights provide the basis for songs, dance, dress, other forms of self-expression and the struggle for survival in the midst of the health and food crisis. This struggle underscores the role of African people as political agents, as opposed to objects patiently awaiting external manipulation and ‘solutions’.

This shifts the questions of African politics from the realist paradigms of power and international relations (only men, especially European males and only big and powerful states are capable of major political actions) and the racist conceptions of Africa. It is the realist paradigm that focuses on the present wars in Africa, on the territorial integrity of states with colonial borders, and on the legitimacy of governments without reference to genocide, arbitrariness in politics and the violations of the basic rights of citizens. By starting from the position that people *think*, the theory of emancipatory politics highlights politics as phenomena of subjective order (i.e. forms of consciousness).

Wamba dia Wamba (1993: 95–118), in an essay on emancipatory politics, poses the issue of the thinking African in contrast to Africans having opinions. He argues that under the parliamentary multi-party mode, politics is not seen

as thought but as opinions on governments (whether legitimate or illegitimate):

Parliamentary parties are the organizers, the subjectivity, of those opinions. They organize the subjective dimension of the State. These parties are thus state organizations. Parliamentarianism as politics is a function of the state parties. The principle of parliamentary politics is not 'people think' but people have opinions.

In this mode of politics called 'parliamentarianism', the sites of politics are the party, trade unions, pressure groups (now called civil society), elections, parliaments and the military. Politics is separated from economics, which is consistent with the capitalist mode of production in so far as capitalism separates economic and social management, governed by fundamentally undemocratic principles (private property, individual accumulation, unlimited right to destroy humans and nature), from political management, which is governed by the democratic principles of elections. Hence in the parliamentary state there is a distinction between the political and economic sites of struggle.

Poor African women, who have borne the brunt of economic structural adjustment, the violence that stems from ethnic hatred, and the chauvinism that arrogates the right to determine who is a citizen are pressing for democratic representation that will ensure that they could exercise full citizenship in society. Previously taboo subjects such as sex, sexuality, sexual terrorism and female genital mutilation are now vigorously debated as part of the democratic discourse, because the struggle for renewal and emancipatory politics in Africa is at the same time the struggle for democracy and a democratic state that is able to manage diversity in a fair and just manner. The basic principle is that in the multi-ethnic, multiracial and multi-lingual societies of Africa, the ideas of homogenous political rule lead to the politicization of regionalism and ethnicity – of diversity generally. The African population is divided along numerous lines; there are divisions between young and old, women and men, various ethnic groups and nationalities, regions, religions, cultures, races, etc. Therefore the celebration of diversity must be based on its management in the framework of democratic institutions and by

democratic instruments if we are to end the dangerous manipulation of the question of citizenship.

The democratic management of diversity requires the reorientation of the educational system so that all of the languages of society will be celebrated, taught, nurtured and given space to develop. This also means protecting intellectual and ideological diversity. Those who are studying the importance of cognitive technologies understand the importance of traditional knowledges in Africa but the assimilated elites turn their backs on this vast reservoir of knowledge to mimic the cultural values of individualism and greed. The present period has brought out the fallacy of the central validating concept, as occurred during the period of decolonization when the 'progressives' sought to put forward one validating principle: Marxism-Leninism. In the period of globalization the validating ideas derived from the scientific method of Europe, the indigenous ideas of Africa, religious fundamentalism, and the fundamentalism of the market are in competition.

Multiparty democracy engenders geopolitics, local self-determination and other forms of ethnic division. In pluralist politics democracy is conceived of as ethnic majorities. The celebration of diversity under the regime of emancipatory politics will negate this and allow Africans to benefit from the strength of diversity. The recent advances in genetic engineering and the genome project have refocused our attention on the importance of diversity. It is in this sense that African women's theories of a new mode of politics and democracy represent a step beyond xenophobia and the incitement to hatred that has marked the old politics of Africa since colonialism (McFadden, 1998).

Throughout the African continent, organized women at the grassroots and in the movement for social and economic rights have rendered irrelevant the colonial strictures that legally defined them as sub-citizens and subservient to men. Through their militant struggles some states are changing the most oppressive laws relating to the status of women despite the fact that the domination of women may still prevail under the guise of tradition. Yet, in day-to-day life it is women, especially from the working classes (poor peasants,

traders, poor farmers, student, healers and spiritual intercessors) who keep society together. Through songs, dance, music and other forms of expression women seek to give voice to the quest for a new mode of politics; they create new sites of politics in the community and in the family. The politicians often seek to co-opt the militancy of women; one can see this in the efforts among current governments to co-opt sections of women and direct their voices into legitimizing their rule. In opposition to this tendency, the theory of emancipatory politics sharpens the question of the place of women in the struggle for democracy and squarely focuses the issue of social emancipation on the urgency for women to rise to citizenship.

Globalization and the New African Voices

One of the positive aspects of globalization and the communications revolution has been the attempt by African youth to seek new forms of expression to oppose the crudeness and barbarity of the system. In the midst of attempts to dehumanize the African, cultural artists from all sections of the pan-African world have created new forms of expression with differing musical instruments and musical sounds. From the music and songs of Hugh Masakela and Miriam Makeba to the various forms of musical presentation under apartheid the peoples of South Africa were able to fashion a weapon of struggle against apartheid that could not be controlled. African Music of all forms and a brand of dance called *toyi toyi* defined the resilience of the people.²²

Since the end of apartheid this tradition of cultural outpourings has boomed as the repression and violence forced alternative forms of expression. Significantly, it was in Zimbabwe when the liberation project had turned into its opposites where the cultural leaders such as Thomas Mapfumo and Oliver Mtukudzi emerged as rallying points for an alternative vision of liberation.²³ Whether in the Afro-beat of Ransome Kuti (father and son) in West Africa or in the Kwasa Kwasa music of Central Africa new songs of freedom have soared across the air drowning out the praise songs and propaganda that emanate from elected dictators. These songs of freedom connect to the progressive aspects of the hip hop nation and the reggae of emancipation and dignity.

Music and song play a pivotal role in the struggle for renewal and for emancipation in Africa. African youth combine both the traditions of their communities with a new African hip hop to expose the hypocrisy and contradictions of the system and the alienating conditions of urban life. They are able to spread the ideas of resistance around the world and creatively use the advances in technology to give meaning to their creativity. The call by Bob Marley for cultural liberation and emancipation was a manifestation of the resistance by the oppressed and the search for new modes of expression and organization. African cultural artists use the media and the global communications technology to inspire the masses to resist the commodity fetishism of global capitalist culture. Cultural artists such as Lauryn Hill have carried forward the traditions of Bob Marley, enriching the call for emancipation with the insights of a young woman seeking to celebrate black motherhood, and reject crude materialism as well as the commodification of sex. In claiming cultural leadership in a period of global racist onslaught against the African people, these cultural artists have opened new sites of politics in support of the struggles of the African people.

The philosophical contributions of cultural leaders and poets complement the articulation of the principles of emancipatory politics for the freedom and transformation of the continent. The information revolution has served to rehabilitate oratory and the democratic practices of the oral traditions as the youth seize new spaces to let their voices heard. This same information revolution has opened the most profound possibilities for communication, education, politics, commerce as well as new forms of leisure, all of which interrogate the ways African states have been integrated into the global system.

Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, I brought attention to the traditions of genocide and genocidal politics in Africa. In the process this chapter sought to rethink the definition of the tasks of decolonization which for the assimilated intellectuals were nation building, economic integration, democratization and regional integration. These intellectuals had premised such tasks on the European mode of economic organization and in general on the principles of

modernization and the capitalist mode of production. It is for this reason that the very same intellectuals speak of the exhaustion of the liberation process without recognizing the episodic nature of the struggle for emancipation. The end of apartheid was therefore not a concession but a crucial moment in the fight for total emancipation. In this struggle, one of the fundamental questions is how to restore the humanity of Africans, and requires a confrontation with the history of genocide and genocidal ideas.

Genocidal economics and the looting of African natural and human resources have led to the devaluation of life. Health challenges such as the millions dying from preventable diseases along with the emergence of new viruses has placed the question of care at the forefront of economic thinking. African feminists have been able to penetrate the globalization of apartheid to illuminate all of the present features of the unequal access to health and to care in the conditions of *Medical Apartheid*. The very same ideas of private wealth and liberalization reproduce the unequal access to water, sanitation and educational services. Our analysis sought to draw from the positive lessons of Ujamaa and ubuntu to draw out the positive elements from the African past. As Walter Rodney correctly noted,

*“A People’s consciousness is heightened by knowledge of the dignity and determination of their foreparents. Indeed, the African worldview regarding ancestors as an integral part of the living community makes it much easier to identify a given generation with the struggles of an earlier generation.”*²⁴

Fundamental to this knowledge of dignity and determination is the use of memory. The colonial educational system sought to erase this memory of freedom and African dignity but this memory was preserved and in the words of Amílcar Cabral waiting the moment for true germination. Memory is a central aspect of African fractals and one of the core concepts of fractal thinking is recursion. Recursion provides the basis for self reference. The element of memory is also a key mechanism of complex theory and is also what a self-organising system uses during the feedback loops (process). Thus

concepts of self organization and self emancipation flow directly from the emancipatory processes that are emerging in the response to the present period of globalization.

Emancipatory politics require a high level of intentionality. As such, self emancipation depends on human agency or will. In short the renewed human spirit. This highlights the central role of all human beings in forging peace and reconstruction, not just as individuals but in community. Renewal therefore requires a break with the old in order for new relations to emerge. This requires intentional and conscious organization for a new mode of politics and economics.

African conceptions of intentionality apply to group projects over several generations. From this it can be understood that the break that was called for by Fanon cannot be grasped as an event but as a process embracing the positive elements of what had been achieved by the ancestors. The African peoples are watching the present leadership and are fully aware of the balance of forces in world politics. The creativity and independence of the masses remain suppressed because the state structures criminalize creativity and self-determination. In many ways, the African peoples are falling back on their knowledge and languages to resist the rapacious nature of globalization and internal colonialism. One scholar (Samir Amin, 1999) captures the rapacious nature of global capitalism in this way:

There is the attempt to submit the whole of human activity to the market and the rule of profit. No sphere can escape this process, neither the protection of privacy, nor the right to breathe unpolluted air, nor the use of human genes. Everything can become a commodity, including spirituality, and enter the circuit of capital in order to be made profitable. The goal is that of granting totalitarian control over biological life and development.

The struggle against making spirituality a commodity or a technological instrument is now a major area of contestation in Africa. This is the spirituality

that is not directly inspired by scriptures or holy texts. Eusi Kwayana (1993) spoke of this spirituality in the following words.

... the spirituality of a people speaks about those strengths of a people which cannot be destroyed, worn out, assassinated or eliminated by other means. It is the reservoir that is closest to the mind and interflows with it, giving and receiving. In domestic, political and social life, it is the extent to which individuals and the community make and sustain an option for virtue rather than vice, purity rather than perversion, justice rather than injustice, freedom rather than oppression, plenty rather than poverty, and work for the future of universal love rather than universal greed. The spiritual dimension therefore permeates life and is as relevant in politics as it is in domestic life and the moral sense of a people. Spiritual health reinforces public or political morality. Spiritual health becomes diseased by intolerance without agonizing and resistance of injustice, racism, gender oppression, ignorance, corruption and all other forms of wrong, and what is not so well understood, disrespect, not only for elders, but equally of youth.²⁵

In this essay I have argued that the ideation system of the enlightenment and the forms of hierarchy of the capitalist system have polluted the spiritual health of Africa. Genocide and genocidal violence by both the colonizers and by Africa's ruling class have brought home the ways in which African lives are devalued. The struggle for renewal is a struggle for a new mode of politics and a new mode of economic organization that will validate humanity of the African. The overwhelming evidence of the need for renewal, the philosophical limits of our conceptions, are brought back to us daily as the raw barbarism of capitalism destroys African lives. The search for renewal is the search for a new theory on the way forward.

Surely, the form that the new social system will take cannot be predetermined; it will rise from the daily struggles of the masses to create a new form of organizing human life that places human beings before profit. In this sense, Africans at home and abroad are a central force in the fight against capitalist globalization. The history of pan-African revolts in spiritual, political and military forms present concrete lessons on the basis of which to move from resistance to the forefront of the struggle for the renewal of Africa, and indeed of all human beings.

Notes

- ¹ Caroline Elkins., (2005)
- ² Americo Boavida (1972 and Adam Hochschild (1997)
- ³ See Mohammed Khalil (1995) and Vandina Shiva (1997).
- ⁴ Amin, Samir, (2004)
- ⁵ Sen, Amartya (2002)
- ⁶ Kaplan, Robert D (2005)
- ⁷ Cooper, Robert 2002
- ⁸ Soros, George (2008)
- ⁹ Juma, Calestous (1989)
- ¹⁰ Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
- ¹¹ Amin, Samir (2004) page 34
- ¹² Daley, Patricia, (2008) page 9
- ¹³ Harvey, David, (1996) pages 35-367
- ¹⁴ Okonta, Ike and Douglas, Oronto (2001)
- ¹⁵ Tandon, Yash (2004)
- ¹⁶ Ndikumana, Léonce &. Boyce, James K (2008)
- ¹⁷ Robinson, Cedric (2000)
- ¹⁸ Some, Malidoma Patrice (1999)
- ¹⁹ Zohar, Danah and Marshall, Ian (1993)
- ²⁰ Bond, Patrick (2004)
- ²¹ Campbell, Horace (2003)
- ²² Masakela, Hugh (2004)
- ²³ Palmberg, Mai (2004)
- ²⁴ Rodney, Walter (1986)

²⁵ Kwayana, Eusi (1993)

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ABOUT THE BOOK

This anthology is about globalization and what it means for Africa. For Africa, globalization is a counter-revolutionary movement that is stalling the drive of the continent's societies to transform themselves into developed and prosperous entities - just as slavery and colonialism did. It impinges adversely on various aspects of Africa's existence - its economy, society, politics and culture; it impacts negatively on its present and its future. It pulls the continent into a vortex where it encounters modernity on the terms of the developed west, and compels it to contend with global forces from a weak position. Unless revolutionary steps are taken, including political-economic integration under the aegis of a strong state and strong elites, to counter the challenges posed by this modernity, the continent will remain in trusteeship to the developed west.

"This book is accessible and will be of interest to general readers interested in globalization in general and Africa in particular. It could also be used as a text in undergraduate classes on globalization and Africa in globalization studies, development studies, African studies, sociology, international relations and political science. At the graduate level it would be a good background reader."

— *Anonymous Reviewer*

"As the editor emphasizes in this proposal, literature on globalization and Africa - especially as written by African scholars - is quite limited. Most research on globalization mainly addresses conditions in the global north and is also undertaken by academics based in Europe and North America. As a result, circumstances in Africa often obtain scarce attention in globalization studies, and researchers in Africa tend to be marginalized. This collection of essays gives voice to eleven African thinkers on globalization. The contributions to the volume are admirably multi-disciplinary and nicely provide historical, political-economic, and cultural-sociological perspectives... Some of the chapters address questions that have had little attention elsewhere in the literature, such as globalization-regionalization links in Africa and connections between globalization and patriarchy in Africa." — *Anonymous Reviewer*

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